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Summary 	  	  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the influence of individual differences 
and the nature of the information presented to readers on emotion inferences in text 
comprehension, in particular on the specificity of these emotion inferences. Research on 
emotion inferences has led some researchers to suggest that emotion inferences made 
during reading are specific (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992) whereas others (e.g., Gygax 
et al., 2007) proposed that readers do not need to elaborate a complex representation of 
emotions but preferentially infer some components of emotion (like behavioral 
information), stereotypical of emotion responses.  
The present thesis investigated the conditions under which readers may go 
further than the component level and reach complex emotion representations. Results 
presented in Chapter 3 demonstrate that top-down processes related to readers’ 
individual differences (i.e., empathy and working memory) or to reading strategies (i.e., 
simulation, elaboration time) do not fully explain the under-specificity of emotion 
inferences found in previous research (e.g., Gygax et al., 2003, 2004; Molinari et al., 
2009).  
However, bottom-up processes, examined in the second part of the thesis, in 
terms of the relevancy of emotion information (i.e., emotion components) conveyed in 
the narratives, better account for the specificity of emotion inferences. To investigate 
this issue, an optimal congruent vs. moderate congruent paradigm (as opposed to the 
habitual match vs. mismatch paradigm) was developed. In this new paradigm, the 
emotional content of the narratives was manipulated based on the number of emotion 
components and on their typicality regarding the intended emotion. Chapter 5 presents 
three experiments suggesting that when the narratives convey highly typical emotion 
information, readers are very likely to integrate specific emotion inferences into their 
mental models of the text. When the narratives convey less typical emotion information 
(but still matching the intended emotion), readers may only map the incoming emotion 
information onto their representations of the texts.  
Although highly critical as regard to the materials used in previous studies on 
the matter (e.g., Gygax and colleagues, 2003, 2004 and 2007), this thesis brings further 
support for Gygax et al.’s (2007) claim that emotion inferences are elaborated in a 
	   vi	  
constructive manner. Chapter 5’s experiments actually showed that emotion inferences 
are based on emotion components (as defined in the emotion literature), which are 
activated and integrated incrementally in readers’ mental representations. Importantly 
this thesis shows that a shift of paradigm and an interdisciplinary approach were needed 
to further our understanding of the processes underlying emotion inferences when 
comprehending text.  
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1. Introduction  
 
« So Alice set to work, and very soon finished off the cake. […] Just then her head 
struck against the roof of the hall: in fact she was now more than nine feet high, 
and she at once took up the little golden key and hurried off to the garden door. 
Poor Alice! It was as much as she could do, lying down on one side, to look 
through into the garden with one eye; but to get through was more hopeless than 
ever: she sat down and began to cry again. »  (Lewis Carroll, 1869, p. 16-17) 	  
When reading this passage of Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and even if no 
explicit emotion is attributed to Alice, readers may know that at this moment, Alice is 
desperate of not being able to go through the garden door. This additional information, 
called an inference, can be deduced based on the information collected in the text and 
on general knowledge of the world. By combining inferences and explicit elements of 
the text, readers construct mental representations of the text that allow them to 
comprehend the situation portrayed in and between the lines (Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1988).  
Inferences are made in order to connect adjacent or distant parts of the text and 
are related to various aspects of it such as referents of nouns or pronouns in sentences 
(e.g., Garrod & Sanford, 1985), spatial relationships between objects (e.g., Glenberg, 
Meyer, & Lindem, 1987) or temporal relations (e.g., Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 
1983). Importantly, the mental representations of a text are elaborated in an incremental 
way (Garnham & Oakhill, 1996), by adding new information and making new 
inferences as the text unfolds, thus confronting the readers to an increasing number of 
possible inferences. As the readers’ processing capacities are finite (van den Broek, 
Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999), not all inferences can be drawn online (i.e., 
during the course of comprehension) and only some of them are generated during 
reading.  
This thesis focuses on the online construction of emotion inferences, which 
correspond to the deduction of the protagonist’s emotion in the situation portrayed by 
the text. Importantly, emotion inferences relate to the cognitive representations of the 
protagonist’s emotion and not to the emotion felt by the readers during reading, 
Introduction 
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although this felt emotion may play some role in the comprehension of the fictional 
characters’ state (as will be discussed later).  
The generation of emotion inferences during reading has been debated in the 
literature as well as the extent to which readers include a specific emotion word in their 
representations of the text. Regarding Alice in Wonderland’s passage for example, it 
may be possible that readers infer Alice’s emotions during reading, but it may also be 
possible that they do not need to infer her emotion, as some emotional cues (e.g., sat 
down, began to cry) are already given in the text and are maybe sufficient for 
comprehension. If, after all, readers infer an emotion and attribute it to Alice, the 
question of interest regards the specificity of the emotion label included in their mental 
representations (i.e., a specific emotion such as sad or desperate or a broader emotional 
feeling such as being in a bad state). 
The first issue (i.e., the online deduction of emotion inference) directly relates to 
the construction of mental representations and to the different models explaining the 
process of comprehending a text. Various studies have showed that readers infer some 
emotion information during reading (e.g., Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertston, 1992; 
de Vega, León, and Díaz, 1996) and this thesis aims at determining the specificity of 
this inference. The view that specific emotion representations can be reached during 
reading has been challenged by previous studies (e.g. Gygax, Garnham, & Oakhill, 
2004; Gygax, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2003) showing that under normal conditions of 
reading, readers do not seem to differentiate between similar emotions. A possible 
explanation for the under-specificity of emotion inferences was proposed by Gygax, 
Tapiero, and Carruzzo (2007). They argued that readers do not need to integrate a 
specific emotion label into their mental representations of the protagonist’s emotion but 
may rather deduce some basic emotion information (e.g., the valence of the emotion or 
typical behavioral response associated with it) shared by different related emotions. In 
this latter case, emotion inferences would neither be specific nor totally unspecific.  
In this thesis, it is first claimed that some individual characteristics may 
influence reading and consequently the elaboration of emotion inferences. If this thesis 
does not aim at investigating the influence of the text on the readers’ emotion 
experience, it may be argued that this emotional experience can modulate the readers’ 
involvement in the narrative and the richness of the constructed mental representations. 
Consequently, the readers’ tendency to transpose themselves in the narrative as well as 
Introduction 
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their empathy capacity may impact their emotion representations. Another individual 
factor that may play some role in inference generation relates to the readers’ processing 
capacities. As comprehension of written texts requires various processing, from the 
decoding of letters, their transposition into words, to the integration of propositions to 
higher representations, some factors such as the readers’ memory capacities may impact 
the elaboration of mental representations. Similarly, the time allocated to readers to 
process the text may have an influence on these high level processes. Experiments 1 and 
2 aimed at investigating the role of these individual factors on the specificity of emotion 
inferences. These experiments’ results did not challenge Gygax et al.’s (2007) findings 
regarding the under-specificity of emotion inferences, but they brought new insight on 
the role played by the individual factors under scrutiny.  
The second part of this thesis investigates the role of the characteristics of the 
experimental material used so far. In text comprehension research, most studies have 
used experimental narratives created by researchers. As will be developed in Chapter 4, 
researchers on emotion inferences may have neglected to consider the nature of emotion 
as defined in emotion research when constructing their experimental narratives. It is 
widely accepted that emotions correspond to reactions to an event, leading to responses 
in the different systems of the organism, those responses being considered as the 
components of emotion (e.g., Davidson, 2003). If Gygax et al. (2007) initiated the idea 
that readers may elaborate emotion inferences by inferring some core emotion 
components in a constructivist manner, the material used in their studies (as well as in 
all other studies) may have failed to assess the importance of those emotion components 
during online inference processing. In addition, the usual paradigm used to study 
inferences (i.e., the match vs. mismatch paradigm described later) might not be 
adequate to study the specificity of emotion inferences. In Chapter 4, a new method to 
construct experimental emotional narratives based on emotion research is described. In 
Chapter 5 and 6, the specificity of emotion inference is investigated with these new 
emotional narratives, using an optimal congruent vs. moderate congruent paradigm. 
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 presented in Chapter 5 revealed that readers, when 
provided with relevant and complete information about the emotion felt by the 
protagonist are very likely to reach specific emotion representations. Moreover, they 
suggest that different processes are in play when reading emotional information in a text 
and that previous research on inferences may have failed to disentangle deep processes 
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of information integration from shallower processes of information mapping. Finally, 
the results support a constructionist view of emotion inference elaboration, based on 
different emotion components identified in emotion research.  
In order to fully comprehend the experimental part of this thesis, the following 
chapter provides the relevant literature background regarding text comprehension, 
emotion inferences and the different factors investigated in this thesis.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
Text comprehension 
 
When comprehending a text, readers elaborate mental representations of the 
situation depicted in the text. Mental representations are composed of different levels of 
text representations, as defined by Kintsch and van Dijk (1978). The primary level 
corresponds to the surface code, with the exact wording and syntax of the sentence. The 
intermediate level, the textbase, is composed of text propositions transmitting the 
meaning of the text but not in the exact words and syntax that readers encountered. The 
higher level, the situation model (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) or mental model (Johnson-
Laird, 1983), includes the explicit information transmitted in the text as well as the 
inferences made based on the readers’ general knowledge (Graesser et al., 1994; 
Kintsch, 1988). The mental model of the text is therefore a representation of what the 
text is about, rather than the text itself. This representation is image-like and has some 
perceptual qualities (Glenberg et al., 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983).   
Importantly, text comprehension follows from the constant interaction between 
the text and the readers’ general knowledge in order to draw relevant inferences as to 
maintain coherence. All models of text comprehension agree on the role played by the 
information transmitted in the text as a source of text processing. Information in the text 
activates associated information in the readers’ knowledge stored in long-term memory. 
As the text is processed, the activation of different concepts in the text and consequently 
in the reader’s memory fluctuates (Graesser et al., 1994).  
The Structure Building Framework (Gernsbacher, 1997) illustrates the cognitive 
processes involved in text comprehension. According to this model, three main 
components play a role in text comprehension: the foundation process, the mapping of 
information and the shifting into another foundation. First, the stimuli coming from the 
text activate memory nodes and form a structure on which, in a second step, the 
subsequent stimuli are mapped if they are coherent with the memory nodes already 
activated. If the incoming information does not activate the same memory nodes, then a 
foundation for a new structure is elaborated. The three components involved in structure 
building are driven by two mechanisms directly linked to the activation of memory 
nodes. When the activation of memory nodes is necessary for the structure being built, a 
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mechanism of enhancement increases the activation of these memory nodes as well as 
the activation of related memory nodes. On the contrary, when the information 
represented by memory nodes is no longer needed for the structure being built, a 
process of suppression diminishes those memory nodes’ activation.   
The possible representations elicited by a given text are infinite, given that they 
may activate numerous memory nodes, in turn depending on readers (and their aim, as 
discussed later). Hence, mental models never contain all possible information about a 
given situation (Garnham, 1992). Consequently, and as introduced before, all possible 
inferences are not made during the course of reading (i.e., online) and some of them are 
only elaborated after the reading is completed (i.e., offline). The different views of text 
comprehension do not present the same predictions regarding the inferences that are 
made online, notably emotion inferences. However, a comprehensive presentation and 
discussion of the different views is not the purpose of this thesis. As will be 
demonstrated later, emotion inferences have been proved to occur during online 
comprehension of the text. For this reason, the following paragraphs only present the 
constructionist view of text comprehension as it enables us to make relatively clear 
predictions as to the online production of emotion inferences.  
 
The constructionist view of text comprehension 
 
According to the constructionist view of text comprehension, readers are not 
passive during reading but are engaged in a search-after-meaning process (Bartlett, 
1932, cited in Graesser et al., 1994). The search-after-meaning process depends on three 
main assumptions. The first assumption concerns the readers’ goal when reading. It is 
assumed that the readers’ goals (e.g., learning, entertainment or aesthetic pleasure) may 
vary depending on the text genre or on the task, hence influencing the resources 
allocated to the different comprehension levels. For example, Schmalhofer and 
Glavanov (1986) asked participants to read a short programmer’s manual in order to 
either briefly summarize it afterwards or perform a knowledge acquisition task. They 
showed that the second group of participants (who were asked to perform the 
knowledge acquisition task) elaborated a more complete situation model than the first 
group, which focused their comprehension on a textbase level.  
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The second assumption states that readers are motivated to construct a mental 
model that reaches coherence at both local and global levels. Coherence on the local 
level is achieved by connecting close constituents of the text whereas coherence on the 
global level requires the connection of distant constituents of the text and depends on 
deeper features. In the Alice in Wonderland’s passage presented earlier, for example, the 
connection between the first two sentences can be made by linguistic cues such as her 
that refers to Alice. Another example of achieving local coherence could come from the 
inference that she is desperate in order to connect the fact that she cannot get through 
the door with the fact that she sits and cries. In this example, the achievement of a 
global level of coherence is of primary importance as it is not a usual thing to grow after 
eating a cake. Nevertheless, by tracking the central theme of the narrative and knowing 
that they are confronted with a fairy tale, readers are able to connect the different pieces 
of information presented in the text. Inferring that Alice is desperate may additionally 
be considered as a way to achieve global coherence by offering a framework into which 
one can understand subsequent actions and event (Graesser et al., 1994). 
The third assumption concerns the readers’ need for explanation when 
processing the different parts of the text. According to this assumption, readers 
constantly try to make sense of the different information transmitted in the text, via the 
use of why-questions. Readers are therefore considered as active when reading.  
However, the search-after-meaning process is not accomplished in all conditions 
of reading. If the text lacks coherence or if the background knowledge necessary to 
understand the content of the text is not accessible to the readers, then it is very likely 
that readers do not engage in the search-after-meaning process. In a similar fashion, if 
the readers’ goal does not require the elaboration of a mental model (for example when 
proofreading a text), the search-after-meaning process is not relevant (Graesser et al., 
1994).   
If the constructionist view of reading generated interesting studies on the content 
of the readers’ representations of text, its structure, or form has never really been 
central. In this thesis, we argue that research on the way information is represented may 
give us some valuable insight into the way emotion inferences are constructed. More 
specifically, we believe that embodied accounts of representations may shed some light 
into emotion inferences. 
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Embodiment and text comprehension 
 
According to the embodied cognition account (Barsalou, 1999b), which might 
be essential when looking at emotion inferences, cognitive processes are not amodal 
(i.e., symbolic) but are grounded in modality-specific systems. This means that when 
experiencing a situation, one captures the perceptual, bodily, motor and introspective 
states related to this situation and stores them as perceptual symbols. Later, when 
accessing knowledge about the situation, one reactivates through simulation these 
perceptual entries previously acquired through experience.  
Embodied accounts of text comprehension assume that when reading, readers 
enter a simulation process in which they put themselves in the protagonist’s shoes and 
in some way experience the situation described in the text (Barsalou, 1999a; Zwaan, 
2004; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006). In other words, readers may be considered as immersed 
experiencers (Zwaan, 2004) who access perceptual and action related representations of 
the described situation. The same neural and bodily systems used for perception and 
action are then used to fully comprehend language (Glenberg, 2011).  
 As an illustration, Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) proposed that amodal 
representations of the sentences The ranger saw an eagle in the sky and The ranger saw 
an eagle in its nest would not totally reflect the readers’ representations. When reading 
the first sentence, readers are very likely to picture the eagle with its wings outstretched. 
This should not be the case when reading the second sentence, as an eagle in the nest 
probably has its wings folded. In order to test this hypothesis, Zwaan et al. (2002) 
presented their participants with sentences implying different shapes of the same object 
(e.g., the eagle’s wings outstretched or folded). After the presentation of the sentences, 
the participants were presented with a picture presenting the object either in the same 
shape as in the sentence or in a different shape. The participants were asked to decide if 
the object on the picture corresponded to the object mentioned in the preceding 
sentence. Zwaan et al.’s (2002) participants were more accurate and faster to recognize 
the pictured object when it was in the same shape as that implied in the sentence 
compared to when it was in a different shape. These results supported the view that 
perceptual information is automatically activated during reading, contradicting accounts 
of amodal representations of the text.  
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There is large evidence supporting the fact that readers include perceptual 
representations in their mental model of the text (for reviews, see Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008; Glenberg, 2007). Crucially, perceptual representations are activated when reading 
not only about performed actions (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 
2006) or perspectives (e.g., Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004) but also about abstract 
concepts such as emotions.  
Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) found that emotion simulation occurs when 
processing emotion related sentences. They presented participants with sentences 
describing a pleasant (e.g., You and your lover embrace after a long separation) or an 
unpleasant event (e.g., Your supervisor frowns as he hands you the sealed envelope) and 
asked them to identify the valence of the sentences. While performing the valence 
identification task, the participants had to hold a pen in their mouth. This manipulation 
developed by Strack, Martin and Stepper (1988) has been proved to induce a negative 
or positive emotional state among the participants according to the position of the pen. 
Holding the pen using only the teeth produces a smile on the participants’ face whereas 
holding it using the teeth and the lips produces a frown. In the smile condition, the 
participants are in a congruent state with the pleasant sentences and in an incongruent 
condition with the unpleasant sentences. That is, the muscles implied in the 
comprehension of pleasant sentences, but not of unpleasant sentences, are the same as 
those activated by the pen (i.e., smile). The reverse is true for the second condition. 
Havas et al. (2007) found that readers were faster to judge the emotional valence of the 
pleasant sentences when they were smiling than when they were prevented to smile and 
vice versa for the unpleasant sentences. More interestingly, in a second experiment, 
Havas et al. (2007) asked the participants to judge if the same sentences were hard or 
easy to understand. By changing the instructions, they wanted to ensure that the 
simulation of the sentence’s content was related to comprehension per se and not to 
other processes potentially coming from the valence judgment task. In this second 
experiment, the results were similar as those found in the first experiment. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in two further experiments, the pen manipulation had no impact on a 
word-to-word priming task. In all, Havas et al.’s (2007) results strongly suggest that 
emotion simulation is involved in the comprehension of emotion-related language. 
Crucially, this simulation occurs at the sentence processing level and is not directly 
related to the processing of positive or negative isolated valenced words.  
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Embodied accounts of text comprehension offer a framework for the processes 
at play when elaborating mental representations of the text and also more specifically 
when comprehending texts involving emotional information. Although these accounts 
are receiving increased attention in the study of emotion language at the lexical or 
sentence level, they have received little consideration in the study of emotion language 
at the discourse level. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 partly aim at rectifying this predicament by 
examining the detailed processes at stake in the representation of emotion during text 
(i.e., narratives) comprehension.  
Fundamentally, embodied accounts of cognition, as well as the aforementioned 
constructionist view of text comprehension, assume that readers track the protagonist’s 
emotion during reading. Before describing the experimental findings supporting this 
assumption, however, one critical issue related to the link between emotion and text 
comprehension needs to be addressed briefly: the role of tracking emotion in text 
processing (i.e., why would we need to infer emotions).  
 
Emotion in text comprehension 
 
Emotion is considered to have a special importance in text comprehension. 
Supporting this claim, Miall (1988) showed that sentences mentioning affective states 
are generally judged as more important than other sentences and elicit more motivation 
for readers to process the text. This special status may follow the idea that readers keep 
track of the protagonist’s emotion during reading in order to draw a coherent model of 
the text regarding spatiality, causality and temporality (Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 
1995). When processing a text, people are likely to rely on their usual mode of 
understanding social situations and events (Miall, 1988). That is, relying on the 
characters’ emotional state offers a framework to interpret their goals and actions, 
which are central in the construction of text representations (Graesser et al., 1994).  
In addition, emotion monopolizes the readers’ attention and consequently 
motivates them to focus on the link between actions and expected or especially 
unexpected results (Oatley, 1999). In this sense, representing the protagonist’s emotion1 
could play a central role in text comprehension by focusing the reader’s attention on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that some authors (e.g., Miall, 1988 ; Oatley, 1999) were not always clear as to the 
difference between representing and feeling the emotion. 
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certain types of information. Therefore emotion may support deep cognitive processes 
needed to resolve ambiguity when the text may lack coherence (Kneepkens & Zwaan, 
1994). 
 Given the apparent primary importance of the emotional content in text 
comprehension, relying on emotional cues during reading and hence elaborating a 
representation of the emotion depicted in the text should be quite automatic. The 
following paragraphs describe the research background related to emotion inferences 
before presenting the issues linked to the processes underlying emotion comprehension.  
 
Activation of emotional knowledge during reading 
 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) were the first to investigate if emotion inferences were 
part of the readers’ mental model of the text. They presented participants with short 
narratives depicting one protagonist involved in a situation with another character. 
Table 1 presents an example of Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) narratives. The described 
situation was intended to elicit an emotion in the protagonist. Crucially, the emotion felt 
by the protagonist of the narrative was not made explicit in the text but was implied by 
the context. All narratives ended with a target sentence mentioning either the intended 
emotion or a mismatching emotion. In Experiment 1, the matching emotion words were 
paired with their perceived complementary opposite, resulting in 12 emotional pairs 
(e.g., sad-joyful, guilty-proud, callous-caring). The matching and mismatching emotion 
words differed in valence but were similar along other dimensions described by Frijda 
(1986) (e.g., intensity, duration, relevance to self versus others).  
 
TABLE 1. Example narrative and target sentences in Gernsbacher et al. (1992). 
Joe worked at the local 7-11, to get spending money while in school. One night, his 
best friend, Tom, came in to buy a soda. Joe needed to go back to the storage room 
for a second. While he was away, Tom noticed the cash register was open. From the 
open drawer Tom quickly took a ten dollar bill. Later that week, Tom learned that 
Joe had been fired from the 7-11 because his cash had been low one night. 
Matching target sentence: It would be weeks before Tom’s guilt would subside. 
Mismatching target sentence: It would be weeks before Tom’s pride would subside.  
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The participants were asked to read the narratives at their own pace. The reading 
times of the target sentences were recorded and compared between the two conditions 
(matching vs. mismatching). The idea behind this paradigm is that the reading time 
mirrors the closeness between the content of the readers’ mental model and the content 
of the sentence. In other words, if readers have previously inferred some emotional 
information on the basis of the narrative, they should read the matching target sentence 
faster than the mismatching target sentence. This is exactly the pattern of results found 
by Gernsbacher et al. (1992) in Experiment 1. These results support the view that some 
emotional information is included in the readers’ mental model.  
However, as stressed by the authors, it may be possible that readers do not infer 
the protagonist’ emotion but rather infer a positive or negative affect related to the 
protagonist. To rule out this interpretation of Experiment 1’s results, Gernsbacher et al., 
in Experiment 2, presented their participants with the same narratives as in Experiment 
1 and changed the emotion words presented in the mismatching target sentences. 
Instead of manipulating the emotional valence, they chose emotions of the same valence 
as the target emotion but unlikely to occur in the situation portrayed in the narrative 
(e.g., sad-envious, guilty-shy, callous-desperate). The results showed that readers were 
still faster to read the matching target sentences than the mismatching ones, and if the 
difference between the two conditions was less important than in Experiment 1, it still 
permitted to conclude that emotion inferences are not just based on emotional valence.  
In Experiment 3, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) raised some methodological issues 
related to the self-pace reading paradigm used in their first two experiments. They 
claimed that presenting readers with a target sentence containing the intended emotion 
may trigger an inference that had not been reached yet. In other words, it is possible that 
readers do not represent the protagonist’s emotion during reading but only when they 
are forced to (i.e., when they encounter the target sentence). In the latter case, the 
reading times associated with the target sentence would mirror the ease of mapping the 
incoming information. Gernsbacher et al. used a naming task in order to test this 
hypothesis. This task simply consists of pronouncing a target word as fast as possible. It 
has been proposed that this kind of task only mirrors what is already activated in the 
reader’s representation and not the ease of information mapping (Potts, Keenan, & 
Golding, 1988). Participants of this experiment read the same narratives as in previous 
experiments but were not presented with the target sentences. Instead, they had to 
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pronounce test words as fast as possible (one test word after each narrative). The test 
words were the same emotion words as in Experiment 1 and appeared at the end of the 
narrative, either matching or mismatching the protagonist’s emotion. The results of the 
naming task were similar to the results found in previous experiments. The participants 
pronounced the target emotion faster when it matched than when it mismatched the 
intended emotion. In all, these experiments of Gernsbacher et al. (1992) support the 
claim that readers activate knowledge about emotions when reading and that this 
activation stimulates them to infer the protagonist’s emotion. In addition, Gernsbacher 
et al. (1992) demonstrated that readers infer more than just valence.  
In a further study, Gernsbacher, Hallada, and Robertson (1998) investigated the 
automaticity of these emotion inferences. They argued that if emotion inferences are 
automatic and consequently drawn without cognitive effort, their elaboration should not 
be impaired by a concurrent task to reading. In order to test this hypothesis, they 
presented participants with the original narratives described above and asked them to 
perform a concurrent attention task in parallel to the reading task. In the first 
experiment, the participants performed a tone-identification task (i.e., determine 
whether the majority of five tones corresponded to high or low pitched tones). The 
results revealed that the participants slowed their reading times when performing the 
concurrent task, which can be considered as evidence for the participants’ divided 
attention. Regarding the inference processes, the difference in reading times between 
the matching and the mismatching conditions replicated previous findings. Interestingly 
though, the difference between the reading times of the matching and mismatching 
sentences was smaller during the concurrent task. Although this effect did not reach 
significance, it still hinted that diminishing the processing resources attributed to 
reading comprehension may affect the construction of emotion inferences. In this first 
experiment, the concurrent task may have been too easy to demonstrate this effect. 
In their second experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1998) used a memory-load task, 
which is more demanding than the tone-identification task. While reading the narrative, 
the participants had to remember four consonants presented at the beginning of each 
sentence and verify if a string of four consonants presented at the end of the sentence 
matched the ones to be remembered. The participants still read the matching target 
sentences faster than the mismatching ones. Gernsbacher et al. (1998) interpreted these 
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results as support for the automaticity of emotion inferences, since their elaboration was 
again not (significantly) disrupted by a concurrent attention task. 
In their third experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1998) enhanced the level of 
attention required by the concurrent task in order to ensure that the automaticity of 
emotion inferences demonstrated so far still remained under a high memory-load task. 
This time, they presented the participants with one consonant at four random points of 
the narrative. While reading the narratives, the participants had to keep the consonants 
in memory and determine at the end of the narratives if a sequence of consonants 
matched the one they had to remember. As in the two previous experiments, the reading 
times of the matching target sentences were faster than the reading times of the 
mismatching target sentences.  
In their final experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1998) directly assessed the 
accessibility of readers’ knowledge about the emotional state of the protagonist. They 
proposed to compare the processing of the target sentences in two conditions. In the 
first condition, the narratives were the same as in previous experiments: they implied 
that the protagonist was feeling an emotion but did not specify this emotion. In the 
second condition, the narratives explicitly stated the emotion felt by the protagonist. 
This information was included in an additional sentence put at the beginning of the 
narratives. Hence, in this second condition, readers knew the emotional state of the 
protagonist before reading all the narrative. If emotional knowledge is automatically 
activated during reading, the target sentences in the first condition should show the 
same match-mismatch effect as the target sentences in the second condition. This 
hypothesis was confirmed by the results, which was also revealed previously that the 
matching target sentences were read faster than the mismatching ones in both 
conditions. Crucially, there was no main effect or interaction effect in relation with the 
implicit-explicit manipulation. In all, Gernsbacher et al. (1998) completed the findings 
regarding emotion inferences by demonstrating that this kind of inferences is likely to 
be made in an automatic manner during reading.  
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Updating emotion representations during reading 
 
Following Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) primary results on the representations of 
emotion during reading, de Vega et al. (1996) investigated the readers’ capacity to 
update their representations of the protagonist’s emotion in response to a change of 
context at some point of the narrative.  
De Vega et al. (1996) presented their participants with short narratives 
describing a situation intended to induce a mental representation of the protagonist’s 
emotion. The short narratives were divided into two parts, each followed by a target 
sentence containing a matching or a mismatching emotion term. In the cumulative 
context condition, the first part of the narrative induced the representation of the 
protagonist’s emotion and the second part of the narrative conveyed information 
strengthening this representation. In the shifting context condition, the second part of 
the narrative was incongruent with the emotion induced in the first part and conveyed 
information about the opposite emotion. In this case, the matching emotion term 
corresponding to the first part of the narrative was mismatching the second part of the 
narrative. As in previously presented studies, de Vega et al. (1996) focused on the 
reading times of the target sentences. In the cumulative context condition, the 
participants were faster to read the matching target sentences than the mismatching 
ones. Moreover, the match-mismatch effect was greater for the target sentences 
following the second part of the text than for the target sentences appearing before the 
second part, suggesting that increasing contextual information related to emotion 
facilitates the accessibility of the described emotion. In the shifting context condition, 
the matching target sentences were read faster than the mismatching ones when they 
followed the first part of the narrative. This effect was reversed for the target sentences 
appearing after the context shifted. This meant that readers were able to update their 
mental representations of the protagonist’s emotion regarding the information conveyed 
in the narrative. 
In an additional experiment, de Vega et al. (1996) controlled for what they 
called the local context hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the reverse mismatch 
effect found in the shifting condition may result from working memory limits rather 
than from the updating of the readers’ representation. It may be possible that readers did 
not have access to the first representation because this representation may have 
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vanished as readers processed the second part of the text. In order to test this 
hypothesis, de Vega et al. (1996) included neutral sentences (i.e., not conveying any 
emotional information) after the first (emotion conveying) part of the narratives, before 
the target sentences. The second part of the narratives used in Experiment 1 was 
excluded from the narratives in this experiment. If the local context hypothesis were 
true, no mismatch effect should occur for the target sentences following the filler part 
(i.e., neutral sentences). Contrary to this prediction, the matching target sentences were 
read faster than the mismatching ones.  
In their last experiment, de Vega et al. (1996) found that representations of the 
protagonist’s emotion are elaborated even in the absence of explicit emotion terms. In 
this last experiment, the same narratives as in Experiment 2 were used. The target 
sentences explicitly stating the character’s emotion were replaced by sentences 
mentioning overt behaviors, matching or mismatching the intended emotion. The same 
pattern of results as in previous experiments was found, namely in that the matching 
target sentences were processed faster than the mismatching ones.  
 
The specificity of emotion inferences 
 
As presented above, Gernsbacher and colleagues’ as well as de Vega et al.’s 
findings suggest that readers track the protagonist’s emotions when constructing mental 
models of the situation pictured in the text. In other words, readers infer the 
protagonist’s emotions. In addition, they are able to modify this representation and 
adapt it to the shifts of context occurring in the text. However, the extent to which 
readers include a specific word such as compassion or hate in their mental models of 
the text remains unclear. This line of research was initiated by Gygax et al. (2003) who 
focused on the readers’ ability to infer a specific emotion during online comprehension.  
Gygax et al. (2003) actually proposed that readers infer some general 
information shared by different emotions when reading an emotional narrative. In an 
offline experiment, the participants were presented with Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) 
narratives (without the target sentences) and had to generate words to complete the 
following last sentence: [Main character] felt … The participants generated a great 
amount of different answers for each narrative. This suggested that a narrative intended 
to induce a certain emotion is compatible with different emotion labels, some of them 
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not being synonymous. In their second experiment, Gygax et al. (2003) investigated if 
readers considered that different emotions were likely to be felt by the protagonist of 
Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) narratives. The participants were asked to read the same 
narratives as above and judge the likelihood of several emotion terms. These terms were 
the intended emotion term investigated by Gernsbacher et al. (1992), eight terms chosen 
among the most mentioned terms in the preceding experiment and three terms 
corresponding to opposite emotions. The results showed that for each narrative at least 
three emotion terms were likely to correspond to the protagonist’s emotion.  
In their last experiment, Gygax et al. (2003) investigated the reading time 
patterns associated with the different emotion terms. They manipulated the emotion 
word presented in the target sentences at the end of the narratives. The first emotion 
word (Matching) corresponded to the original emotion of Gernsbacher et al. (1992) 
(e.g., depressed). The second emotion word (Matching Synonym) was a synonym of the 
original emotion (e.g., miserable). The third emotion word (Matching Similar) shared 
valence and several other components with the original emotion without being 
synonymous to it (e.g., useless). The last emotion word was the perceived opposite of 
the matching emotion (e.g., happy). When comparing the reading times of the different 
target sentences, the authors found that the matching, matching synonym and matching 
similar target sentences were read faster than the mismatching target sentences. 
However, no difference between the different matching conditions was demonstrated, 
supporting Gygax et al.’s (2003) claim that readers do not differentiate between similar 
emotions during reading.  
Gygax et al. (2004) explored possible conditions under which a specific emotion 
may be inferred. They first proposed that the content of the emotional narratives used in 
previous research may have not been sufficient to activate the different components of 
emotion needed to reach a specific emotion representation. As will be developed further 
in this thesis, emotions are traditionally considered as being constituted of different 
components. Although most theorists agree with a componential definition of emotion, 
the number of components is still a matter of debate. However, three components mark 
a consensus among theorists: physiological arousal, motor expression and subjective 
feeling. Moreover, dimensional theories of emotions suggest that emotions are 
composed of different general dimensions. The number and the nature of those 
dimensions are variable but all models agree to include evaluation-pleasantness and 
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activation-arousal as two essential dimensions (Fontaine et al., 2007; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; Russell, 1980). In addition to this first 
claim, Gygax et al. (2004) argued that the lack of emotion components in the 
experimental narratives may also have impaired simulation processes at stake during 
reading, in reason of inappropriate context information.  
In order to resolve this issue (i.e., the lack of emotion information in the 
narratives), Gygax et al. (2004) focused on the length of the experimental narratives. 
They doubled the number of sentences of each emotional narrative. In an offline 
completion task, they presented the participants with the same four different emotion 
words as in Gygax et al.’s (2003) third experiment and asked them to choose the most 
appropriate emotion. They found a higher agreement regarding the intended emotion 
term in the long version of the narratives (63%) than in the short versions (49%). This 
result supported their hypothesis that the under-specificity of emotion inferences may 
result from insufficient emotion context. However, when testing the online elaboration 
of emotion inferences with the long version of the narratives, the results were exactly 
the same as in Gygax et al. (2003). That is, if the matching, matching synonym and 
matching similar target sentences were read faster than the mismatching sentences, 
there was again no difference in the reading times of the target sentences between the 
different matching conditions.  
In a second experiment, Gygax et al. (2004) tried to compel the readers to draw 
specific emotion inferences. They based their hypothesis on the why-questions 
described by the constructionist view of text comprehension as one of the conditions to 
establish text coherence. As a reminder, the readers generally attempt to maintain local 
and global coherence and therefore try to answer why-questions throughout the text. By 
altering their narratives and rendering the emotion inferences necessary to establish 
local coherence, Gygax et al. (2004) forced the readers to put more effort in the 
resolution of the why-questions that may be at the basis of emotion inferences. Similar 
to the offline results found with the longer narratives, the ambiguous narratives elicited 
a higher consensus concerning the intended emotion (62%) than the original narratives. 
However, testing the specificity of online emotion inferences with the ambiguous 
version of the narratives did not change the reading patterns showed in previous studies.  
In the aforementioned studies, Gygax and colleagues claimed that readers do not 
reach a specific emotion representation during reading. They argued that instead of 
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inferring an emotion per se, readers may infer some core components of this emotion 
that can be shared by similar emotions. In other words, the lack of difference between 
the different matching conditions may result from the fact that readers included some 
stereotypical information (e.g., the valence of the emotion or a behavior associated to it) 
in their mental models of the text but did not need to infer a specific emotion word. 
Gygax et al. (2007) further developed this idea and focused on the behavior 
associated to the emotion as a possible representative of stereotypical information 
related to the emotion. They added two target sentences based on a typical behavioral 
reaction to the emotion target sentences. For example, a typical behavioral reaction for 
anger could be to clench one’s fist. They hypothesized that if readers include such 
stereotypical information in their mental representations of the text, the mismatch effect 
linked to behavioral sentences might be more important than the mismatch effect linked 
to emotional sentences. In addition, they discussed the interpretation of the mismatch 
effect usually considered as an indicator of an inference to be drawn. When considering 
Gygax et al.’s (2004) results, it appears that the reading times of the matching sentences 
in the different conditions were significantly different from the reading times of the 
mismatching sentences. However, given the fact that the reading times of the different 
matching sentences were not different, the authors concluded that no specific emotion 
inferences had been made. This can appear quite contradictory, as the same difference 
may be interpreted as mirroring specific or non specific emotion. Gygax et al. (2007) 
argued that a mismatch effect might mirror not only an inference process but also a 
mapping process. That is, as long as the incoming information does not contradict 
readers’ current mental representations, it can quite easily be integrated in these 
representations. In order to control for what they called the context integration effect, 
Gygax et al. (2007) included a control condition in their experimental material. In this 
control condition, the second sentence of some filler narratives was manipulated so as to 
convey easy-to-map information or unexpected information. For example, the first 
sentence of the narrative described a girl going to the gym. The following sentence in 
the easy-to-map condition explained that this girl enjoyed the time spent at the gym. In 
the unexpected condition, the second sentence stated that she did not like going to the 
gym. At this stage of reading, it is very unlikely that readers have entered a process of 
inference. Consequently, any difference in the reading times of the context matching 
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and context mismatching sentences would reflect a context integration process rather 
than an inference process. 
Gygax et al.’s (2007) found that readers were faster to read the matching target 
sentences than the mismatching ones in all conditions. However and most importantly, 
the mismatch effect linked to the behavioral sentences was greater than that related to 
the control sentences, which in turn was no different to the mismatch effect linked to the 
emotion sentences. These results strongly suggested that readers base their 
representations of the protagonist’s emotions on behavioral information related to 
emotions rather than on emotions per se. Gygax (2010) further showed that behavioral 
inferences related to emotions are not to be confounded with any predictive behavioral 
inferences (i.e., what the protagonist is going to do). In Gygax (2010), readers were 
presented with the same narratives as in Gygax et al. (2007) and with narratives 
intended to activate a predictive inference of the protagonist’s behavior. These last 
narratives did not transmit emotional information and highly encouraged the readers to 
infer the protagonist’s behavior (e.g., picking a shiny coin on the floor). Like the 
emotional narratives, these narratives ended with a matching behavior sentence or a 
mismatching behavior sentence. When comparing the difference in the reading times of 
the matching and mismatching target sentences, this difference was higher in the 
emotional behavior than in the behavior condition, supporting the claim that processing 
behavioral information related to emotion was different than processing behavioral 
information in general. 
According to these results, specific emotion inferences seem not to be needed 
during online comprehension. Nevertheless, this does not mean that readers do not 
include some kind of information related to the protagonist’s emotion during reading 
but it suggests that emotion information might be better thought in terms of 
stereotypical reactions than in terms of a specific emotion word, supporting the idea that 
text comprehension might be based on good-enough representations (Ferreira, Bailey, & 
Ferraro, 2002). That is, the readers’ representations might not be detailed enough to 
differentiate between similar emotions but may be detailed enough to reach a totally 
satisfying comprehension.  
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Factors potentially influencing emotion inferences 
 
The literature review of the previous research of emotion inferences suggests 
that, generally, readers do not include a specific emotion representation in their mental 
models of the text. However, it may be the case that under certain circumstances, 
readers reach specific representations of the protagonist’s emotion. This thesis aims at 
investigating those conditions under which emotion inferences may be specific.  
 
Empathy and simulation 
The first factor that may influence emotion inferences directly relates to the 
processes readers undertake to understand the protagonist’s emotion. Different 
explanations have been proposed regarding how readers comprehend this emotion, in 
regard to their personal involvement.  
According to Oatley (1999), comprehending fictional emotions can result from 
different processes. The first process, termed identification, assumes that readers 
identify with the character and adopt their goals and plans during reading. As a result, 
they comprehend the protagonist’s emotions when their goals and plans are achieved or 
missed. The second process refers to the readers’ sympathy for the character and states 
that readers attribute emotions to the characters and experience sympathetic emotions 
towards them (see also Tan, 1994). The third process is related to autobiographical 
memory. When readers are confronted to fictional events, they may reactivate past 
experiences and emotional states that derived from these experiences, hence 
comprehending the protagonist’s emotion by re-evocating their own emotion. This 
process is similar to Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) explanation for the activation of 
emotional knowledge during reading. Gernsbacher et al. (1992) claimed that when 
participants faced similar situations to the ones described in a narrative, they 
experienced emotional reactions. These emotional reactions became memory traces. 
When reading about similar situations, these memory traces are activated and brought 
upon the processing of the text. Importantly, the three different processes are 
interrelated, sympathy and memories of proper experiences deriving from the readers’ 
identification to the protagonist (Oatley, 1999).  
Besides identification, sympathy and memory activation processes, Goldie 
(1999) assumes that there must be some additional empathic and simulation processes 
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in order to comprehend others’ emotions. These two processes differ in the perspective 
taken by the readers. In Goldie’s terms, empathy involves imagining what emotion a 
situation would elicit in the protagonist from their point of view. In this sense, his 
definition concurs with the Theory of Mind definition. That is, people are able to 
attribute motivations, emotions, actions and thoughts to other people as well as 
reasoning about others’ own mental states (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). When 
empathizing with others, according to Goldie (1999), one keeps an observer position. 
One certainly has to understand what may happen inside the other, but one does not 
transfer their own values, interpretations or feelings to the other.  
Contrary to empathy in which readers keep an external perspective, simulation 
processes require them to take an internal perspective via in-his-shoes imagining. In 
transposing themselves into the other’s shoes, readers put together their own and other’s 
internal feelings (Goldman, 2001). This is not to say that readers confound the 
protagonist’s emotion with their own emotion when reading narratives. De Vega, Díaz 
and León (1997) indeed showed that readers are able to infer the protagonist’s emotion 
by relying on perspective taking and not on their own perspective of the narrative. De 
Vega et al. (1997) manipulated the content of the narrative, by specifying that the 
protagonist was either aware or not aware of an information that may influence his or 
her emotional state. For example, a female protagonist is waiting for her boyfriend to 
come but he does not arrive. The readers then learn that the protagonist knows (or does 
not know in the uninformed condition) that her boyfriend is actually spending time 
playing poker with his friends. In the informed condition, if readers do not take the 
protagonist’s perspective, they should infer that she is furious. However, de Vega et 
al.’s (1997) results revealed that readers consider only the information available to the 
protagonist during reading and infer the protagonist’s emotion by relying on a 
perspective-taking process.  
Simulation processes have also received considerable attention from the 
embodied accounts of comprehension (Barsalou, 1999a, 1999b, Glenberg, 1999). As 
introduced earlier, embodied theories of comprehension consider that simulation of 
action, physiological and subjective states are required to comprehend emotional 
language (e.g., Glenberg, Havas, Becker, & Rinck, 2005). Thus, to understand a 
sentence about, let us say anger, one has to simulate a state of anger, including the 
relevant motor actions (e.g., to clench the fist), physiological reactions (e.g., the heart 
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beating faster) and subjective feelings (e.g., feeling restless). In other words, the core 
component of understanding a narrative describing an emotional situation is the re-
enactment of the described emotion. Very importantly, this re-enactment is rarely a full-
blown, conscious simulation. If it may conduct to changes in the systems of the 
organism implied in simulation, it may also stay at an unconscious level (Barsalou, 
Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003).  
If simulation is quite automatic during reading, Barsalou (1999a) nonetheless 
claimed that varying richness of simulation explains minimal versus rich inferences 
during comprehension. When the reader invests minimal effort to engage in simulation 
processes, the resulting representations may stay at a minimal level. On the contrary, 
when the reader is motivated to construct a detailed simulation, their mental 
representations may contain richer inferences.  
It is important to note that the distinction between empathy and simulation varies 
in the literature. Whereas some authors differentiate the two processes (e.g., Goldie, 
1999), others argue that empathy works through simulation (e.g., Decety & Grèzes, 
2006; Goldman, 2005; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The view that empathy may be 
entirely cognitive has been replaced by an agreement concerning its multifaceted aspect 
(i.e., cognitive and emotional). As a matter of fact, the instruments dedicated to the 
assessment of empathy are based on four complementary facets, i.e., perspective taking, 
fantasy, empathic concern and personal distress.  
In this thesis, both empathy and simulation processes have been investigated 
simultaneously (see Chapter 3). In regard to Gygax et al.’s (2007) results, and assuming 
that readers do not automatically engage in deep simulation processes, compelling them 
to do so may enhance behavioral related inferences. In addition, we hypothesized that 
high-empathy readers may infer more specific emotion than low-empathy readers. This 
last hypothesis was based on Komeda and Kusumi’s (2006) study. These authors 
investigated the influence of the readers’ engagement on the construction of text 
representations. In their study, the participants were asked to read emotional narratives 
describing relief- or worry-related situations. In half of the narratives a shift related to 
the described emotion appeared in the middle of the text whereas in the other half the 
whole narratives were consistent with the described emotion. After each narrative, the 
participants were asked to rate how similar to and empathic they felt towards the 
protagonist. These offline responses were meant to assess their level of engagement in 
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the narratives. Komeda and Kusumi (2006) showed that readers highly engaged in the 
narratives (as reflected by offline responses concerning empathy or felt similarity with 
the protagonist) were more sensible to shifts in the text. The fact that high-empathy 
readers may have more dispositions to attribute emotion to others also supports this 
second hypothesis.  
If empathy and simulation are potentially influencing emotion inferences by 
affecting the way readers comprehend the protagonist’s emotion, other factors related to 
more general processes implied in text comprehension might also have an impact on 
emotion inferences.  
 
Processing limitations: Working memory and time to elaborate 
Processing text and elaborating mental models are demanding processes. 
Different limitations may impact the construction of mental models by influencing the 
amount of processing capacities available to the readers. Two factors that are directly 
related to the manipulation of mental representations are examined in this thesis: 
working memory and processing time.  
Working memory corresponds to a cognitive mechanism that is responsible for 
the storage and computation of currently activated mental representations (Baddeley, 
1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992). As previously introduced, 
the different models of text comprehension postulate that incoming information is 
encoded in working memory. In parallel, related information corresponding to recently 
processed information and/or information in long-term memory (based either on the text 
or on the readers’ general knowledge) are activated and combined to the incoming 
information in order to develop coherent mental representations of the text (Masson & 
Miller, 1983). In this sense, working memory is highly involved in the maintenance of 
text coherence, by monitoring and manipulating its content, rejecting or accepting the 
retrieved information, maintaining cues for information in long-term memory and 
encoding the products of retrieval (Mar, 2004). Crucially, a maximum amount of 
representations can be simultaneously activated, processed and stored by working 
memory. For this reason, it seems relevant to hypothesize that high- and low-working 
memory readers may differ regarding their text comprehension skills, especially in 
terms of emotion representations complexity (i.e., specificity).  
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The capacity of working memory is often assessed with the Reading Span Task 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), which aims at testing the processing and storage 
functions of working memory simultaneously. In this task, participants read strings of 
sentences aloud (i.e., processing function) and have to remember the last word of each 
sentence (i.e., storage function). After each string of sentences, the participants try to 
recall the maximum of retained words. Working memory capacities, as measured by the 
Reading Span Task, have been shown to be related to text comprehension measures 
such as the ability to answer questions about the text (Masson & Miller, 1983).  
Regarding the influence of working memory on inference elaboration, the ability 
to construct bridging inferences (i.e., needed to connect new information to the current 
model) is highly correlated with the readers’ working memory level (e.g., Singer, 
Andrusiak, Reisdorg, & Black, 1992). To connect new propositions to prior 
propositions, readers must indeed identify the referent related to the new propositions. 
This referent may be more easily available for readers with high working memory 
capacities (Singer et al., 1992). In a similar fashion, when there is increasing distance 
between a pronoun and its referent, inferences construction is highly correlated with the 
readers’ reading span score (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).  
Estevez and Calvo (2000) focused on another group of inferences that are called 
elaborative. This kind of inferences, contrary to bridging inferences, are not necessary 
to directly link the sentences, but are elaborated in order to complete the text 
representation by adding some information related to the global interpretation of the 
text. Depending on the context, emotion inferences may be considered as elaborative. If 
inferring a broad emotional state may act as a bridging inference because it allows 
linking different parts of the text (e.g., a physical reaction to an event), inferring a 
specific emotion is likely to correspond to an elaborative inference because it adds extra 
but not needed information to the text representation. Estevez and Calvo (2000) 
investigated the influence of working memory capacities on one particular class of 
elaborative inferences, predictive inferences, which correspond to anticipations of future 
events according to the explicit information in the text (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). For 
example, readers might infer that the protagonist is going to study after having read that 
they went to the library, looked for a separate table and opened their book (from 
Estevez & Calvo, 2000) 
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Estevez and Calvo (2000) selected high- and low- working memory participants 
and presented them with short passages either predictive or non-predictive of a target 
word. The passages were followed by confirming or disconfirming target words. In 
addition, the authors manipulated the Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (i.e., the time 
between the end of the passage and the presentation of the target word) in order to 
determine the time course of the inferences. The difference in the latency to pronounce 
the confirming target words between predictive and non-predictive passages is 
considered to reflect a facilitation effect mirroring the degree of activation of the 
inference. Estevez and Calvo’s (2000) results revealed that both high- and low- span 
readers were able to draw predictive inferences online, yet high-span readers needed 
less processing time and were more efficient than low-span readers.  
In this thesis, we hypothesized that depending on their reading span, readers 
might elaborate more or less specific emotion inferences. That is, low-span readers may 
not construct their representation of the protagonist’s emotion so as to infer a specific 
word, in reason of limited processing capacities. On the contrary, specific emotion 
inferences may occur among high-span readers. In addition, as demonstrated by Estevez 
and Calvo (2000), high-span readers are likely to draw specific inferences in less time 
than low-span readers. In a typical reading task, sentences are separated by 500 
milliseconds. In this time condition, emotion inferences should be facilitated for the 
high-span readers. If the time between the two sentences is extended (e.g., to 1000 
milliseconds as in Experiment 2 of this thesis), low- and high-span readers’ inferences 
may be identical regarding their specificity, as enough time to process would be 
allocated for the low-span readers.  
On a related note, and as introduced earlier, mental models of the text can be 
considered as perceptual simulations of the meaning of the text (Glenberg et al., 1987; 
Zwaan, 2004). This particular status of mental models may require the involvement of 
perceptual processes that could be notably related to the readers’ visuo-spatial working 
memory in addition to their general working memory capacities. Fincher-Kiefer (2001) 
and Fincher-Kiefer and D’Agostino (2004) indeed showed that readers engaged in a 
concurrent task recruiting visuo-spatial processes present disrupted comprehension for 
elaborative inferences (i.e., predictive inferences) compared with readers performing a 
concurrent verbal task. For this last reason, the influence of the visuo-spatial span on 
emotion inferences was also studied in this thesis.  
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If readers' individual differences (i.e., top-down processes) might explain the 
under-specificity of emotion inferences, bottom-up processes, namely text 
characteristics may also influence readers' emotion representations. Unlike previous 
studies investigating emotion inferences, we explored more deeply the literature on 
emotion construct so as to directly investigate the role of emotional information 
provided to the readers on the specificity of emotion inferences. 
 
Characteristics of the emotion construct in the narratives 
In this thesis, we assumed that the emotion content of the narratives used in 
previous studies did not allow the readers to infer specific emotions. In regard to the 
issues raised by Gygax et al. (2007), it is likely that readers construct their mental 
representation of an emotion by inferring core components of emotion. In regard to the 
embodied theories of text comprehension, readers simulate the emotion concepts that 
contain information about the experiential states associated to emotion. In order to 
define emotion as well as those experiential states and core components needed for an 
emotion to occur, we directly relied on emotion research. 
A variety of conceptualizations of emotion have been proposed since the first 
attempts of Plato and Aristotle. A consensus has however been reached that considers 
emotion as a change in the functioning of the organism following a triggering event, 
either internal or external (Scherer, 2000). Crucially, the triggering event must have 
significance for the organism. Emotion is thus caused by, and adapted to, the relevance 
of the stimulus events, evaluated with respect to their meaning for the organism 
(Scherer, 2000).  
The amount of changes as well as the systems concerned by the changes in the 
organism for an emotion to appear is nevertheless still a matter of debate. If the majority 
of theorists agree on a “reaction triad of emotion” (Scherer, 2000, p. 138) composed of 
physiological arousal, motor expression and subjective feeling, some authors consider 
additional motivational components of emotion as essential. These motivation 
components correspond to action tendencies and to cognitive processes implied in the 
evaluation of the event at the basis of the situation (Ellsworth, 1991; Frijda, 1986; 
Scherer, 1984, 2005).  
The different views on emotion have been combined in the componential theory 
of emotion proposed by Scherer (1984, 2005). According to this theory, an emotion is 
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“an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in five components in response to the 
evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the 
organism” (Scherer, 2005, p. 697). The components are related to the different systems 
of the organism and are the following: the appraisal, psychophysiological, motivational, 
motor expression and subjective feeling components. These will be described more 
thoroughly in Chapter 4 and 5. Scherer’s model assumes that there are as many different 
emotion episodes as there are different appraisals and changes in the organism, but also 
acknowledges the existence of some frequently occurring patterns conducting to 
emotions universally shared like happiness or disgust. Crucially, in Scherer’s theory, 
changes must happen in all components to trigger emotion. Consequently, it may not be 
possible to differentiate between emotions by relying on changes in only some 
components.  
The under-specificity of emotion inferences revealed by Gygax et al. (2003) as 
well as Gygax et al. (2004) may directly result from the issue that readers may require 
all the emotion components in the text, or inferred for that matter, to activate a specific 
emotion (and in these experiments, readers were not provided with these). Molinari, 
Burin, Saux, Barreyro, Irrazabal, Bechis et al. (2009) actually showed in a study 
investigating emotion inferences specificity, that emotions belonging to the same family 
(according to the cognitive structure of emotion by Ortony et al., 1988) were not 
differentiated during the reading of emotional narratives. This idea can be applied to 
Gygax et al. (2004) in which they showed that when reading a narrative about a man 
who lost his job, for example, readers similarly activated concepts such as depression, 
sadness and uselessness. In this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) we argue that the narratives 
that were used in previous studies on emotion inferences as well as in the first two 
experiments of this thesis did not qualitatively allow readers to reach specific emotion 
inferences.  
Now that we have summarized the theoretical background at the base of our 
hypotheses, the next chapters present the experimental parts of this thesis.  
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3. Individual Differences and Emotional Inferences during 
Reading Comprehension 
 
 
 
In this chapter, two experiments investigating readers’ representations of the 
main protagonist’s emotional status in short narratives, as well as several mental factors 
that may affect these representations are presented. General and visuo-spatial working 
memory, empathy, simulation and time to elaborate were investigated as potential 
individual differences in generating emotional inferences. Participants were confronted 
with narratives conveying information about the protagonist’s emotional state. We 
manipulated each narrative’s target sentence according to its content (emotional label 
vs. description of the behavior associated to the emotion) and to its congruence to the 
narrative (matching vs. mismatching). The time to elaborate was manipulated between 
experiments: In Experiment 1 the sentences were separated by 500 milliseconds 
whereas this time was extended to 1000 milliseconds in Experiment 2. The results 
showed that globally the difference between reading times of congruent and 
incongruent target sentences was bigger in the behavioral than in the emotional 
condition. This pattern was accentuated for high visuo-spatial working memory 
participants when they were asked to simulate the narratives. When extended 
elaboration time was offered to the participants, no preference for behavioral 
information or emotion per se occurred.   
These results support the idea that mental models may be of a perceptual nature 
and may more likely include behavioral elements than emotion labels per se, as 
suggested earlier by Gygax et al. (2007). 
 
 
Experiment 1 presented in this chapter was published: 
Gillioz, C., Gygax, P., & Tapiero, I. (2012). Individual differences and 
emotional inferences during reading comprehension. The Canadian Journal of 
Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 66, 239-
250. 
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Experiment 1:  
Simulation, empathy, working memory and emotion inferences 
 
Research on reading comprehension has shown that readers build mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) or situation models (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) of a scene 
depicted in a text that comprise both explicit and implicit elements. The latter are based 
on general knowledge and are referred to as inferences. Inferences generated during 
reading are often considered necessary to allow readers to maintain a certain local as 
well as global coherence of the text (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). Those 
establishing or maintaining local coherence connect adjacent constituents of the text, 
whereas those establishing or maintaining global coherence connect most constituents 
of the text by deeper features such as the theme of a narrative. The construction of a 
mental model is incremental, as readers continually update their representations with 
new information, either explicit or implicit (Garnham & Oakhill, 1996). If mental 
models can be relatively complex, they are nonetheless most likely tributary to readers’ 
limited processing capacities (e.g., Baddeley, 1996), which may limit possible 
inferences as the text is being processed (i.e., online). Not surprisingly, research on 
inferences has repeatedly tried to identify which inferences are made online, and which 
are not, leading to a certain controversy on the actual need to make certain inferences.  
In this chapter, we focus on the mental representation readers construct of the 
affective state of the protagonist in short narratives, which has typically been subject to 
controversy as to whether it was inferred online or not. If some theories suggest that this 
type of inference may not be drawn during reading (e.g., the minimalist view of reading 
from McKoon and Rattcliff, 1992), others consider it essential for global coherence, 
giving it an online status (e.g., the constructionist view of reading by Graesser et al., 
1994). Although of prime concern in early research on the matter, the relevance of these 
theories has been questioned with regards to the complexity of the processes involved in 
emotional inferences (e.g., Gygax, Tapiero, & Carruzzo, 2007). Most importantly, and 
this chapter furthers this idea, individual differences may well modulate the actual 
integration and complexity of the protagonist's emotional status in readers' mental 
models. 
Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, and Robertson (1992) were among the first to conduct 
a series of experiments investigating readers' ability to mentally represent the 
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protagonist’s emotional status described in short narratives. In their first two 
experiments, presenting participants with different narratives portraying emotion-
eliciting situations, they found that target sentences were read significantly faster when 
they contained matching emotion terms than when they contained mismatching emotion 
terms of opposite valence (Experiment 1) or similar valence (Experiment 2). 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) concluded that readers do integrate specific emotions in their 
mental models while reading. These findings have been further supported by other 
studies investigating readers' inclusion of the protagonists' affective status in their 
mental models (Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Gernsbacher, Robertson, 
Palladino, & Werner, 2004; de Vega, Leon, & Diaz, 1996).  
Using short narratives based on Gernsbacher et al. (1992), Gygax, Oakhill, and 
Garnham (2003) and Gygax, Garnham, and Oakhill (2004) questioned the assumed 
notion of specificity (i.e., readers infer a specific emotion label and differentiate between 
similar emotions or merely infer a broader feeling). They showed that although 
participants were sensitive to congruence manipulations of target sentences containing 
emotion words (i.e., they read sentences containing congruent target emotion words 
faster than incongruent ones), they were equally fast when reading target sentences 
containing (a) Gernsbacher et al.'s initial emotion words (e.g., depressed), (b) emotion 
words synonymous to the original ones in Gernsbacher et al. (e.g., miserable) and (c) 
emotional terms that were merely similar to them (e.g., useless). Most importantly, 
these findings were independent of the length of the narratives, reflected in the amount 
of information given about the main protagonist's emotional status (Gygax et al., 2004). 
Gygax et al. (2007) tried to give an explanation to account for such a seemingly 
non-specific representation of the protagonist's emotional status. Their core argument 
was that most readers, under normal conditions, may only include part(s) of the emotion 
construct in their mental models. By emotion construct, the authors referred to Scherer’s 
(e.g., 1984, 2005) definition of an emotion as a process of coordinated changes in the 
five organismic subsystems (information processing, support, executive, action, and 
monitoring), resulting from the appraisal of an event, internal or external. Each 
subsystem is associated with a particular component of emotion (i.e., cognitive, 
psychophysiological, action tendency, motor expression, or subjective feeling), the sum 
of all component changes resulting in a specific emotion. Although a more detailed 
account of this theory goes beyond the scope of this chapter, as the construction process 
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is dynamic and cumulative (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), Gygax and colleagues (2003, 
2004, 2007) suggested that when reading about emotional situations, readers may well 
build a representation of emotion in an incremental manner but not inevitably reach 
some specific emotion (or specific emotion label such as sad or happy). The latter stage 
only appears if all necessary components are presented in the text or implied by it, or 
under critical conditions, some of which are examined in the present study. Under 
normal reading conditions, and if the text is rather under-specified, readers might only 
include the core and easy-to-represent elements of the main protagonist’s emotional 
response. Among these elements, valence may be a good candidate, although not on its 
own (Gernsbacher et al., 1992), as well as behavioral responses (i.e., similar to 
Scherer’s action tendency or motor expressions) elicited by the emotional situation. By 
behavioral responses the authors referred to any movement, or reference to movement 
in response to the emotion-eliciting situation. For example, someone might clench their 
fist in response to a frustrating situation or freeze in response to a scary one. Gygax et 
al. (2007) suggested that behavioral responses were easier to infer, at least easier than a 
fairly complex and abstract representation of emotion.  
 
 
TABLE 2 Example of an experimental narrative used in Gygax et al. (2007) and in Experiments 
1 and 2. 
Narrative: 
Suzanne came back from her regular visit to the nursing home. She walked slowly from 
the nursing home to her place. She thought of the days with her grandmother with a heavy 
heart. She had trouble holding back her tears when thinking of her grandmother alone in 
her room. 
Target sentences: 
Matching emotion: As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling sad. 
Mismatching emotion: As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling happy. 
Matching behavior: She sat on her settee, wrapped in a blanket. 
Mismatching behavior: She danced all night, as she was always the one to show others 
how to party. 
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To test this, they presented participants with narratives in which the protagonist 
was experiencing an emotion-eliciting situation. The final target sentence of each 
narrative comprised either an emotion word, congruent or incongruent, as in previous 
research, or some congruent or incongruent information about the physical behavior of 
the protagonist (see Table 1 for an example).  
Results indicated a significantly larger congruence effect in the behavior 
condition compared to the emotion condition, suggesting faster processing of congruent 
behavioral information as well as slower processing of incongruent one. Gygax et al. 
(2007) added a specific control condition for what they called the context integration 
problem. In short, they argued that differences between reading times of sentences 
containing congruent information and sentences containing incongruent information 
might not necessarily mirror inferential processes, as previously assumed. When 
reading the sentence The weather is nice, readers might infer that the sun is shining, but 
it is unlikely, under normal circumstances, that they infer some information about, let's 
say, taking the train. However, Gygax et al. (2007) argued that after the sentence The 
weather is nice, the sentence John is taking the train should still be read faster than It is 
very dark (which is incongruent), maybe in the same way that congruent emotions are 
read faster than incongruent ones. The former effect (i.e., John is taking the train vs. It 
is very dark), although similar to effects that have led researchers to believe in 
inferential processes, might just mirror integration processes, meaning that as long as 
the sentence does not contradict the context, readers maintain a fast reading pace (see 
Gygax et al., 2007 for a more complete argumentation). Table 3 shows an example of 
the control condition. 
The results of the control condition were very similar (i.e., congruence effect) to 
the ones found in the emotion label condition, but much smaller than the difference 
found in the behavioral condition, hinting at the idea that emotion labels were not 
necessarily included in readers’ mental representations of emotions, and that some 
behavioral information was likely included in readers’ mental representations. Gygax et 
al. (2007) further suggested that such information was connected to what could be 
referred to as an emotion construct. In essence, readers construct a representation 
foundation, formed of stereotypical, or common information (i.e., behavioral reaction) 
associated with the emotion realm. This last point is particularly important, as Gygax 
(2010) showed that such a behavioral inference was not to be mistaken with any 
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behavioral inference, independent of emotional content. They showed that although 
readers do generate behavioral inferences such as picking up after the sentence John 
saw a penny on the floor, they still showed higher congruent vs. incongruent effects in 
the emotion behavioral condition. 
 
TABLE 3. Examples of control narratives used in Gygax et al. (2007) and in this experiment. 
In the first narrative, the second sentence is the congruent neutral target sentence and in the 
second narrative, the second sentence is the incongruent neutral target sentence. 
Narrative 1: Neutral matching 
Georges was writing and preparing for a conference in the East. He wanted to make the 
most out of his trip. He therefore planned several visits to his friends and to the people he 
knew on the way. He was taking his time to prepare for the trip and had been preparing 
since spring.  
Narrative 2: Neutral mismatching 
Cindy had just finished work and was going to her gym. She thought that going to the gym 
was individualistic and preferred volleyball. But after a knee injury, she could not play 
volleyball anymore. After changing, she entered the gym, which was empty and dark. 
That’s strange, she thought as she was warming up.  
 
 
 In all, these results suggest that (a) readers do infer emotional information 
during reading, but (b) the components included in readers' mental models are only a 
part of a more complex emotion construct. Given this idea of complexity, it seems 
reasonable to assume that there might be individual differences that may affect the 
construction of more elaborate emotional inferences. In the present chapter, we tested 
this idea by specifically focusing on factors that could lead readers to form a more 
complex and abstract representation of emotions. Specifically, we attempted to identify 
three factors that may affect the elaboration of complex representations of emotions: (a) 
simulation, (b) empathy and (c) processing limitations (i.e., working memory). The first 
two, although based on different constructs (e.g., Tan, 1994), are directly associated 
with the possible ways people understand emotions, and the last one is related to more 
general cognitive functions. We do not have any strong evidence to assume interactions 
between these factors. For example, to our knowledge, the link between empathy and 
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working memory has been quite difficult to establish (e.g., Hansen, 2011). We therefore 
only present specific predictions as to their respective effects on emotional inferences. 
 
Simulation and empathy 
 
In this chapter, we embrace the idea, introduced by Oatley (1994), that through 
simulation (to differentiate from empathy, as discussed later), readers identify with the 
characters and dynamically adopt their goals and actions through their own planning 
process. This is a creative process by which readers map their own emotional responses 
onto those of the characters. It also mirrors Goldie's (1999) suggestion that people can 
understand emotion through in-his-shoes imagining, projecting their own beliefs and 
thoughts onto the character.  
Simulation processes have been shown to be relevant in psycholinguistics, as the 
way individuals perceive real-world situations may have a large effect on word 
interpretation (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Situation models may hence be defined as 
experiential (perception and action) simulations of described situations (Barsalou, 
1999a; Zwaan, 2004). Recent empirical evidence converges in suggesting that 
comprehenders can be viewed as immersed experiencers: readers experience 
information as if they were participating in the activity described (Zwaan, 1999a, 
1999b, 2004; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006).  
We believe that forcing an experiential way of reading may reinforce the 
behavioral component of the emotional inference generated during reading. More 
specifically, we expect the congruency difference (i.e., congruent faster than 
incongruent) between the emotional and the behavioral component conditions found in 
Gygax et al. (2007) to be more pronounced under simulation enforcement than under no 
specific simulation instructions. To evaluate this issue, we enforced readers in 
simulation processes by giving participants explicit instructions to simulate the 
narratives, i.e., to put themselves in the protagonist's shoes. 
However, if we believe that enforced simulation processes could result in a more 
pronounced representation of behavioral information, empathic readers may construct 
complex representations of emotions including more specific emotional labels, 
regardless of simulation processes.  
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Tan (1994) suggested that through empathy, which does not require the readers 
to share similar feelings as the protagonist (i.e., which they do when simulating), 
readers easily understand and imagine the main protagonist’s emotional status. If, 
according to Goldie (1999), readers can maintain a certain observer's position when 
involved in empathic processes, they still anticipate how the main protagonist is going 
to behave and how he or she is going to feel. Some researchers on emotional inferences 
have strongly suggested that empathy was an important factor in the representation of 
emotions during reading (e.g., Komeda & Kusumi, 2006). More empathic readers may 
therefore build complex representations of emotions. Again, by complex, we essentially 
mean that the mental models built by readers incorporate more elements of the emotion 
construct (i.e., not just behavioral elements) the sum of which may even activate 
specific emotional labels. If empathy has a role in the complexity of readers’ mental 
representation of the main protagonist’s emotional status, we expect that a measure of 
empathy (e.g., Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980, 1983) should enable us to 
associate different levels of empathy with differences in the complexity of emotional 
inferences. In essence, compared to the low empathic readers, we expect the more 
empathic ones to show an increased congruency effect in the emotion condition (i.e., 
more specifically emotion label inference) even to the extent of resembling the strong 
congruency effect in the behavioral condition.  
Inherently, however, the very notion of disparity in the elaboration of mental 
models also raises issues of processing capacities, independent, or in conjunction with 
the empathic or simulation processes that readers may trigger.  
 
Processing limitations: Working memory capacities 
 
Although this issue was never explicitly explored, the unspecific nature of 
emotional inferences suggested by Gygax and colleagues (2003, 2004, and to a certain 
extent 2007) could have been an artifact of readers’ limited working memory capacity. 
This assumption relies on the critical idea that the mental representation of a text is 
partly computed and stored in working memory (Just & Carpenter, 1992). In fact, 
Estevez and Calvo (2000) found that the time it took participants to generate elaborative 
inferences (i.e., inferences that are not essentially needed for coherence) depended on 
their working memory capacity. As readers with poor working memory capacity 
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encounter new sentences or group of sentences, they may not have enough time to 
generate the inferences attached to the preceding sentences. Accordingly, readers do not 
always generate these elaborative inferences. If they do so, the inferences might be 
neither strong nor specific. In the same line of thinking, van den Broek, Young, Tzeng, 
and Linderholm (1999) suggested that readers have a limited amount of possible 
activation available. This means that the number and specificity of possible inferences 
made while reading is limited. Even if readers make the appropriate inferences, the 
specificity of some previously activated inferences might still diminish as readers 
encounter new words, sentences or propositions.  
If one considers that readers, as suggested earlier, engaging in an experiential 
way of reading may have an accentuated representation of behavioral elements, we 
could hypothesize that both general working memory and visuo-spatial working 
memory may play a role in the elaboration of these inferences, though a different one.  
On the one hand, visuo-spatial working memory limitations may hinder a 
representation of behavioral elements, because both visuo-spatial working memory and 
the conceptual representation of sensory elements share the same sensory space 
(Vermeulen, Corneille & Niedenthal, 2008). This is of course based on the premise that 
behavioral elements of emotional inferences are sensory based. Interestingly, except for 
research focused on spatial text processing (Meneghetti, Gyselinck, Pazzaglia & De 
Beni, 2009), the impact of visuo-spatial working memory capacities on reading 
comprehension has not received much support (e.g., Oakhill, Yuill & Garnham, 2011). 
Still, we believe that to transpose themselves in the protagonist’s shoes and experience 
each situation, readers might activate different visual and spatial processes relying on 
their visuo-spatial working memory capacities. Those with higher visuo-spatial working 
memory scores may therefore show an accentuated prominence of behavioral 
information, reflected in an even more pronounced congruency effect in the behavioral 
condition compare to the emotional one.  
On the other hand, better general working memory scores may result in a more 
elaborate and complex representation of emotion (i.e., readers have more resources to 
process all emotion components), signaled by an increased congruency effect in the 
emotion condition (i.e., more specific emotion label). 
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Method 
 
The present experiment was composed of three phases. The first phase 
comprised the main experiment (self-paced reading task), divided in two parts 
corresponding to the two different simulation conditions. In Part I, no specific 
instructions except that of reading the texts at a natural pace were given to the 
participants. In Part II, participants were asked to simulate, that is to imagine themselves 
in the protagonist’s shoes. Each participant did both parts. The second phase was aimed 
at the evaluation of each participant’s working memory capacities, both general and 
visuo-spatial working memory capacities. In the third and final phase, we evaluated 
each participant’s level of empathy. 
 
Participants 
Eighty-six students (57 women and 29 men) from the University of Fribourg 
took part in this experiment for course credits. All participants were native French 
speakers. Due to unusually aberrant long reading times (i.e., several reading times 
above eight seconds for three- to four-words sentences), three participants were 
removed from the analyses. They obviously did not understand the instructions.  
 
 
Materials 
 
Experimental narratives 
Twenty-four narratives, in French, from Gygax and Tapiero (2003) were used in 
this experiment. To construct these narratives, Gygax and Tapiero (2003) tried to 
distance themselves from the habitual way narratives are set up in this line of research. 
Most often, these narratives are created by having researchers initially write (intuitive) 
narratives that involve the main protagonist in some emotion triggering situation and 
then asking judges to agree on whether the narratives rightly encompass the emotional 
situations (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992; de Vega et al., 1996). This procedure offers 
researchers a certain control over linguistic factors such as frequency or syntactic 
properties of the sentences they create, although the content of the narratives may not 
encompass the most complete, or salient description of emotions (or emotion 
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situations), at least not for the population under scrutiny. Instead of creating the 
narratives themselves, Gygax and Tapiero (2003) directly asked 30 students to each 
generate 24 narratives focused on specific given emotions. A categorical analysis of 
participants’ responses enabled the authors to construct 24 stereotypical narratives using 
the most recurrent categories and the most salient wording. Although it meant that the 
control over certain linguistic factors was more difficult, the resulting narratives 
corresponded – semantically as well as in the particular wording of the constituent 
sentences – more accurately to the population under investigation (see Table 1 for an 
example narrative).  
As others have done (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992; Gygax et al., 2003, 2004), in 
our materials, each emotion (i.e., each narrative) was paired with it’s opposite (sad - 
happy). Each narrative was present in four different versions, depending on the target 
sentence. The target sentence contained a matching emotion, a mismatching emotion 
(from its opposite narrative), a matching behavioral description or a mismatching 
behavioral description (from its opposite narrative). Eight lists were constructed, to 
ensure that each participant would see all conditions without (Part I) and with (Part II) 
simulation instructions, and that each passage was present in each simulation condition 
across the experiment. This means that in four lists, a particular passage appeared in 
Part I and in the other four lists in Part II. In each of these four lists, it appeared with a 
different target sentence. A participant was presented with one of the eight lists and saw 
a narrative only once.  
 
Filler narratives 
Twenty-four filler passages from Gygax et al. (2007) were also used. Out of the 
twenty-four filler narratives, twelve were used to test the neutral match/mismatch 
question mentioned earlier. Six of these narratives had a matching second sentence and 
six had a mismatching second sentence. In the latter case, the rest of the narrative was 
written so as to clarify the ambiguity raised by the presence of mismatching information 
(see Table 3 for examples of control narratives). We used the second sentence as the 
target sentence to ensure that the matching neutral information was unlikely to have 
been incorporated in readers’ mental representations of the text (i.e., after just one 
sentence). A pilot study (in Gygax et al., 2007) ensured that the matching neutral 
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sentences were indeed neutral and that the mismatching sentences were considered 
mismatching given the context. 
In total, forty-eight passages were presented to each participant. In each 
simulation part of the experiment, there were twelve experimental narratives, six 
experimental filler narratives and six normal filler narratives. For each participant, these 
were presented in a random order.  
The narratives were presented on a Power Macintosh 4400 using Psyscope 
Software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Responses to the target 
sentences of each narrative were collected using a response button box attached to the 
computer, which permits millisecond accuracy. 
 
Working memory tests 
Two working memory tests were used in this study. First, participants’ general 
working memory was evaluated with Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) French version 
of the Reading Span Test (RST) (Delaloye, Ludwig, Borella, Chicherio, & de 
Ribaupierre, 2007). Second, participants’ visuo-spatial working memory was assessed 
using a standardized version of Corsi Block-Tapping Task (Kessels, van Zandvoort, 
Postma, Kappelle, & de Haan, 2000). In this task, the experimenter presents participants 
with a small platform composed of nine blocks. The experimenter then taps particular 
sequences of blocks, which participants have to reproduce. The initial sequence is 
composed of only two blocks. If participants reproduce correctly one of two sequences 
of the same length, they are presented with a sequence in which one block is added. If 
none is reproduced correctly, the number of correct blocks reproduced last is taken as a 
measure of participants' visuo-spatial working memory span. The total score is the 
product of the span and the number of correct trials. 
 
Empathy scale 
Each participant’s level of empathy was assessed with a French version of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)2 of Davis (1980, 1983). Composed of twenty-eight 
items, this questionnaire measures four components of empathy: Empathic Concern, 
Perspective Taking, Fantasy and Personal Distress. The Perspective-Taking scale and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Free translation, not validated, available from Stephanie Braun (sbraun@ulb.ac.be), ULB – Erasme 
Hospital, Brussels, Belgium. 
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the Fantasy scale represent the cognitive facet of empathy and respectively measure the 
tendency to adopt the psychological point of view of others and the tendency to 
transpose themselves into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters. The Empathic 
Concern scale and the Personal Distress scale represent the emotional facets of empathy 
and measure other-oriented and self-oriented feelings. The total score of empathy was 
calculated by summing the Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking and Fantasy scales, 
as proposed by Pulos, Elison and Lennon (2004). The higher the score, the more 
empathic a participant is. 
 
Procedure 
Each narrative was presented one sentence at a time. As in Gygax et al. (2007), 
participants were instructed to read each sentence at a normal reading speed, as if they 
were at home, reading a magazine. They were asked to press the yes button when they 
finished reading a sentence, resulting in the next sentence appearing on the screen after 
500 milliseconds. To make sure that participants read the narrative carefully, some 
narratives (n = 16) were followed by a question related to the text. Participants 
answered the question by pressing either the yes or no button. After the presentation of a 
passage, participants were prompted with the message Are you ready? followed by the 
next passage. Before the actual experiment, participants underwent a practice session 
made up of three passages. 
After completion of Part I (no specific instructions to simulate), participants 
were asked to rate, on an 8-point scale (0 = no simulation at all to 7 = totally engaged 
in a simulation process), the extent to which they tried to naturally simulate the 
narratives. After completing the scale, they were informed that similar narratives would 
appear on the screen, but this time, they were explicitly asked to mentally simulate the 
situations presented to them. More specifically, we told them to make an effort to put 
themselves in the protagonist’s shoes, as if they were living the narrative from the 
inside. At the end of Part II, participants filled the 8-points scale again, to ensure that 
participants complied with the instructions.  
The order no instructions to simulate  instructions to simulate was fixed, as 
the reversed order would have made little sense, as any resulting lack of effect would be 
imputable to a spill-over effect. Conversely, a fixed order has the disadvantage of 
confounding a possible order effect by which a particular condition might be altered 
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whereas another one might not. To ensure that this would not be the case, we examined 
Gygax et al.’s (2007) data by splitting them into two parts. As shown in Figure 1, both 
parts showed the exact same pattern in terms of the central conditions (Emotion and 
Behavior) and in terms of the differences in (residual) reading times between congruent 
and incongruent information, ruling out any confounding order effect that have had 
targeted the central conditions differently. Participants’ working memory capacities 
were then evaluated with the RST followed by the Corsi Test. Finally, participants filled 
in the IRI questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Mean differences in reading times between congruent and 
incongruent Emotion and Behavior information in Gygax et al. (2007). The 
slight decrease in reading time differences between Part I and Part II is 
independent of the conditions under investigation and reflects a certain 
habituation to the task by the participants. 
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Results 
 
Data transformation 
Reading times collected in the self-paced reading task were first transformed in 
order to allow for individual differences in reading speed as well as to allow for the fact 
that all target sentences were not in the same position in the text nor of the same length. 
The transformation procedure was inspired by Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Garnsey 
(1994) and Gygax et al. (2007). For each participant, a regression equation of time (i.e., 
reading time) against length (i.e., number of characters in the target sentence) was 
produced, separately for the 2nd (control condition) and 5th (experimental conditions) 
sentences. Residual reading times were calculated by subtracting the actual reading 
times from the reading times predicted by the regression equation. A negative residual 
time means that the reading time was longer than expected. Figure 2 shows the residual 
reading times for the different conditions (without considering individual differences). 
Two emotion target sentences and two behavior target sentences were removed from the 
analyses as they showed an awkward reverse congruence effect, hinting that their 
content was considered highly ambiguous by our participants. 
We present the analyses in two parts. We initially present a first model that is 
comparable to Gygax et al. (2007). In essence, as Gygax et al. (2007) did not account 
for individual differences, we wanted to match our data to theirs first. We then present 
analyses that take individual differences into account. As this experiment was 
exclusively concerned with individual differences, all analyses were conducted 
considering participants as random factor. In all analysis sections, when the main or 
interaction effects are not reported, it means that they were not significant.  
 
Inference elaboration – First model 
A general 2 (Simulation: With vs. Without Simulation) X 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. 
Behavior vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the residual reading times showed a main effect of Congruence, F(1, 82) = 
105.37, p < .001, congruent sentences being read on average 450 milliseconds faster 
than incongruent ones, and an interaction effect of Nature by Congruence, F(2, 164) = 
7.52, p < .001. There was no other main or interaction effect. Our simulation 
manipulation did not produce any of the expected effects, even if the participants 
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reported having simulated much more in Part II (M = 5.51) than in Part I (M = 2.96), 
t(80) = 13.62, p < .01.  
We explored the source of the Nature by Congruence interaction effect - the main focus 
of Gygax et al. (2007) - in separate follow-up ANOVAs. In all follow-up analyses, F-
values were calculated using the original model error term (Kirk, 1995). Degrees of 
freedom were adapted accordingly. All p-values were also converted to account for 
multiple comparisons (i.e., Bonferroni corrections). In the first follow-up we compared 
the emotion and behavior conditions in terms of congruency. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Mean residual times in each emotion content and simulation condition in Experiment 
1, without considering individual differences. Negative residuals mean slower reading times (as 
predicted by each participant's regression of time by number of letters). 
 
 
For this purpose, we examined the interaction of Congruence with respect to two 
of the three values of the Nature variable. A 2 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior) X 2 
(Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated measure ANOVA showed a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 164) = 6.30, p < .017. A second follow-up ANOVA 
showed a significant 2 (Nature: Control vs. Behavior) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. 
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Incongruent) interaction effect, F(1, 164) = 14.56, p < . 017. Finally, there was no 2 
(Nature: Emotion vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) interaction 
effect, F(1, 164) = 1.70, p = .19. This means, as shown in Figure 2, that the difference 
between reading times of congruent and incongruent sentences was greater in the 
behavior condition (624 ms) than in the Control (310 ms) and the Emotion condition 
(416 ms). These results perfectly matched those found by Gygax et al. (2007). This is 
true even to the extent of the slight numerical difference between the emotion and the 
control condition (which will be most apparent when examining the visuo-spatial 
individual differences). No further post hoc analyses were performed on each 
condition’s simple congruence effect. Essentially, they would all be significant. The 
crucial comparison is between the experimental conditions’ congruence effects and the 
control condition’s congruence effect, the latter representing a simple context yet non-
inferential effect (as stressed by Gygax et al., 2007). 
Further analyses were done in order to reveal any influence of participants’ 
characteristics on emotional inference elaboration. Since we did not expect them to 
interact in the influence that they may have on emotional inference elaboration, each 
variable related to participants’ characteristics was added individually to the main 2 
(Simulation: With vs. Without Simulation) X 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior vs. 
Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) analysis. Different models were 
tested, each by running separate ANOVAs. 
 
Inference elaboration - Individual differences 
To investigate the role of individual differences, we explored the data by 
conducting hierarchical clusters on each of our measures using Ward's Method (see 
Table 4 for a summary of all individual differences scores). This method enabled us to 
classify participants in a meaningful way - more than with a manual split at least, where 
participants have to be shifted relatively subjectively to one of the group -, as it 
maximizes similarity of members of a group according to the scores of each individual 
on a particular scale. Ward’s method is distinct from all other clustering methods 
because it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between the 
clusters. Basically, a score is entered into a cluster if it results in a minimal increase of 
the error sum of squares. In sum, Ward’s method minimizes the total within-cluster 
variance whilst maximizing the between-cluster variance (Ward, 1963). Subsequent 
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analyses were tested with two groups, except if stated otherwise. All cluster analyses 
are briefly presented, but only significant impact to the initial 2 (Simulation) X 3 
(Nature) X 2 (Congruence) analysis are presented. 
 
TABLE 4. Mean scores (and standard deviations in brackets) of each individual 
differences score, after splitting our sample using the Ward method. In our sample, 
RST scores ranged from .25 to .94 (the total score is the product of the span and the 
number of correct trials), Corsi scores from 24 to 104 and IRI scores from 33 to 95.  
 High Group Low Group Mean 
General working 
memory 
.76 (.1) .46 (.1) .61 (.09) 
Visuo-spatial memory 78 (9.5) 49 (11.4) 63 (10.5) 
Empathy 80 (6.3) 62 (8.0) 71 (7.1) 
 
 
General working memory 
The cluster analysis on the proportion of RST correct items revealed two uneven 
groups, reflecting a skewed distribution (supported by a -.70 skewness value): a higher 
RST group (n = 63) with a mean of .76 (SD = .09) and a lower group (n = 20) with a 
mean of .46 (SD = .09). The two groups were significantly different (Ws = 210, z = -
6.77, p < .001). When introduced in the initial model as an independent variable, no 
effect other than those found without the variable was apparent. Due to its particular 
distribution and uneven sample sizes, we extracted the lower group participants and 
conducted another classification procedure. If this latter did improve sample sizes, with 
a higher RST group (n = 31) with a mean of .84 (SD = .04) and a lower group (n = 32) 
with a mean of .68 (SD = .05), both group were quite similar (.3 SD under and .6 SD 
above the standard score). Therefore, and although significantly different, t(61) = 13.76, 
p < .001, their inclusion to the model did not affect it3.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To ensure that the null results were not due to our categorization procedure, we also performed 
extra analyses adopting different strategies: (a) we used three clusters and (b) we split the data 
into quartiles and compared high and low quartiles. None of these bore any consequence on the 
analyses presented in this chapter. These different strategies were also adopted with other 
variables when relevant. For the Empathy scale, we also tested each of its four sub-components 
separately, but nothing came of these different analyses. We also ensured that the null results 
were not due to a questionable reliability of the IRI sub-scales. This was not the case, all 
Cronbach's α being higher than .7. 
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Visuo-spatial working memory 
The cluster analysis on total scores revealed a high Corsi group (n = 33) with a 
mean of 78.61 (SD = 9.50) and a low Corsi group (n = 50) with a mean of 49.14 (SD = 
11.43) bearing significant difference (Ws = 1275, z = -7.74, p < .001). When introduced 
in the initial model as an independent variable, there was an additional 2 (Simulation) X 
3 (Nature) X 2 (Congruence) X 2 (Corsi) interaction effect, F(2, 162) = 4.59, p < .05 
(see Figure 3).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Mean residual times in each emotion content and simulation condition as a 
function of Corsi scores. Negative residuals mean slower reading times (as predicted by 
each participant's regression of time by number of letters). 
 
 
Interestingly, when conducting two follow-up ANOVAs to examine individually 
the two Corsi groups, the low Corsi group was only affected by congruence, as shown 
by a significant Congruence effect, F(1, 81) = 59.36, p < .025, but no other main nor 
interaction effect. On the other hand, and compared to the first model analysis, the high 
Corsi group showed an additional Simulation by Nature by Congruence interaction 
effect, F(2, 162) = 4.27, p < .025. When examining this interaction more closely in a 
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follow-up ANOVA, there was a Nature by Congruence effect only significant in Part II, 
F(2, 162) = 8.64, p < .025, qualified by a Nature (Behavior vs. Emotion) by 
Congruence interaction effect, F(1, 162) = 13.41, p < .017, and a Nature (Behavior vs. 
Control) by Congruence interaction effect, F(1, 162) = 12.51, p < .017,  but no Nature 
(Emotion vs. Control) by Congruence interaction effect. 
The Simulation manipulation seems to have affected the two groups differently. 
If the low Corsi group seems to have been mainly affected by congruence, independent 
of the conditions, the high Corsi group seems to have been influenced by the 
manipulation in our central conditions (Emotion and Behavior). Although no nature by 
congruence effect was apparent in the first part of the experiment, it changed in the 
second part, the congruence effect being much bigger in the Behavior condition in the 
second Part (901 ms) than in the first Part (568 ms), and than in the Emotion condition 
(227 ms). This is in line with the idea that situation models include perceptual 
components (Glenberg, 1999; Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983) 
and that the ability to integrate elaborative and predictive inferences during reading 
depends upon visuo-spatial resources (Fincher-Kiefer, 2001; Fincher-Kiefer & 
D’Agostino, 2004). Readers' situation models are perceptual in nature, and readers build 
them on the basis of their own perceptual analogous experiences. As in our experiment, 
when simulating, high visuo-spatial span participants may have relied on a greater 
capacity to embody themselves in the narratives, thus leading them to a stronger 
representation of behavioral elements.  
Still, note that in the Emotion condition, the congruence effect actually 
decreased from Part I to Part II (i.e., from 584 to 227 ms) for the high Corsi group. In 
fact, the source of this effect is mainly in Part I, where the Emotion congruence effect is 
similar to the Behavior one. This might explain the general trend of a slight global 
numerical difference between the Emotion and the Control condition.   
 
Empathy level 
The cluster analysis revealed two groups: a higher Empathy group (n = 45) with 
a mean of 80.84 (SD = 6.30) and a lower group (n = 38) with a mean of 62.05 (SD = 
7.96). Although both quite high, hinting as for the RST at a skewed distribution 
(supported by a -.51 skewness value), they were significantly different (Ws = 741, z = -
7.82, p < .001). When introduced in the initial model as an independent variable and 
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contrary to our expectations, no effect other than those found without the variable was 
apparent. As for the RST measure, different splitting strategies were adopted, none 
bearing any different pattern of results.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Gygax et al. (2007) found evidence that when reading narratives about a 
protagonist in an emotion eliciting situation, readers tend to build a representation of the 
main protagonist’s emotional response which favors behavioral information (over 
emotions per se). In this experiment, we wanted to further their findings by examining 
circumstances that would intensify or reduce this process.  We were particularly 
interested in individual differences that could account for the results found in Gygax et 
al. (2007). More specifically, we investigated whether the elaboration of emotional 
inferences was associated to particular identification processes, as defined by simulation 
or empathy, or to processing limitations, as defined by different types of working 
memory limitations.  
 If our results supported the idea that readers were in general more likely to 
include behavioral information than emotions per se in their mental representations of 
the text (as previously shown), we only found limited contributions from the different 
factors under scrutiny. In other words, the processes identified by Gygax et al. (2007) 
may well be stable and generalizable across a wide range of readers and reading 
strategies (e.g., simulation). If null effects are often delicate to interpret, we would still 
like to propose a discussion of the underlying processes that might explain the general 
lack of influence of these factors. This discussion may set the very foundations of future 
investigations on emotional inferences and may direct researchers interested in the 
matter towards most relevant issues.  
 Before entering into the heart of this discussion, it is important to present the one 
factor that seemed to explain part of the variance of our simulation manipulation. More 
specifically, if our simulation manipulation did not show the expected general pattern, 
and this will be discussed later, our measure of visuo-spatial working memory showed 
that this general trend was not stable across participants with different visuo-spatial 
working memory capacities. Most importantly, the behavioral component of high visuo-
spatial span participants' mental model seemed to have benefited from our simulation 
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manipulation, whereas this was not the case for low visuo-spatial span participants. 
When asked to simulate, high visuo-spatial span participants showed increased 
sensitivity to target sentences containing behavioral elements. This supports the idea 
that simulating text increases the likelihood of including behavioral elements in readers' 
mental model, even if this only seems to be true for high visuo-spatial span readers. It 
also supports the broader notion that visuo-spatial capacities are crucial when 
generating elaborative inferences (e.g., Fincher-Kiefer, 2001; Fincher-Kiefer & 
D’Agostino, 2004) and that, at least for some participants, when compelled to be actors 
in the text (i.e., in our study through a simulation manipulation), perceptual and motor 
information may show access and encoding facilitation (Ditman, Brunyé, Mahoney, & 
Taylor, 2010). Note that the present data cannot truly disentangle the detailed processes 
that influence visuo-spatial working memory, but at least they suggest that visuo-spatial 
working memory is a serious candidate when examining processes at stake in emotional 
inferences and reading comprehension.  
 Even though low- and high- visuo-spatial participants showed differential 
simulation effects, the main Nature by Congruence effect remained, suggesting that low 
visuo-spatial span participants still favored behavioral information to emotions per se 
(i.e., regardless of simulation). This strongly suggests that readers transpose themselves 
in the protagonist’s shoes during reading, even when no specific instructions to do so 
are given to them, leading to a stronger behavioral representation of the situation. In a 
sense, this is not surprising, considering that to understand a text and the main 
protagonist’s mental states, readers automatically lay upon their own psycho-
physiological resources to imagine themselves living the same narrative and performing 
the same actions as the protagonist (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Goldman, 2002; 
Mouilso, Glenberg, & Havas, 2007; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). By 
simulating, readers substitute their own feelings for those of the protagonist (Goldman, 
2005) and can access knowledge of what is described in the text and elaborate a mental 
representation based on this knowledge. Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, and 
Vermeulen (2009) and Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) further argued that the 
process of simulation is necessary to access emotional meaning and elaborate mental 
representations of emotional texts.  
In some respects, one could argue that the general lack of effect of our 
simulation manipulation reflects a ceiling effect, all participants being more or less 
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already engaged in simulation processes. This is compared with research suggesting that 
even passive reading of action-related words already activates motor- and premotor-
associated brain regions (e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004), implying rather 
spontaneous simulation processes. 
A ceiling effect might also exist for both our empathy and our general working 
memory measures. Low- and high-empathy participants, as well as low- and high- 
general working memory participants showed all relatively high scores, at least 
compared to standards scores. In addition to this, empathy might be connected to 
simulation processes, some authors arguing that empathy and simulation are difficult to 
disentangle (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Goldman, 2005; Preston & de Waal, 2002). If our 
results suggest that working memory and empathy may not be accountable for the 
relative lack of elaboration, it should be stressed that the groups of participants were 
quite similar. 
These probable ceiling effects raise two crucial issues. First, they raise the 
pertinence of a constant reliance on university students as participants. Some measures 
may not be most appropriate with regard to undergraduate students' characteristics. 
Second, and on a more conceptual level, they do support the fact that complex 
elaboration of emotions might not be present when inferring emotions, even for 
participants with relative high levels of empathy, simulation processes and working 
memory. According to Gygax et al. (2007), the apparent dominance of behavioral 
information in readers' mental models can be explained by different factors, all based on 
the perspective that behavioral elements are more easily activated and included in 
readers' mental models. First, they argued that readers do not need to construct elaborate 
and complex representations to attain a reasonable understanding of the text. This is in 
line with the idea found in research on text comprehension that underspecified 
representations of text are often perfectly acceptable (e.g., Sanford & Graesser, 2006), 
and that good enough representations (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) may in the 
long term be beneficial in terms of cognitive load. In essence, it might even be 
counterproductive for readers to automatically integrate elaborate and complex 
representations of the main protagonist’s emotional status, as any potential shifts may 
involve a large amount of cognitive processing. Second, if one considers the main 
function of emotions to prepare the body for the appropriate actions (Frijda, 1986; 
Scherer, 1982), readers, through simulation, will most likely activate neural areas that 
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are implicated in actions associated with the described emotions (Havas et al., 2007). 
Such an activation, in turn, will lead readers to the construction of mental 
representations mostly composed of behavioral characteristics.  
Although these two explanations coincide with our results, we still believe that 
some situations may elicit more elaborate representations of emotions. If behavioral 
elements are well-suited candidates for the representation of the protagonist’s emotional 
status, as explained above, there may still be textual elements that elicit elaborate 
emotions. These textual elements have in fact been difficult to explore, as the narratives 
used in the present study, as well as in studies of others, although more or less 
ecological, were never structured in a consistent manner regarding the quality and 
quantity of emotional information they conveyed. Typically, Scherer and his colleagues 
(e.g., 1984, 2005) identified different emotion sub-components which combination is 
necessary to produce specific emotional responses. In this experiment, as well as in 
most research on emotional inferences, we may not have paid enough attention to the 
emotion components that the passages contained. The present results may be, in terms 
of the lack of specific emotional inferences, the direct result of such an issue, which 
may also have impacted upon the relatively moderate effects of our individual 
differences. We are currently investigating this very issue in our laboratory. 
On a different yet related methodological note, the present experiment, as others 
before, was based on the habitual match vs. mismatch or congruent vs. incongruent 
paradigm. Fundamentally, this could be the cause of some of the null effects found in 
this experiment for two main reasons. First of all, in case of a match vs. mismatch 
effect, it is always difficult to know if the effect is mainly associated with the 
incongruent information (i.e., as you often find in EEG studies on the N400, for 
example) or with the congruent one. Second, in self-paced reading experiments, match 
vs. mismatch effects are often quite important in terms of milliseconds (e.g., 200 
milliseconds minimum), suggesting that the paradigm may not be sensitive to small 
changes of processes, as they may have appeared in this experiment.   
Finally, we cannot exclude the fact that the null effects reported here result from 
a lack of statistical power. Our results would benefit from a replication with a greater 
sample, as the differences between the conditions examined in this experiment may 
have been too subtle to be demonstrated given the relative small number of participants 
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(still higher than most of the studies on the topic) and the different variables under 
observation. 
In conclusion, this experiment confirmed previous findings (e.g., Gygax, 2010) 
on the unspecific nature of emotional inferences and on the prevalence of behavioral 
elements in readers' mental models of emotions. It also showed that visuo-spatial 
memory capacities might influence such predominance, but that general working 
memory, empathy capacities and reading preference were not of prime importance in 
those inferential processes. 
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Experiment 2: 
Individual differences and time to elaborate 
 
In Experiment 1 we presented evidence supporting Gygax et al.'s (2007) 
findings that readers were more inclined to construct representations of emotions 
composed of behavioral elements than of emotion labels per se. Although we expected 
some external variables to account for the lack of specificity of emotion inferences, 
most of our results tended to show that variables mediate behavioral inferences more 
than they do so for specific emotion inferences.   
We expected that working memory limitations, as measured by the RST, would 
at least explain a higher reliance to behavioral concepts, those being more easily 
activated and integrated in readers' mental models. This was not the case. On the other 
hand, visuo-spatial working memory did play a role in our measures of inferential 
processes, high-span visuo-spatial working memory participants showing heightened 
sensitivity to behavioral information when asked to simulate. These results suggest that 
working memory may not be accountable for the relative lack of elaboration, as 
suggested in earlier research. On the contrary, some elements pertinent to visuo-spatial 
working memory may even facilitate behavioral representations, especially when 
participants engage in a simulation process during reading.     
Gygax et al. (2007) raised the issue that behavioral elements were easily and 
rapidly accessible, hence their inclusion in readers' mental models was given preference 
to more elaborate elements such as emotions. One aspect inherent to such a concept is 
the time participants have to elaborate more complex representations. If our experiment 
was a self-paced reading experiment, we did encourage participants to read the passages 
at a normal pace, as if they were reading a magazine, and time between sentences was 
always at 500 milliseconds. Estevez and Calvo (2000) demonstrated that predictive 
inferences take longer to elaborate and even longer for low memory span participants 
(i.e., in their experiment at least 550 milliseconds after the crucial information). It may 
be the case that participants in our experiment were forced to activate easily retrievable 
information by the rather short interval between the presentations of our sentences. We 
therefore decided to conduct a second experiment by increasing the time intervals 
between sentences to 1000 ms to evaluate whether the results of Experiment 1 were 
dependent upon elaboration time. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
Eighty-nine (16 men and 73 women) from the University of Lausanne 
participated in this experiment. All participants were native French speakers. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The same materials and procedure as in Experiment 1 were used in this 
experiment. The only difference between the two experiments consisted of time 
between each sentence in the self-paced reading task. In this experiment, the time 
between the two sentences was extended to 1000 milliseconds. 
 
Results  
 
Before conducting the analyses, reading times were transformed to residual 
reading times as in Experiment 1. Residual reading times that were more than 2.5 SD 
above or below each participant’s overall mean were replaced in the analyses by the 
cut-off values (2.4%).  
 
Inference elaboration - First model 
As in Experiment 1, a general 2 (Simulation: With vs. Without Simulation) X 3 
(Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. 
Incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA on the residual reading times showed a main 
effect of Nature, F(2, 176) = 12.57, p < .001, the emotion sentences being read on 
average 85 milliseconds slower than the control sentences and the behavior sentences 
being read on average 150 milliseconds slower than control sentences and a main effect 
of Congruence F(1, 88) = 81.66, p < .001, reflecting that readers were on average 320 
milliseconds slower to read the incongruent target sentences compared to the congruent 
sentences. Figure 4 shows the residual reading times for the different conditions 
(without considering individual differences). 
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FIGURE 4. Mean residual times in each emotion content and simulation condition, without 
considering individual differences in Experiment 2. Negative residuals mean slower reading 
times (as predicted by each participant's regression of time by number of letters). 
 
 
As in Experiment 1, these two main effects were qualified by a Nature by 
Congruence interaction effect, F(2, 176) = 95.55, p < .001.  
We investigated the Nature by Congruence interaction effect by running separate 
follow-up ANOVAs, calculating the F-values using the original error tem and with 
adapted degrees of freedom. We also used Bonferroni correction in order to account for 
multiple comparisons. Contrary to the results found in Experiment 1, there was no 2 
(Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) 
interaction effect, F(1,176) = 5.12, p = .025. However, the 2 (Nature: Emotion vs. 
Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) interaction effect was 
significant, F(1,176) = 19.69, p < .001, as was the 2 (Nature: Behavior vs. Control) X 2 
(Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) interaction effect, F(1,176) = 44.92, p < .001. 
These results mean that contrary to what was previously found, participants did not 
show a preference for the behavioral information associated to emotion but were as 
likely to integrate an emotion label or behavioral information related to emotion in their 
mental representations of the text.  
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In order to reveal an influence of Elaboration Time, we conducted a general 2 
(Elaboration Time: 500 ms (Experiment 1) vs. 1000 ms (this chapter)) X 2 (Simulation: 
Without vs. With Simulation) X 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior vs. Control) X 2 
(Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) mixed ANOVA, with Simulation, Nature and 
Congruence as within-factors and Elaboration Time as a between-factor which showed 
a main effect of Nature, F(2, 340) = 4.21, p = .02, a main effect of Congruence, F(2, 
340) = 253.95, p < .001, and a Nature by Congruence interaction effect, F(2, 340) = 
30.72, p < .001, but no main or interaction effect implying Elaboration Time, indicating 
that readers’ preference for behavioral components inferences was not influenced by 
elaboration time. For this reason, analyses focusing on individual differences were done 
only on this experiment’s data, without including the data presented in Experiment 1.  
 
Inference Elaboration - Individual differences 
 
General working memory  
The cluster analysis on the proportion of RST correct items revealed two uneven 
groups: a higher RST group (n = 53) with a mean of .77 (SD = .07) and a lower group (n 
= 35) with a mean of .53 (SD = .10). The two groups were significantly different (Ws = 
630, z = -8.01, p < .001). As in Experiment 1, when introduced in the initial model as an 
independent variable, no effect other than those found without the variable was 
apparent. 
 
Visuo-spatial working memory 
Two groups were determined by the cluster analysis on the Corsi total scores: a 
higher Corsi group (n = 28) with a mean of 75.21 (SD = 7.39) and a lower Corsi group 
(n = 61) with a mean of 48.13 (SD = 11.82). The two groups were significantly different 
(Ws = 1891, z = -7.60, p < .001) but contrary to the results found in Experiment 1, their 
inclusion in the initial model did not change the inference pattern. 
 
Empathy level 
A lower Empathy group (n = 48, M = 64.73, SD = 4.12) and a higher Empathy 
group ( n = 41, M = 50.56, SD = 5.58) were revealed by the cluster analysis. These two 
groups were significantly different (Ws = 861, z = -8.11, p < .001). When introduced in 
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the initial model as an independent variable and contrary to our expectations, no effect 
other than those found without the variable was apparent.  
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, the time between the sentences was extended to 1000 
milliseconds. We expected this manipulation to favor the elaboration of specific 
emotion inferences by allocating enough time to the readers to construct complex text 
representations. In addition and following Estevez and Calvo’s (2000) results, low 
working memory participants were expected to benefit more from the extended time 
than high working memory participants. 
The results obtained in this experiment support the idea that readers need time to 
reach specific emotion representations. The difference between emotional and 
behavioral sentences was not replicated in this experiment suggesting that more time to 
process the text may diminish the readers’ preference to rely on core components of 
emotion when constructing emotion inferences. When enough time is available, readers 
seem to construct richer emotion inferences. 
In this experiment, contrary to Experiment 1, our potentially mediating variables 
had very little effect on the inferential processes that we identified. It is tempting to 
suggest that the extended time between sentence presentations may have acted as an 
individual differences inhibitor. In this case, low visuo-spatial working memory span 
participants may have benefited from the greater elaboration time leading to a similar 
pattern to that of high-span participants. 
However, it may also be the case that the extended time induced a non-natural 
reading situation leading to peculiar inferential patterns.  
In all, even if the results presented here support the fact that under certain 
circumstances, readers show an equal tendency to include emotional and behavioral 
information in their mental representations of the protagonist’s emotion, the specificity 
of the inferred emotion word is still not clear. This issue will be further developed in the 
following chapters.  
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4. Constructing Adequate Emotional Narratives to 
Investigate Emotion Inferences: Reconciling Emotion and 
Text Comprehension Research 	  	  	  
In this chapter, we present and discuss different issues related to the materials 
and the methodology used so far when investigating emotion inferences during text 
comprehension. We argue that insufficient control over the very construct of emotions 
has been achieved in most, if not all, of the experimental narratives that have been used 
in previous studies. We also argue that the match vs. mismatch effect typically used in 
inference research may not be adequate to assess deeper processes involved when 
readers construct mental models. Consequently, we first advocate for a better method to 
elaborate relevant emotional narratives – based on emotion research – and, second, for a 
different approach to the match vs. mismatch method. 	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Reading comprehension and emotion inferences 
 
When comprehending a text, readers elaborate a mental representation of the 
situation portrayed in the text. This mental representation is based on explicit elements 
described in the text and implicit elements deduced during reading through an inference 
process (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). As reading processes are quite fast and as 
readers have limited processing capacities regarding working memory, all possible 
inferences are not made online (i.e., during the reading), with some only being 
elaborated offline (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). Inferences can relate to different 
aspects of the text, such as spatial relationships, referents of nouns and pronouns, 
consequences of an event, or characters’ emotion, the latter being the focus of this 
thesis. For example, when reading, Sarah walked slowly from the nursing home to her 
place. She had trouble retaining her tears when thinking of her grandmother alone in 
her room readers may draw different inferences, one of which could relate to Sarah’s 
emotion (i.e., sadness). Different studies have shown that readers infer the main 
protagonist’s emotional state during reading (e.g., de Vega, Leon, & Diaz, 1996; 
Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 
1998), yet the specificity of these inferences have not received unanimous support (e.g., 
Gygax, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2004; Gygax, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2003).  
Most of the research on inferences and consequently on emotion inferences has 
been based on the match vs. mismatch paradigm. For example, typically, small 
narratives intended to trigger an emotional inference are presented to readers. At a 
certain point in the narrative, an emotion label is presented, either matching or 
mismatching the intended emotion, and researchers are interested in the time it takes 
readers to process the sentence including the emotional label. This paradigm relies on 
the notion that the time to read the target sentence mirrors the closeness between the 
emotional target and the content of the reader’s mental model. If a reader has previously 
inferred the information included in the target sentence, they will read this sentence 
faster than a sentence related to information not previously included in their mental 
model (Graesser et al., 1997).  
Although the self-pace reading paradigm has been widely used in inference 
research, the process to which faster or slower reading times are really linked is still a 
matter of debate. Gernsbacher et al. (1992) pointed out that faster reading times might 
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not indicate that information has already been included in the reader’s mental models 
but might indicate that this information is easily integrated into them. Similarly, Gygax, 
Tapiero, and Carruzzo (2007) differentiated the inference process from a context-
integration process. They argued that faster reading times of the target sentences may 
indicate an inference process but may also be related to the fact that the presented 
information is consistent with the representation being elaborated, although it does not 
mirror a previously made inference. Consequently, when comparing the processing time 
of mismatching versus matching sentences, one can identify which information is closer 
to that contained in the readers’ mental models but one cannot truly determine if the 
information contained in the matching sentences has already been inferred.  
When investigating the specificity of emotion inferences, this limitation is of 
prime importance regarding the conclusions that may be drawn. For example, 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) presented readers with target sentences containing a matching 
emotion (e.g., sad) or a mismatching emotion that was either of opposite (e.g., happy) or 
of same valence (e.g., shy) as the matching one. They showed that readers were faster to 
read the matching emotion sentences than the mismatching emotion sentences. 
According to these results, they concluded that readers include some emotional 
knowledge in their mental models of the text and that this emotional knowledge is more 
specific than valence. The specificity of such emotional knowledge was further 
investigated by Gygax et al. (2003, 2004), who decided to compare different matching 
emotion labels and, consequently, to investigate if readers constrain their 
representations of emotion so as to infer one emotion label (i.e., specific 
representations) or if their representations are more likely to match different related 
emotion labels (i.e., underspecified representation). In the first case, differences in 
reading times of target sentences containing a matching emotion (e.g., sad), a synonym 
emotion (e.g., depressed) or a similar emotion (e.g., miserable) should arise when 
confronted with emotional texts. This difference never occurred during online reading 
comprehension, even when readers were encouraged to constrain their representation 
(by using longer or ambiguous texts). Gygax et al. proposed that these results might 
reflect that readers do not need to access a specific emotion representation during 
reading but may rather include more general emotion information in their mental 
models of the text. This claim was further investigated by Gygax et al. (2007), who 
focused on the behavioural reaction associated with the emotion as a better indicator of 
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emotion inferences. They compared target sentences containing a matching or 
mismatching emotion label and target sentences containing a matching or mismatching 
behavioral reaction to the emotion described in the narrative. In order to control the 
match vs. mismatch issues introduced above, Gygax et al. proposed to implement a 
context-integration condition in addition to the usual matching vs. mismatching 
inference conditions. They presented their participants with control narratives and 
varied the information transmitted early in these narratives. In the control congruent 
condition, the second sentence was congruent with the first one whereas in the control 
incongruent condition the second sentence was incongruent. At this moment of the 
reading process, no inference regarding the narrative is likely to be made. Then, any 
mismatch effect is related to a context-integration process and not an inference process. 
In their experiment, Gygax et al. compared the amplitude of the mismatch effect linked 
to the control condition with the one linked to the emotion or the behavior conditions, 
revealing that, contrary to the emotion sentences, the difference between the matching 
and mismatching behavior sentences was greater than the difference between the 
matching and mismatching control sentences.  
 
Overlooked methodological issues in past studies 
 
Match vs. mismatch: A misleading path 
 
In this chapter, we propose that experiments conducted by Gygax et al. (2004) 
may have failed to assess the specificity of emotion inferences, mainly due to the fact 
that the small expected differences between the various matching conditions were very 
probably hidden by the huge incongruence effect linked to the mismatching sentences. 
In other words, their results actually showed small differences between the three 
matching conditions that may not have reached significance due to their comparison to 
the mismatching condition. In addition, if we agree that Gygax et al.’s (2007) context-
integration condition brought new control on the measure of the inference process, the 
authors again compared opposite emotion labels and may have missed subtle processes 
at play during emotion inference elaboration. We also consider that better control can be 
applied to the match-mismatch effect, as will be presented later in this chapter. 
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The control over the emotion construct in the narratives: Two crucial issues 
 
In addition to the limitations directly linked to the use of the match vs. mismatch 
paradigm, we claim that the texts used so far in emotion inference research may have 
not allowed readers to reach a specific emotion representation. In inference studies and 
as introduced before, participants are confronted with texts intended to transmit a 
representation of the main protagonist’s emotion. In some studies, the experimental 
texts are segments of narratives written by professional writers (as in Brunyé, Ditman, 
Mahoney, & Taylor, 2011; Dijkstra, Zwaan, Graesser, & Magliano, 1994; Molinari 
Marotto, Barreyro, Cevasco, & van den Broek, 2011). Although using such naturalistic 
texts has the advantage of investigating emotional inference in an ecological context, it 
has to deal with the issue that no control can be applied to the different properties of the 
text that are known for their influence on reading times (e.g., syntax, word frequencies, 
sentence complexity or length of the text) (Graesser et al., 1997). For this reason, 
research on inferences has mainly been conducted using texts, called textoids, created 
by the experimenters in order to control those variables. The textoids are typically short 
narratives describing an episode intended to induce an emotional state in the 
protagonist, without explicitly wording the emotion. They are written with the aim to 
mirror natural text on the first hand and to control for the text characteristics on the 
second hand. If the textoids used in previous studies have controlled the text properties 
quite well on a basic level (i.e., the words and syntax used in the target sentences), they 
have attributed little control over the emotion labels used in the target items (Issue I) or 
on the emotional content of the narratives (Issue II). However, the specificity of 
emotion inferences is directly related to what we define as an emotion. If one wants to 
determine if emotion inferences are specific or not, one has to precisely define what 
exactly is grouped under the term emotion.  
 
Target emotion labels 
Let us consider the first issue, namely the number and the variety of emotional 
terms investigated in previous studies. Although several authors selected a wide range 
of emotional states (e.g., de Vega et al., 1996; Gernsbacher et al, 1992; Molinari et al., 
2009), others focused on a very small sample of emotional states (e.g., Komeda & 
Kusumi, 2006). For example, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) worked on 24 emotion labels 
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and de Vega et al. (1996) included 48 emotion labels in their research. These emotion 
labels covered a wide range of emotional states, from emotions traditionally considered 
as primary (e.g., sadness, joy) to moods (e.g., depression, anxiety) or personality traits 
(e.g., shyness, confidence, bravery). On the contrary, Komeda and Kusumi (2002) only 
investigated the representation of emotion with narratives intended to elicit 
representations of worry or relief, emotional states that may also more define mood than 
emotion. It may be possible that inferences related to emotional states such as mood, 
emotions or personality traits are drawn in a same way. However, simulation accounts 
of reading comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Glenberg, 1999; Zwaan, 2004) 
propose that readers enter a simulation process in which they put themselves in the 
character’s shoes during reading. By doing this, readers reactivate previous information 
acquired while experiencing a similar situation in order to comprehend the situation 
pictured in the narrative. Regarding the basic differences between emotions, moods and 
personality traits, we doubt that the simulation processes implied in the comprehension 
of mood are as vivid as the ones related to the comprehension of emotion. This follows 
on from the idea that emotions are produced in reaction to a stimulus that is relevant to 
the organism, in order to mobilize resources and respond to this stimulus. Emotions are 
intense and have a short duration contrary to moods or personal traits, which are of low 
intensity, are not directly linked to a cause and can last for a long time (Frijda, 1986; 
Scherer, 2005). From this point of view, moods or personal traits have fewer defining 
characteristics that can be simulated. Consequently, the process of inference 
surrounding such emotional states may be different from the process of inference 
regarding emotions, given the relative lack of salience associated to moods or personal 
traits. Investigating emotion inferences using such various emotional states may then 
have lead to confound inference processes directly related to real emotions with 
inference processes related to more general emotional states.  
 
Emotion content of the narratives 
The second issue concerns the lack of control over the emotion construct 
described in the narratives and consequently, its relevancy regarding the emotion 
intended to be inferred. Researchers have created their experimental material by 
selecting emotion labels and writing narratives they estimated would match them, but 
few details on the exact emotional content of the narratives are available in the 
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literature. For example, de Vega et al. (1996) wrote two sets of 24 emotional narratives 
describing situations that are relevant to students, such as going on a date or passing an 
exam. In a first normative study, they identified the three most relevant emotion labels 
for each narrative. Then, they asked a sample of students to choose from these emotion 
labels the one that best matched the narrative. They selected the emotion label most 
frequently chosen for each narrative and obtained 24 pairs of emotions of opposite 
affective valence.  
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) constructed emotional narratives involving two 
characters and describing concrete actions, relationships and settings, sometimes 
mentioning the character’s goals, but never mentioning the character’s feelings. The 
authors controlled the relevancy of the narratives for the students by enrolling several 
undergraduate students in the construction of their material. Thus, the narratives were 
written based on the target emotion by a group of researchers and students. Gernsbacher 
et al. (1992) chose the target mismatching emotion labels afterwards and included either 
a mismatching emotion label, differing by its valence but quite similar to the other 
dimensions defined by Frijda (1986) (Experiments 1 and 3), or a mismatching emotion 
label of the same valence but differing on one of the other dimensions (Experiment 2).  
The choice of Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) emotion labels was challenged by 
Gygax et al. (2003). These authors used Gernsbacher et al.’s narratives and asked their 
participants to complete the target sentence [Main character] felt… without explicitly 
asking them to generate emotional words. Gygax et al. showed that the responses 
included a lot of different emotions that were not even synonymous. Gygax et al. then 
presented eight matching emotion labels for each narrative to their participants and 
asked them to rate how likely each emotion was to be felt by the protagonist. They 
found that for each narrative several (at least three) emotion labels were equally rated. 
These results pointed out that the narratives used in Gernsbacher et al.’s (1992) 
experiments were compatible with different emotion labels and, if they were relevant to 
test general emotional knowledge activation, they were not adequate to test the 
specificity of emotional inference. One possible explanation for this inadequacy may 
rely on the choice made by Gernsbacher et al. to focus on quite cold descriptions. There 
was almost no reference made to basic emotion characteristics (e.g., physiological or 
subjective reaction to the described situation) that are at the very base of emotion. This 
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may have caused readers to infer a broad emotional feeling, as not enough information 
was given in order to distinguish between similar specific emotions. 
In order to construct experimental emotional narratives leading to a higher 
agreement concerning the emotion pictured in the text, Gygax and Tapiero (2003) asked 
students to write descriptions of situations that would cause a given emotion for a 
hypothetical protagonist. By doing this, they intended to investigate the semantic field 
related to the different emotion terms used in their narratives. They identified different 
core categories (e.g., internal or external mental, internal or external physical, punctual 
or regular time, etc.) and developed their experimental narratives by choosing the most 
recurrent semantic categories resulting from the students’ propositions for Gernsbacher 
et al.’s (1992) emotion labels. Whereas the resulting narratives may be seen as the most 
representative for the student population investigated in this kind of research, we again 
claim that they were not written homogeneously enough. When looking closer at Gygax 
and Tapiero’s (2003) narratives, it appears that they do not contain the same amount of 
emotional information in terms of emotional features (see the following section for a 
detail description of what these features are). Whereas several narratives included a lot 
of physical descriptions (e.g., to walk slowly, to suffer, to retain tears for sadness), 
others were focused on cognitive descriptions (e.g., to blame oneself, to feel remorse in 
guilt) or on situational descriptions (e.g., to go home late, to be in the dark in fear). In 
addition, we consider that Gygax and Tapiero (2003) may have misinterpreted the 
categories by not relying on more accepted categories (e.g., appraisal, physiological 
reaction, action tendency) thoroughly described in emotion research as constitutive 
elements of the emotional experience (e.g., Ekman, 1977; Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984). 
These issues are of great importance in the debate on the specificity of emotional 
representation during reading since Gygax et al. (2007) argued that rather than 
including a specific representation of emotion in their mental model, readers infer the 
behavioural response to a situation as part of the emotion construct. They proposed that 
readers do not need to infer a specific emotion to comprehend a text and may be more 
likely to keep an open representation of the protagonist’s emotional state, based on 
stereotypical responses to emotion that can be shared by different emotions. Regarding 
the content of their experimental narratives, this assumption may have been a premature 
conclusion as no precise control (i.e., narratives generated by students) was applied to 
the quantity of emotion-related behavioral information included in the narratives.  
 Reconciling emotion and text comprehension research 
 
	  79 
A new approach to emotion inferences and the construct of narratives 
 
Theoretical background 
 
In this chapter, we propose a new approach to elaborate emotional narrative by 
filling the gap between psycholinguistics and emotion research. We argue that the need 
to control the emotional content of experimental narratives is a crucial issue when 
focusing on the specificity of emotion inferences. First, researchers need to define 
exactly which emotional states are under investigation. Then, to ensure the readers’ 
ability to reach a specific emotion representation during reading, an optimal condition 
should be determined that contains all the necessary emotional information needed to 
define a given emotion. Finally, less optimal conditions should be constructed by 
manipulating the information transmitted in the narratives in order to compare the 
different processes at stake when constructing representations of the protagonist’s 
emotion. This manipulation additionally offers a solution to the match-mismatch issues 
described above by allowing the construction of narratives differing by their 
congruency (or typicality) level to the matching emotion. Consequently, the comparison 
of the processing of the same target sentence in different contexts of congruency, in 
spite of different target sentences in the same context, would be possible.  
Identifying the corresponding emotional information requires the identification 
of semantic profiles related to the emotion terms used in the readers’ language. This line 
of research was initiated by Scherer (2005) who proposed asking participants to 
evaluate what would typically elicit a given emotion and what would be the typical 
responses triggered by this emotion. Before presenting the method used in this semantic 
approach, it is important to more precisely define what the term emotion encompasses. 
According to the widely accepted componential theories of emotion (Davidson, 2003; 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1984, 2005), an 
emotion is the resulting episode of a specific evaluation of an event, external or internal, 
that activates changes in the body. These changes happen in different subsystems of the 
organism and the activation of each subsystem corresponds to an emotion component. 
Scherer (2005) identifies the five following emotion components: (1) the Cognitive, (2) 
the Neurophysiological, (3) the Motivational, (4) the Motor Expression, and (5) the 
Subjective Feeling components. All components are highly interrelated, where changes 
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in one subsystem will produce changes in the other subsystems. The synchronized 
changes of activation in all emotion components lead to an emotional experience. The 
cognitive component corresponds to the appraisal of the situation and is composed of a 
hierarchical sequence of stimulus evaluation checks. The emotional responses of the 
other subsystems are elicited via the appraisal of the situation in a dynamic and 
cumulative way (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 1984). The neurophysiological 
component refers to bodily symptoms generated in somatic nervous, neuroendocrine 
and autonomic systems (e.g., heartbeat, breathing or muscle reaction). The motivational 
component consists of action tendencies produced by the appraisals, like redirecting 
one’s attention or moving towards or away from the stimulus. Changes in facial and 
vocal expressions compose the Motor Expression component and the Subjective Feeling 
component regarding the intensity, duration, valence, arousal and tension aspects of the 
emotional experience.  
Various features characterize the five components of emotion and 144 features 
have been identified and adapted from questionnaires used in previous studies (Scherer 
& Wallbott, 1994; Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986). Among these features, 31 
refer to the Appraisal component, 18 to the Psychophysiological component, 26 to the 
Motor Expression component, 42 to the Action Tendency component and 22 to the 
Subjective Feeling component. As a given feature (e.g., to smile) is more or less 
probable to happen when experiencing different emotions, it is possible to characterize 
an emotion according to the features it is the most related to. The GRID instrument 
(Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, in press; 
Scherer, 2005) was developed to do exactly this. It is a Web-based questionnaire 
containing 24 emotion terms and all the emotion features. The emotion terms 
correspond to twelve emotion words often used in emotion research (i.e., anger, 
contempt, disgust, fear, guilt, interest, joy, pleasure, pride, sadness, shame, surprise) and 
twelve emotion words frequently reported in free-listing tasks and self-reports of 
emotional experiences (i.e., anxiety, compassion, contentment, despair, disappointment, 
happiness, irritation, stress, being hurt, jealousy, hate, love). For a given emotion, 
participants are asked to evaluate, on a 9-point scale, the probability of each of the 144 
emotion features to be inferred when the emotion label is used in their cultural group. In 
essence, the GRID instrument assesses the semantic field of emotions within more than 
20 languages. For psycholinguists, both its semantic input and its cultural specificity are 
 Reconciling emotion and text comprehension research 
 
	  81 
crucial in enabling them to construct appropriate materials, as outlined in the concrete 
example presented in the following section. 
 
A practical case: Constructing French narratives 
 
In this section, we present an example of a concrete use of the GRID to construct 
emotion narratives, in French (based on Fontaine et al., 2007), to investigate the 
aforementioned issue of specificity within emotion inferences. By using this example, 
we aim to provide readers with a glimpse at the numerous possibilities that the GRID 
offers to researchers interested in emotion inferences.  
In Fontaine et al. (2007), 145 Swiss French-speaking students were asked to fill 
in the GRID questionnaire. Centered means for each feature of each emotion were 
calculated, allowing a classification of the features in terms of the probability of 
appearance in each emotion. This classification of the feature’s scores enabled the 
authors to identify the most, neutral or least typical features for each component of a 
given emotion. For example, the most typical Motor Expression feature of anger is to 
open the eyes widely whereas the least typical feature is to not show any change in vocal 
expression. More neutral features include expressions such as showing tears or having a 
trembling voice.  
As stated above, we claim that the specificity of emotion inferences would be 
best assessed by comparing the same emotion target sentence in different levels of 
narrative congruency, with a reference level corresponding to the optimal condition in 
which such inferences are most likely to be generated. Crucially, and according to 
Scherer’s (1984, 2005) definition of emotion, an experimental narrative in the optimal 
condition should contain all components of the target emotion defined by their most 
typical feature.  
To construct congruency levels of narratives, one can manipulate the quality or 
the quantity of emotion information transmitted in the narratives. By quality of emotion 
information, we mean the typicality of the components’ features. For example, in a less 
congruent version of a narrative, in terms of quality, the features defining the different 
components may be congruent but not typical of the intended emotion. By quantity of 
emotion information, we mean the total number of components defined by their typical 
feature. In this case, a less congruent version of a narrative would include only some, 
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yet not all, components (defined by their typical features) of the particular emotion. In 
sum, one can quite easily play around with both quality and quantity dimensions when 
constructing the narratives, depending on the research question at hand. 
Crucially though, when developing the experimental narratives, if it is essential 
to ensure that they do differ across conditions, it is fundamental to verify that one 
version of an emotion does not correspond to some version of another emotion. In other 
words, if it is clear that different narrative versions of a given emotion are more or less 
congruent regarding the intended emotion, a narrative less congruent to a given emotion 
may be typical regarding another emotion. In this case, it is possible that encountering 
the target sentence in the less congruent version of a given emotion narrative may elicit 
a mismatch effect as the readers may have inferred the emotion word typically defined 
by the component’s features. Still, although some emotions do share most typical 
features for some or most of their components, they usually differ in one or more 
components. For example, irritation and hate have the same most probable features 
concerning Appraisal (i.e., the character is treated unjustly), Action Tendency (i.e., to 
want to damage, hit or say something that hurts), Motor Expression (i.e., to move 
against people or things) and Psychophysiological Reactions (i.e., heartbeat getting 
faster). However, their Subjective Feeling component is different (i.e., feeling restless 
for irritation and being in an intense emotional state for hate). In this case, it is probable 
that readers confronted with narratives containing all components but the Subjective 
Feeling component are as likely to infer that the protagonist is feeling hate or irritation. 
Note that the scores defining the probability to encounter each of these features may not 
be the same for the two emotions, giving us some insight into which emotion may or 
may not be inferred.  
There are actually many ways to choose the features to be integrated into the 
different versions of a narrative, the semantic distance required between the versions 
being highly influential. In terms of quantity, less congruent versions can contain none 
to four emotion components, yet in terms of quality, less congruent versions may be 
more or less close to the optimal version when looking at individual features’ scores.  
In Gillioz & Gygax (2012, see Chapter 5), we wrote three versions of twenty-
four narratives (i.e., twenty-four emotions) using the GRID instrument. Each narrative 
(whatever version) comprised seven sentences. The first sentence always described a 
general context and the final sentence, the target sentence, included the intended 
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emotion. Sentences 2 to 6 were intended for experimental manipulation. Essentially, 
each sentence could correspond to a component of the intended emotion. Our first 
manipulation constituted a quantity manipulation whereby the quantity of emotion 
components available to the readers varied in some versions of the narratives. This 
manipulation concurs with the idea initiated by Gygax et al. (2004) that an emotion 
inference may reach specificity if sufficient relevant emotional information is provided 
to the readers. Contrary to Gygax et al. (2004), who focused on the length of the 
narrative and the number of details to encourage readers to constrain their emotion 
representation to a specific one, we concentrated on the quantity of emotion 
components in each narrative. If readers construct their mental representation of an 
emotion as the emotion itself is constructed when responding to an affective situation 
(i.e., by cumulating all component responses), readers may require all the components 
(in the text or inferred) to activate a specific emotion representation. In the optimal 
version of the narratives, we inserted all five relevant components, each described by its 
most typical feature, hence providing the readers with all the needed information in its 
most relevant form. In the moderate version of the narratives, we only provided readers 
with three components, also described by their most typical features (the other two 
component sentences were replaced by neutral filler sentences). Our second 
manipulation constituted a quality manipulation whereby we manipulated the typicality 
of the features presented for each component. In the suitable version of the narratives, 
we kept the five components as in the optimal version but altered the quality of two 
emotion components (i.e., the Motor Expression and the Psychophysiological 
components) by including congruent yet less typical features. In sum, each version of 
the narratives differed only in two sentences. The optimal version presented all 
components with the most typical features, the suitable presented all components with 
two of them including less typical yet congruent features and the moderate version 
presented filler neutral sentences instead of relevant components for the two crucial 
manipulated sentences.  
To ensure that our manipulations were appropriate, we kept the same relative 
semantic distance between the versions of each narrative by computing a distance ratio 
as follows: We first identified the one emotion in the GRID that presented the highest 
score for the most typical feature of the Motor Expression and Psychophysiological 
components respectively. These were happiness and love. Basically, we considered 
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these as our reference emotions. We then selected a congruent yet less typical feature of 
the Motor Expression component of happiness and a congruent yet less typical feature 
of the Psychophysiological component of love. Finally, we computed the ratio between 
the scores of typical and congruent features for each component and used it to choose 
all the features of Motor Expression and Psychophysiological components for the 
emotions we planned to test.  
Importantly for our manipulation check, narratives in the different versions 
presented statistically different total typicality scores, F(2, 46) = 616.94, p < .001. The 
optimal versions (M = 14.00, SD = 1.94) were more typical than the suitable versions 
(M = 10.77, SD = 1.32), F(1, 23) = 369.90, p < .001 and, in turn, more typical than the 
moderate version (M = 8.70, SD = 1.29), F(1, 23) = 977.92, p < .001. A supplementary 
offline check was conducted to verify that these new narratives were appropriate to 
elicit representations of protagonists’ emotions, where we asked forty-eight participants 
to choose among three emotion words the label that best matched the emotional state 
felt by the protagonist. For each narrative, we presented the participants with the 
intended emotion word, a similar emotion word and an emotion word of same valence. 
The agreement concerning the intended emotion label (65%) was constant across all 
versions of the narratives, showing that they were all congruent to the intended emotion, 
even more so than those used by Gygax et al. (2004), who found an offline agreement 
of 49% on the intended emotion when presenting participants with Gernsbacher et al.’s 
(1992) original narratives. The percentage of choice was very close to the one found by 
Gygax et al. (2004) when presenting readers with longer narratives (63%), suggesting 
that if the quality (in terms of components and features) of the emotion information 
presented in the narratives is sufficient (and this was the case even with only three 
different components in the moderate versions), there is no need to make the narratives 
longer in order to elicit emotion representations among the readers, at least offline. 
In a subsequent reading experiment investigating online processes, sixty-four 
participants were presented with the emotional narratives constructed with the GRID. In 
this experiment, special focus was allocated to (self-paced) reading times of target 
sentences containing intended emotions. Contrary to Gygax et al.’s (2004) findings of 
no differences in reading times of target sentences containing either an intended, a 
synonym or a similar emotion, differences in the reading times between the versions 
(i.e., optimal, suitable and moderate) were apparent. Specifically, readers were slower to 
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read target sentences in the optimal condition than in the suitable and moderate 
conditions. If this slowdown effect is somehow contrary to what could be expected in 
light of the habitual match vs. mismatch effect (i.e., faster reading times in the most 
typical version of the narrative), the authors suggested that an integration process had 
taken place in the optimal condition, resulting in deeper processes (hence the slower 
reading times), supporting the idea that under certain ideal conditions (i.e., all relevant 
components and features are presented), readers can infer specific emotions, contrary to 
previous claims.   
 
Concluding comments 
 
Emotional narratives based on emotion research (i.e., the GRID instrument), 
offer new possibilities to investigate emotion inferences and all satellite issues. Most 
importantly, it provides researchers with a better control over the content of their 
experimental materials. Consequently, it also broadens paradigm prospects by 
extending possibilities beyond the usual (and maybe imprecise) match vs. mismatch 
paradigm. Preliminary results using an optimal congruent vs. moderate congruent 
paradigm (as explained above) suggest that, if previously studied, match vs. mismatch 
effects may have highlighted some processes linked to inference processing, but they 
have not allowed us to pinpoint differences between shallow mapping processes and 
deeper integration processes. The latter might only become apparent and measurable 
when comparing same emotion targets in different contexts of typicality/congruency. In 
fact, results grounded in typical vs. less typical effects might question not only previous 
results on emotion inferences but also more general conclusions on inference processes. 
For example, Gillioz and Gygax’s (2012) reading patterns cast doubts on previous 
interpretations of reading times.  
In conclusion, in this chapter we presented a new way to control the emotion 
construct (based on emotion research) contained in experimental narratives used to 
examine emotional inferences. If researchers have so far controlled for basic properties 
of the text, we argue that this control may not have been sufficient to examine deeper 
processes involved in emotion inferences. 	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5. Going Beyond the Simple Match-Mismatch Effect: 
Emotion Inferences and Their Underlying Construct 
 
 
 
Research on emotion inferences has shown that readers include a representation 
of the character’s emotional state in their mental model of the text but the specificity of 
this representation is still a matter of debate. In this chapter, we show that readers can 
infer specific emotions but only provided that the text comprises appropriate 
components of emotions (and their relevant features). We further claim that past 
psycholinguistic research failed to adequately consider research on emotion construct 
and that the habitual match-mismatch paradigm may have shadowed the actual 
processes at stake. 	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Comprehending a text requires readers to go beyond the words and to form 
mental representations partly based on the information transmitted by them. These 
mental representations, called mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) or situation models 
(Kintsch, 1988) contain not only elements made explicit in the text but also implicit 
elements. As the text unfolds, readers include these implicit elements in their mental 
representations by making inferences based on their general knowledge. Inferences 
enable readers to maintain global or local coherence in the text (Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994). At a local level, inferences allow readers to connect adjacent 
components of the text. At a global level, they are necessary to map incoming 
information to more distant components of the text and to reach comprehension of some 
general features (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). Very importantly, mental models 
contain more than the text itself and include perceptual elements associated to symbolic 
ones (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Their content is perpetually updated according to new 
information but also according to what was already included in them; in this sense, 
mental models guide reading and consequently inference processes (Glenberg, Meyer, 
& Lindem, 1987).  
Among all inferences possible, some have received relatively sparse attention, 
one of which being protagonists’ emotional, or affective state(s). Part of the research on 
this particular inference has tried to focus on the specific nature of emotions in mental 
models. In other words, some researchers have questioned whether readers infer specific 
emotions, therefore differentiating between similar emotions such as sad and depressed, 
or infer only global emotional states. In these studies, as in other studies on inferences 
in text comprehension, the match vs. mismatch paradigm has been mostly used. In this 
paradigm, participants are presented with short narratives intended to elicit mental 
representations of the main protagonist’s emotional state. Each narrative usually 
includes at some point a target sentence either matching or mismatching the intended 
emotion. The time taken to read this target sentence is typically recorded and the time 
necessary to process the matching sentence is compared to the time needed to process 
the mismatching one. Behind this paradigm is the assumption that if readers have 
previously inferred the intended emotion (i.e., have included it in their mental models), 
they will be faster to read the matching target sentence. When confronted to the 
mismatching target sentence, readers should slow their reading pace, as the content of 
the sentence contradicts their current mental models. In this last case, a relatively 
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effortful process of adjustment has to be activated, reflected in longer reading times. 
Essentially, reading times of target sentences mirror how close the information in the 
sentences are to readers’ mental models.  
Using this paradigm, Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, and Robertson (1992) showed 
that readers, when presented with a narrative inducing a representation of the 
protagonist’s emotion, were faster to read a target sentence containing a matching 
emotion (e.g., guilty) than a target sentence containing either a mismatching converse 
emotion (e.g., proud) or a mismatching emotion label of the same valence as the 
intended emotion (e.g., shy). The authors concluded that readers do infer precise (or 
specific in terms of Gygax, Oakhill, and Garham, 2003) emotions when reading, and not 
only valence. In a later study, Gernsbacher and Robertson (1992) showed that these 
inferences were rather impermeable to cognitive load, therefore automatic.  
Gygax et al. (2003) and Gygax, Garnham, and Oakhill (2004) showed however 
that even if emotion inferences contain more than just valence, it did not necessarily 
mean that they were precise or specific. These authors used the same narratives as in 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) and also tested target sentences including an emotion 
synonym to the one tested by Gernsbacher et al. (1992) and target sentences including a 
similar emotion, yet not a synonym. If readers always slowed down when encountering 
the mismatching target sentence, they were equally fast to read the different matching 
sentences (i.e., initial, synonym and similar emotions). These results remained the same 
when the narratives were elaborated so as to force a more specific emotion inference by 
introducing more emotion information in them or by rendering them ambiguous (Gygax 
et al., 2004).  
One possible way to explain the non-specificity of emotion inferences was 
proposed by Gygax, Tapiero, and Carruzzo (2007), who suggested that emotion 
inferences may be elaborated in a constructivist manner. According to the authors, 
emotional inference may be based on a sum of stereotypical components, such as 
valence or the behavioral responses associated to emotions. They argued that if one 
were to accurately access emotion inferences, one would need to investigate some of 
these components as inferences instead of the global resulting emotions. Gygax et al. 
(2007) presented their participants with similar narratives as used in previous research 
and also tested target sentences including a matching or a mismatching behavior. They 
also controlled for what they called the context integration issue. Basically, Gygax et al. 
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argued that the differences between reading times of matching and mismatching target 
sentences may reflect two different processes: An inferential process (as always 
assumed) or a context integration process (less likely to give us valuable insight). They 
argued that researchers rarely differentiated between the two. In the former case, readers 
are faster to read matching sentences because they include previously inferred 
information. In the latter case, readers are simply faster to read matching sentences 
because they do not contradict readers’ mental models. Gygax et al. proposed that the 
difference between reading times of matching and mismatching target sentences related 
to an inference process should be greater than the difference elicited by a context 
integration process. They actually showed that differences between matching and 
mismatching behavior sentences were bigger than differences between matching and 
mismatching emotion sentences (i.e., including emotion terms), which in turn were 
similar to those in the context integration control conditions. The authors concluded that 
these results supported previous claims emotions per se were not adequate to investigate 
emotion inferences. Gillioz, Gygax, and Tapiero (2012) further showed that if readers 
infer the behaviors associated to emotions and not the emotions per se, they do it 
independently of general working memory capacities, empathy level or simulation 
processes. Still, the authors did find that simulation processes enhanced behavioral 
preference for readers with high visuo-spatial working memory capacities, giving some 
support to the idea that mental models may well be perceptual (Glenberg, 1999; 
Glenberg et al., 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983).  
All these results support the idea that behaviors associated to emotions are more 
likely to be inferred during reading than emotion per se. Importantly, these behavioral 
inferences are particular as they are different from inferences of any non-emotional 
behaviors (Gygax, 2010). The behavioral component of an emotion, as part of the 
stereotypical information related to this emotion, may well be inferred at an early stage 
in the elaboration of a specific representation of the main protagonist’s emotional state. 
This early-stage representation might be completed as new information is made 
available to readers. According to Gygax and colleagues, inferring stereotypical 
information about an emotion would allow readers to rely on salient characteristics of 
the emotion yet keeping the representation broad enough to easily adapt it to new 
information (i.e., a behavior is often shared by more than one emotion). Attributing a 
very precise or specific label to the emotion felt by the protagonist may force readers 
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under certain conditions to revise it according to incoming information, which may be 
cognitively costly. In addition, this representation might well be good enough, or 
sufficient, to comprehend the text (as in the good-enough representation concept of 
Ferreira, Bailey, and Ferraro, 2002). 
One could also argue that the simulation process involved in reading 
comprehension usually reactivates perceptual symbols acquired during preceding 
experiences of a situation, which are related to modality specific systems of the 
organism (Barsalou, 1999b). Even if a full reenactment of the bodily and introspective 
states is not necessary to access knowledge, some core parts of the previous experience 
are still reactivated (Barsalou, 1999b). An associated behavior may be a good candidate 
for such reactivation as emotions can generally be considered as preparation for actions 
(Frijda, 2005). In addition, all theoretical models of emotion include a behavioral 
component, either at the center of the emotional process (Frijda, 1986) or as a key 
component happening at the end of a sequential process of emotion (Davidson, 2003; 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). 
If this idea of emotion component has been increasingly linked to emotion 
inferences in text comprehension (mainly by Gygax & colleagues) we believe that a 
significant part of its potential contribution to our understanding of emotion inferences 
has been neglected. Namely, researchers (including Gygax & colleagues) have failed to 
fully integrate theories on the componential composition of emotions (e.g. Davidson, 
2003; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1984, 2005) into their models of emotion 
inferences. The present chapter attempts to correct this and to present a more integrative 
approach of emotion inferences in reading.   
Most important to this approach is the fact that if readers construct their mental 
representation of an emotion as they would construct an emotional response to an 
emotion-eliciting situation, they will require all relevant components – explicitly in the 
text or inferred – to activate a specific or complex emotion. By activating and 
integrating only one or two components in their mental models, readers will unlikely 
elaborate a complex emotion representation. The lack of specificity of emotional 
inferences found in previous studies might therefore simply emanate from the 
unspecific content of the narratives used to test emotion inferences. In other words, the 
narratives used, whatever the conditions (i.e., high working memory, specific 
simulation processes, …) could never allow readers to reach more elaborate emotions. 
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Although Gygax et al. (2004) hinted at the possibility of a failure of the narratives to 
convey appropriate information, their explanation was based on a quantitative argument 
(i.e., not enough information) and not on a qualitative one (i.e., not the appropriate 
information), which we present here. In previous research, since the most appropriate, 
or salient information may not have been available to readers, they may have stopped 
their inference processes at an earlier component stage.  
Methodologically, we also argue that previous studies may have failed to detect 
the specificity of emotional inferences due to the use of the match vs. mismatch 
paradigm. If using this paradigm confirmed that readers were faster to read matching 
than mismatching emotion target sentences, these results mainly relied on mismatching 
effects. We claim that it is actually quite difficult to distinguish effects coming from a 
mismatching sentence (i.e., slower reading times) and those coming from a matching 
sentence (i.e., faster reading times), although researchers often make claims as if the 
effect was bound to the matching conditions.  Even if implementing Gygax et al.’s 
(2007) control condition, subtle processes of inference elaboration may be absorbed by 
relatively huge match vs. mismatch effects.   
In the present chapter, we attempted to access more subtle processes (1) by 
relying on emotion research to better ensure the quality of emotion information in our 
experimental narratives and (2) by relying on differential levels of congruency only 
(moderate, suitable and optimal).  
For the quality of the information presented to readers (and incidentally for the 
levels of congruency), we relied on Scherer’s (1984, 2005) definition of emotion as a 
result of synchronized and interrelated changes in five components linked to the 
different subsystems of the organism. Among the components, the Appraisal 
component corresponds to the evaluation of the situation that triggers the emotion and is 
composed of a hierarchical sequence of stimulus evaluation checks. The Motor 
Expression component involves the changes in face, voice and gesture. The Action 
Tendency component relates to the motivational aspect of emotion and the 
Psychophysiological component involves the different bodily changes. Finally, the 
Subjective Feeling component is a monitoring component concerning the general 
feeling associated to the event or situation. All components are highly interrelated, 
changes in one subsystem producing changes in the other subsystems. Most 
importantly, the emotional responses of the bodily subsystems are elicited via the 
 Emotion inferences and their underlying construct 
 
	  93 
appraisal of the situation in a dynamic and cumulative way (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; 
Scherer, 1984). 
Crucially, all the components are present in each emotional episode and different 
emotions are elicited via different activations of these components (i.e., different 
component features). Scherer (2005) proposed to develop an instrument in order to 
investigate the semantic field of emotion and determine which features of the 
components are likely to happen in a given emotional episode. For example, for the 
emotion anger, a psychophysiological feature might be a red face. The GRID 
instrument (Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth 2007; Fontaine, Scherer & Soriano, 
in press; Scherer, 2005), a web-based questionnaire, was built to access this 
information. It comprises a representative set of 24 emotion terms and 144 emotion 
features, which reflect activity in the five components of emotion. In Fontaine et al. 
(2007), 145 French-speaking Swiss students were presented with the emotion terms and 
the 144 emotion features. They were asked to evaluate on a 9-point scale how each 
emotion feature is related to the emotion terms in their particular cultural group. This 
study allowed the authors to identify which feature of each component characterized the 
most appropriately a given emotion. It also permitted to classify the different features 
for each component of each emotion, from the most typical to the least typical. For 
example, the most typical motor expression feature for happiness is to smile whereas 
the least typical feature is to frown. In between, features such as increase the volume of 
voice or having a trembling voice are quite neutral, because they are neither judged as 
likely to happen nor as unlikely to happen.  
The GRID scores allowed us to identify typical features as well a less typical 
ones for a given emotion, with which we created better controlled emotional narratives 
by manipulating the number of emotional components present in the narratives and the 
typicality of their features. The reading experiments presented in this chapter were 
consequently based on an optimal congruent vs. moderate congruent paradigm instead 
of a matching vs. mismatching paradigm. This manipulation gives the possibility to 
compare specific emotional inference as well as emotion components inference in 
different conditions of typicality. In short, a congruent target sentence following a 
narrative with most typical features (i.e., the optimal condition) should be read faster 
than the same congruent target sentence following less typical, yet still plausible 
features (i.e., the moderate condition). In addition, internally to the narratives, if readers 
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elaborate their mental representation of emotion based on emotion components, these 
components described by typical features should be read faster than those described by 
less typical features.  
Inherent to these issues is the difficulty of constructing appropriate narratives. 
We next present a Pilot study intended to provide us with adequate materials for our 
purposes. 
 
 
Constructing narratives: Pilot study 	  
The goal of the pilot study was to construct emotional narratives based on the 
features identified in the GRID instrument and to control that these narratives did elicit 
the intended emotions. In essence, we made sure that the GRID provided us with 
valuable information as to investigate emotion inferences. 
 
Method 	  
Participants 
Forty-eight students of a psychology introductory course from the University of 
Lausanne took part in this experiment. All participants spoke French as their first 
language. There were 38 women and the participants were aged from 19 to 33 (M = 
22.14, SD = 3.58). 
 
Materials 
 
Emotional narratives 
For each of the 24 emotional labels contained in the GRID instrument, we 
constructed a corresponding narrative (see Table 5 for a full list of the emotions tested 
in our study). Each narrative started with a sentence introducing the protagonist and 
describing the context of the narrative. This sentence was followed by five sentences, 
each related to one of the five emotion components (i.e., Motor Expression, Appraisal, 
Psychophysiology, Action Tendency and Subjective Feeling). We wrote each narrative 
in three versions in order to manipulate the specificity of the narrative, as discussed 
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earlier. We varied the degree of typicality of the components present in the narratives 
and the number of components across the narratives to get three levels of typicality (i.e., 
moderate, suitable & optimal). In the optimal version of each narrative, the most typical 
feature of each component was included in its corresponding sentence. For example, in 
the narrative about Happiness, the most typical Motor Expression component 
corresponded to smile, the most typical Psychophysiology component to the heartbeat 
getting faster and the most typical Appraisal component corresponded to a situation in 
itself pleasant for the person. In other words, the optimal version of each narrative 
contained all the necessary information needed to define a specific emotion.  
 
TABLE 5. Emotions investigated by the GRID instrument and used in Experiments 3, 4, 5 and 
6. 
Happiness, Joy, Contentment, Pleasure, Pride, Anger, Love, Fear, Sadness, Despair, 
Shame, Interest, Irritation, Jealousy, Guilt, Anxiety, Surprise, Hate, Disappointment, 
Being hurt, Disgust, Contempt, Stress, Compassion. 
 
In the suitable version of each narrative, we replaced the most typical features of 
the Motor Expression and the Psychophysiology components with congruent but less 
typical features whereas the Appraisal, Action Tendency and Subjective Feeling 
components remained unchanged. In the narrative about Happiness, for example, the 
Motor Expression component to smile was replaced by to speak faster, whereas the 
Psychophysiology component the heartbeat getting faster was replaced by the 
breathing getting faster. All other components were unchanged. The suitable version 
hence contained as many component sentences as the typical version but two of these 
component sentences were less typical as to  the intended emotion.  
In the moderate version of each narrative, the Motor Expression and the 
Psychophysiology components sentences were replaced by neutral filler sentences that 
did not convey any emotional information. In a pre-test, eight students were asked to 
evaluate the extent to which 78 sentences intended to be neutral conveyed an emotional 
information on a 6-point scale (0 = does not convey any emotional information to 5 = 
conveys a lot of emotional information).  
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TABLE 6. Example of an emotional narrative used in the pilot study and Experiments 3, 4, 5 
and 6 in the three typicality versions. In the Pilot study, the final target sentence was not 
presented. Instead, participants had to rank three possible emotions in terms of salience to the 
narrative. 
Optimal version 
Context sentence: As she was arguing with her best friend, Emily did not agree with her and 
could not help shouting at her. 
Motor expression component: As soon as she heard what she said, Emily fell silent.  
Psychophysiology component: At the same time, she felt a knot in her stomach. 
Appraisal component: Emily knew she could have avoided this situation.  
Action Tendency component: She really wanted to disappear.  
Subjective Feeling component: At that moment, Emily felt bad. 
Target sentence: Emily felt guilty. 
Suitable version 
Context sentence: As she was arguing with her best friend, Emily did not agree with her and 
could not help shouting at her. 
Motor expression component: As soon as she heard what she said, Emily changed the 
melody of her voice.  
Psychophysiology component: At the same time, she felt her muscles tensing. 
Appraisal component: Emily knew she could have avoided this situation.  
Action Tendency component: She really wanted to disappear.  
Subjective Feeling component: At that moment, Emily felt bad. 
Target sentence: Emily felt guilty. 
Moderate version 
Context sentence: As she was arguing with her best friend, Emily did not agree with her and 
could not help shouting at her. 
Filler neutral sentence: The two friends were at Emily’s place.  
Filler neutral sentence: They were talking about what had happened that day. 
Appraisal component: Emily knew she could have avoided this situation.  
Action Tendency component: She really wanted to disappear.  
Subjective Feeling component: At that moment, Emily felt bad. 
Target sentence: Emily felt guilty. 
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We retained the 48 filler sentences having the lowest scores (M = 0.26, SD = 0.44) and 
added them in the moderate versions of the narratives, ensuring that their meaning 
would not impinge upon the narratives’ general meaning. Compared to the optimal and 
suitable versions, the moderate version of each narrative contained only three 
components of emotional experiences.  
In all versions of the narratives and for each component sentence, we included 
the exact words used in the GRID. Table 6 shows an example of a narrative in each 
version of typicality.  
 
Questionnaire about the emotional narratives 
Three booklets containing eight narratives in the optimal version, eight 
narratives in the suitable version and eight narratives in the moderate version were 
constructed. In each booklet, a narrative appeared in one version and the order of 
presentation of the narratives was random. For each narrative, three emotion labels were 
proposed. The first emotion label corresponded to the emotion intended by the authors 
and to the features combination present in the narrative. The second emotion label 
corresponded to a synonym emotion term when possible or to an emotion term 
matching the described situation (e.g., pleasure in the happiness narrative, or hate in the 
anger narrative). The third emotion term corresponded to an emotion of same valence 
as the intended emotion but not synonym of it (e.g., interest in the happiness narrative 
or anxiety in the anger narrative). The emotion labels were presented in a semi-random 
order. 
 
Procedure 
Each participant received one of the three booklets. The participants were asked 
to read each narrative of the booklet carefully and to order the three emotions from the 
most relevant to the narrative to the least relevant.  	  
Results and discussion 	  
In this pilot study, we wanted to ensure that our narratives would lead to a high 
agreement among participants about which emotion is ranked first, especially for the 
optimal versions. Still, as these narratives were elaborated on the emotion features 
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identified by the GRID instrument and contained at least three typical features of the 
emotion, we expected the participants to generally rank the intended emotions as first 
and those of same valence as last.  
In Table 7, we present the percentages of choice of each emotion type across the 
different versions. The choice of the intended emotion label as the best label for the 
narrative was constant among the different versions of the narratives, F(2,46) = 1.00, 
MSE = 1.68, p = .38, and was clearly above chance (33%), t(23) = 7.68, p < .001.  
 
 
TABLE 7. Percentages of choice of the different emotions in the three versions of the 
emotional narratives in the Pilot study 
Versions Intended label Similar label Same valence label 
Optimal 64.39 28.54 7.07 
Suitable 64.05 27.34 8.61 
Moderate 66.96 25.99 7.07 
 
 
As expected, the narratives constructed based on typical features of emotion 
components identified by the GRID instrument elicited a high choice rate of the 
intended emotions compared to synonym emotions or emotions of same valence, and 
this in all three versions. These results confirm that all versions of the narratives are 
congruent to the intended emotions (i.e., which become the target emotion in 
Experiments 3, 4, 5 and 6) and that the GRID provided us with the appropriate materials 
on which to base our materials. 
Note that, as this Pilot study was offline by nature, these results could be taken 
as support to the idea raised by Gygax et al.’s (2004) that, if readers are provided with 
the appropriate information, they may build a more specific emotion representation, at 
least offline. However, nothing can yet be said about the online status of these 
inferences, which is central to Experiment 3. If investigated offline there did not seem 
to be much difference between the different versions of the narratives, we actually 
expect this to be different when tested online. 	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Experiment 3: 
Emotion components and the specificity of emotion inferences 	  
The Pilot study mainly showed that the GRID instrument provided us with the 
appropriate materials on which to base our narratives to test our hypotheses on the 
influence of typicality on the mental representations of emotions. In the present 
experiment, we went a step further and investigated the online construction of the 
protagonist’s emotional status using narratives based on the GRID. The aim of this 
experiment was twofold.  
First, we wanted to see if the lack of specificity of emotion inference argued by 
Gygax and colleagues was a consequence of the underspecified emotion information in 
terms of emotion components in the experimental narratives used in previous research. 
Embodied views of cognition suggest that previous experiences of emotion may be 
central to the understanding of any emotional situation, hinting that this may also be the 
case when understanding emotion from text. Consequently, readers may construct their 
mental representations of a protagonist’s emotional state on the basis of different 
stereotypical emotional features. We therefore hypothesized that readers are more likely 
to specifically infer an intended emotion when presented with all the emotion features 
highly consistent with and typical to this emotion (i.e., in the optimal condition). A 
decrease in typicality (i.e., in the suitable or moderate conditions), although all features 
may be present, may result in a less specific representation.  
Second, we wanted to look at the sequential process of inferences as a narrative 
unfolds its emotion components. As proposed by Gygax and colleagues, readers may 
rely on these components to infer specific emotions, but some of them may well be 
inferred well before readers reach their explicit mention. To investigate this issue, we 
measured reading times of all sentences (i.e., not only the final target sentence). 
 
Method 	  
Participants 
Sixty-four participants (fifty women) of a psychology introductory course from 
the University of Fribourg took part in this experiment. All participants spoke French as 
their first language. The participants were aged from 18 to 44 (M = 22.87, SD = 4.59). 
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Material 
 
Emotional narratives 
The same emotional narratives as in the Pilot study were used in this experiment. 
We added a target sentence containing the intended emotion (i.e., the one from the 
GRID instrument) at the end of each narrative, structured as this: [Main character] felt 
[target emotion].  
Each participant saw eight narratives in the optimal version, eight narratives in 
the suitable version and eight narratives in the moderate version. In each version set, 
half of the narratives were presented with the Appraisal and Motor Expression 
components appearing at the beginning of the narrative and the other half of the 
narratives with the Action Tendency and Psychophysiology components appearing first. 
To ensure that all narratives would be seen across the experiment in all versions and that 
participants would be confronted to all experimental condition versions, we constructed 
six lists. 
 
Filler narratives  
Twenty-four filler narratives were added to the experimental narratives. These 
narratives were written in the same style as the experimental narratives but were not 
intended to transmit any emotional information. They were mainly intended to ensure 
that the participants did not uncover the aim of the experiment. 
The narratives were randomly presented using Psyscope Software (Cohen, 
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Reading times of each sentence were collected 
using a response button box attached to the computer, which permits millisecond 
accuracy. 
 
Additional post-experimental questionnaire 
To investigate individual differences, at the end of the experiment, we repeated 
the same procedure as in the Pilot study in order to ensure that each participant agreed 
with the emotion labels we included in the narratives. Each participant saw the 
narratives in the same version in the questionnaire as in the experiment. For each 
narrative, we also added two questions to assess (1) the extent to which the participants 
identified themselves with the protagonist (0 = not at all, 4 = completely) and (2) if the 
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participants had already experienced a similar situation (yes or no) than the one depicted 
in the narrative. 
We also assessed each participant’s level of empathy with a French version of 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980, 1983). This questionnaire differentiates 
between two facets of empathy, each characterized by two scales. The cognitive facet of 
empathy is measured through the Perspective Taking (i.e., to what extent is it easy to 
adopt the point of view of others) and the Fantasy (to what extent is it possible to 
imagine itself in other people’s shoes) scales. The emotional facet of empathy is 
evaluated through the Empathic Concern and the Personal Distress scales that measure 
other-oriented and self-oriented feelings.   
 
Procedure 
Each narrative was presented one sentence at a time. Participants were asked to 
read the sentences at their normal pace, as if they were at home reading a magazine. At 
the beginning of each narrative, the message Are you ready? appeared on the screen. 
Participants pressed the Yes button in order to make the first sentence appear and to 
move forward in the narrative after each sentence. Some narratives (n = 14) were 
followed by a question related to the text that required a Yes or No answer in order to 
ensure that all participants paid adequate attention to the narratives. Before the 
beginning of the experiment participants were presented with three practice narratives.  
After the completion of the self-pace reading task, participants filled in the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the questionnaire about the emotional narratives. The 
whole testing session lasted approximately 45 minutes.  
 
Results 	  
Data transformation 
Reading times were transformed in order to take into account the characteristics 
of the sentences (i.e., length and position in the narrative as well as position in the in the 
experiment) and those of the participants (i.e., individual natural reading speed). 
Following the method introduced by Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Garnsey (1994) and 
used in Gygax et al. (2007), we calculated, for each participant and separately for each 
sentence, a regression equation of time (i.e., reading time) against position of the 
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sentence in the experiment (i.e., trial number) and length (i.e., number of syllables in the 
sentence). We subtracted the actual reading time from the time predicted by the 
regression to obtain residual reading times. A positive residual reading time therefore 
means that the time to process the sentence was longer than expected. Residual reading 
times falling more than 2.5 SD above or under each participant’s mean of each sentence 
were replaced by their cutoff value (2.4% of the data). The analyses were done on the 
residual reading times. All analyses were conducted both by-participants (F1) and by-
items (F2) (Clark, 1973).  
 
Sentences composing the narratives (not the target sentences) 
In this experiment, we manipulated the very content of emotional narratives by 
varying the number and the typicality of emotion components formulated in the 
narratives. We hypothesized that if readers base their mental representations of the main 
protagonist’s emotional status on stereotypical information, some presented emotion 
components might well have already been inferred during reading of the preceding 
context. Consequently, we expected the components described by typical features to be 
more easily included in the readers’ mental model compared to the components 
described by less typical ones. At least, we expected to find differences in residual times 
between the more typical and the less typical Motor Expression component (and maybe 
the Psychophysiological component) when presented the second part of the narratives 
(i.e., when readers have had enough information available to infer the particular 
component). Such an effect would support Gygax et al.’s (2007)’ results showing that 
readers may spontaneously infer behavioral components associated to the emotion.  
We compared the residual reading times of the two experimental component 
sentences (i.e., Motor Expression and Psychophysiology) presented in the second part 
of the text in the optimal and suitable versions. We did not consider the moderate 
version, as the experimental component sentences were replaced by neutral sentences in 
this condition. As expected, when analyzing the Motor Expression component, 
participants were faster to read the typical Motor Expression component sentences (-86 
ms) than the less typical ones (15 ms), marginally significant in the by-item analysis, 
t1(63) = 1.84, p = .04 (one-tailed), t2(23) = 1.47, p = .08 (one-tailed). This result signaled 
the importance of the Motor Expression component in readers’ mental representations 
of emotion to the extent of possibly inferring the information before encountering it 
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explicitly if the context is strong enough. Although the data showed the same tendency 
for the Psychophysiology component, typical sentences (-28 ms) being read faster than 
the less typical ones (8 ms), it was not significant, t1(63) = .55, p = .30 (one-tailed), 
t2(23) = .44, p = .30 (one-tailed).  
 
Target sentences including the emotion term 
As for the emotion inference per se, we hypothesized that the more typical the 
emotion information is, the more specific an emotion inference would be. As the 
optimal version of each narrative contained all the necessary information needed to 
define a specific emotion, we expected that readers in this condition should be most 
likely to infer the intended emotion than in the two other conditions. If faster reading 
times mirror a better adequacy of the content of the target sentence to the content of the 
readers’ mental representations, as argued in previous studies based on the match vs. 
mismatch paradigm, we should expect faster reading times of the target emotion 
sentence in the optimal than in the suitable condition, in turn faster than in the moderate 
condition.  
Unexpectedly, our results (see Figure 5) showed the opposite pattern: there was 
a significant linear trend indicating that residual reading times were higher with 
increased typicality, F1(1, 63) = 5.33, MSE = 12092.87, p = .02, F2(1, 23) = 4.71, MSE = 
6252.78,  p = .04. Readers were slower to read the target sentences in the optimal 
version than in the suitable version, in turn slower than in the moderate version.  
A careful scrutiny at the results of each narrative suggested that only two 
narratives elicited a reverse typicality effect (i.e., the one expected). For the narratives 
about Love and Interest, readers were slower to read the target sentence in the moderate 
condition and optimal condition. Since Scherer (2005) himself raised the issue that both 
Love and Interest should not be truly considered as real emotions, but more as attitudes 
or preferences, we considered our analyses without them. Of course, when conducting 
the analyses again, without the two narratives the preceding trend was enhanced, F1(1, 
63) = 9.59, MSE = 14055.41, p = .003, F2(1, 21) = 13.33, MSE = 8183.36, p = .001. 
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FIGURE 5. Mean differences in residual reading times of the emotional target 
sentence across the three versions of the narratives in Experiment 3. The same 
target sentences are in different typicality contexts.   
 
In order to be certain that the slowdown associated to the typicality of the 
narrative could not be attributed to a mismatch effect associated to the fact that some 
participants may have considered the emotion terms in the final sentences as not 
appropriate (despite the results in the Pilot study), we eliminated for each reader the 
narratives for which they did not choose the intended emotional label in the additional 
post-experimental questionnaire about the emotional narratives they had just seen in the 
experimental task. The analyses still showed the exact same pattern, the linear trend 
being still present in the same direction both by-participants F1(1, 63) = 6.49, MSE = 
19163.30, p = .013, and by-items F2(1, 21) = 5.06, MSE = 7955.41 p = .035.  
One might argue that readers were slower to read the target sentence in the 
optimal version of the narrative because, as this version offers the most highly salient 
information to infer a specific emotion, the target sentence might be too obvious and 
cause a pragmatic reaction of surprise (i.e., why do they tell me, it’s so obvious) leading 
to longer reading times. If this was the case, we should get similar effects in the 
Subjective Feeling component (i.e., the sentence before the target sentence), which 
defines a broader feeling relevant to the narrative (e.g., felt good, was in an intense 
emotional state) and can be consequently considered as even more obvious than the 
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target sentence. However, contrary to the target sentence, no influence of the version of 
the narrative was found on the reading times of the Subjective Feeling sentence, F1(2, 
126) = .36, MSE = 25584.16, p = .70, F2(2, 42) = .54, MSE = 9981.84, p = .59, 
indicating that readers inferred the general feeling associated to the narrative as easily in 
the different versions of the narrative. The slowdown associated to the target sentences 
seems to be associated to the target sentence containing the emotion.  
Before we discuss this effect in more detail and propose an explanation of the 
possible processes in place, it is important to note that we found no signal of any effect 
of our individual difference measures. The results hold across Empathy groups (low- 
and high-empathic participants), as well as across participants with different emotion 
experiences in terms of the experiences described in the narratives. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our results seem to challenge our initial idea that enhancing the emotional 
typicality in narratives contributes to more specific representations of the main 
protagonist’s emotional status. Readers seemed indeed slower to map the intended 
emotions onto readers’ ongoing mental representations in the optimal, highly typical 
versions of the narratives, However, sentences composed of highly typical components 
(and preceding the target sentences) were read faster than less typical ones, suggesting 
us to be somehow cautious when interpreting slower reading times.  
We suggest that when confronted to congruent, yet not typical components of an 
emotion construct, readers keep an open representation of emotion, allowing any target 
(congruent) emotion to fit, or be easily map onto, the elaborated situation model (as 
suggested Gygax et al., 2003, 2004). When confronted to typical components and as the 
text itself provides sufficient information to justify a more constraining and restrictive 
choice, readers may engage in a process of integrating specific emotions (as specific as 
sad, or happy). 
Different explanations may then be drawn concerning the slowdown in reading 
times when encountering an explicit emotion embedded in a target sentence. First, it 
might be the case that as readers process narrative information prior to the target 
sentence, they may integrate a specific emotion term that corresponds to their individual 
lexicon of emotion. The term integrated might not be the one presented in the target 
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sentence, therefore slowing down any mapping process. If this is plausible, it might be 
unlikely, as the emotion chosen in this experiment to be presented in the target 
sentences were confirmed in the Pilot study, as well as the GRID instrument created 
from a similar population.   
A second explanation, more plausible to us, regards the Structure Building 
Framework (Gernsbacher, 1997), stipulating that readers habitually build mental 
representations based on memory nodes of previously stored memory traces, which are 
reactivated as the text is being processed. When pertinent memory nodes are first 
activated, readers build a text foundation based on them. Incoming information that 
activates similar memory nodes is simply mapped on to the current foundation. 
According to Gernsbacher (1997), building a foundation takes time whereas simply 
mapping new information does not, given that the new information is coherent with the 
foundation.  
When reading narratives containing congruent yet not highly constraining 
information, readers keep a relatively open representation of the main protagonist’s 
emotional state. In other words, they built a foundation composed on several 
components and on which different emotions can easily be mapped onto. Consequently, 
when encountering the target emotion in the suitable or the moderate conditions, it is 
very likely to be easily mapped on a relatively underspecified foundation.  
When presented with narratives congruent and composed of highly constraining 
information, readers may activate two different yet related mechanisms. First, they may 
activate a suppression mechanism (Gernsbacher, 1997) and diminish the activation of 
memory nodes that do not fully correspond to the emotion description. Second and in 
parallel, they may enhance the activation of memory nodes (Gernsbacher, 1997) that are 
highly relevant to the emotion described in the text. In this case, fewer emotions might 
be easily mapped onto readers’ representations. When encountering an appropriate 
emotion, readers may have to engage in suppression and activation processes that will 
result in a more specific foundation, yet taking more time to finalize it. Note that any 
following information, congruent but not necessarily salient, may then be more difficult 
to map onto readers’ representations, especially if it does not completely match the 
information in the foundation. We put this idea to test in the following experiment. 
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Experiment 4: 
Testing the mapping vs. integration hypothesis 	  
In Experiment 3, we found slower reading times of target sentences in the 
condition when the narratives are composed with all salient and typical emotion features 
than when they were composed or several yet not all typical features. We argue that this 
slowdown mirrors an integration process, different from a mapping one, at the base of 
habitual reading times interpretations. 
If readers perform a simple mapping process of a target sentence when it follows 
a narrative that is composed of some but not all the information needed to infer a 
specific emotion (i.e., the moderate version of the narrative), they should be able to 
easily map other following congruent yet not salient emotions onto their mental model. 
In other words, it should be easy to map any more congruent yet different emotions onto 
an underspecified mental model. In contrast, if the same congruent yet not salient 
emotion follows a specific representation resulting from an integration process (where a 
specific emotion has been integrated), this emotion will not be easily mapped onto 
readers’ mental model. In Experiment 4, we tested this hypothesis by including a 
plausible yet unlikely additional emotion after the target sentence, which comprised our 
target emotion (as in Experiment 3)   
 
Method 	  
Participants 
Fourty-four participants (thirty-five women) of a psychology introductory course 
from the University of Lausanne took part in this experiment. All participants spoke 
French as their maternal language. The participants were aged from 18 to 34 (M = 
20.44, SD = 3.17).  
 
Material 
 
Emotional narratives 
Considering the rather linear trend across the three conditions in Experiment 3, 
we decided to only use the optimal and moderate narratives in Experiment 4. By doing 
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this, we also increased power, as each list comprised more narratives per condition. To 
each initial narrative, we added a second target sentence containing a congruent emotion 
yet of low relevancy (i.e., unlikely to be inferred). The two emotional target sentences 
were structured as follows:  
(1) [Main character] felt [intended emotion]. (as in Experiment 3) 
(2) At the same time, [he/she] felt [congruent emotion].  
The congruent emotion, chosen again on the basis of the features contained in 
the GRID instrument, was of the same valence as the intended emotion and shared no 
more than one typical feature with it. Table 8 shows all intended-congruent emotion 
pairs.  
 
 
TABLE 8. Pairs of emotions used in Experiment 4. The first emotion is the intended emotion and 
the second is the congruent emotion. The same emotion term never happened as an intended 
and a congruent emotion in the same part (except for the pairs Love-Pleasure and Pleasure-Joy. 
The pair Pleasure-Joy was discarded from the analyses). 
Part I Part II 
Happiness Pride Pride Happiness 
Surprise Contentment Contentment Surprise 
Anger Being hurt Being hurt Anger 
Despair Shame Shame Despair 
Guilt Disappointment Disappointment Guilt 
Love Pleasure Compassion Love 
Interest Joy Joy Interest 
Fear Hate Hate Fear 
Sadness Anxiety Anxiety Sadness 
Stress Jealousy Disgust Stress 
Pleasure Joy Irritation Contempt 
Contempt Disgust Jealousy Guilt 
 
 Emotion inferences and their underlying construct 
 
	  109 
Importantly, congruent emotions had to be unlikely to be inferred from the 
narratives yet had to be coherent with the corresponding narrative to avoid incongruity 
effects. When creating the intended-congruent emotion pairs of emotions, we attempted 
to match them so as to maximize the possibility that each of 24 intended emotions 
would appear once in the intended emotion sentence and once in the congruent emotion 
sentence. Two intended emotions could not be used as congruent ones (i.e., compassion 
and irritation) and were replaced by two other emotions (joy and guilt). In order to 
ensure that the congruent emotions met the congruency requirements, six judges were 
asked to read the narratives and detect possible incongruences imputed to the congruent 
emotions.  
Each participant saw twelve narratives in the optimal version and twelve 
narratives in the moderate version. Since each emotion could appear as intended or as 
congruent, we divided the experiment in two parts, separated by an interference task, so 
that each emotion could appear once in each part (once as intended and once as 
congruent) for the same participant. We constructed four lists to ensure that each 
participant would see all conditions and that each narrative would be present in each 
condition. Each list contained six optimal narratives, six moderate narratives and twelve 
filler narratives. Each participant hence saw 48 narratives, with a break (i.e., 
interference task) in the middle.  
We also controlled for several methodological issues that may have some of the 
results of Experiment 3. First, we controlled for spill-over effects from a narrative onto 
the next one. As readers can keep an emotion representation for longer than just one or 
two sentences (deVega, Leon, & Diaz, 1996), an emotion inference may well interfere 
with the processing of a subsequent narrative, especially if the latter is also relevant to 
emotion representations. Readers may have to engage in simultaneous activation (of the 
new components) and inhibitory (of the previous components) processes. To control 
this issue, we used the same filler narratives as in Experiment 3, but, although chosen 
randomly, always inserted them between the experimental narratives. 
 
Interference task 
The Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) was used as an interference 
task to separate the two parts of the experiment. In this task, participants see an arrow 
pointing to the left or the right in the middle of the screen. This arrow is surrounded by 
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other arrows pointing either in the same (congruent condition) or in a different direction 
(incongruent condition), or by straight lines (neutral condition). The participants have to 
indicate as fast as possible the direction to which the middle arrow is pointing. As 
participants quite automatically process the surrounding arrows, response times are 
higher in the incongruent condition (when surrounding arrows point to the opposite 
direction as to the target arrow) than in the neutral and the congruent conditions. 
Although one could argue that inhibitory processes may be central in reading 
comprehension, we considered this task only as an interference task, therefore do not 
present any analyses pertaining to this measure.   
 
Questionnaire on emotions proximity 
As their contribution was rather small, we replaced the Identification and 
Relevancy questionnaires used in Experiment 3 (but kept the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index) with a questionnaire on emotion proximity in order to control that the emotions 
chosen for the congruent sentences were considered as mismatching. The questionnaire 
comprised the experimental pairs (e.g., happiness-pride, despair-shame) and 18 filler 
pairs that were either highly similar (e.g., joy-happiness) or highly dissimilar (e.g., 
shame-pride). The participants were asked to evaluate on a 8-point scale (0 = not at all, 
7 = completely) the extent to which the emotions presented in each pair were similar.  
 
Procedure 
The same procedure as in Experiment 3 was used. Each narrative was presented 
one sentence at a time. Participants were asked to read the sentences at their normal 
pace, as if they were at home reading a magazine. At the beginning of each narrative, 
the message Are you ready? appeared on the screen. Participants pressed the Yes button 
in order to make the first sentence appear and to move forward in the narrative after 
each sentence. Some narratives (n = 14) were followed by a question related to the text 
that required a Yes or No answer in order to ensure that all participants paid adequate 
attention to the narratives. Before the beginning of the experiment participants were 
presented with three practice narratives.  
After completion of the first part of the self-paced reading experiment (i.e., half 
of the narratives were presented), participants were asked to do the flanker task before 
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seeing the second part of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the participants 
filled in the IRI and the questionnaire on emotion proximity. 
 
Results 
 
The same data transformation as in Experiment 3 was applied in Experiment 4 
and all analyses were performed on the residual reading times. 4.7 % of the data were 
replaced by their cutoff values.  
 
Relevancy of the emotional pairs 
The choice of the emotion pairs was confirmed by the questionnaire on emotion 
proximity. The participants estimated that the emotions in each pairs were similar but 
not synonym (M = 4.36, SD = 1.07). This ensured that any expected differences 
between target sentences were not due to mismatch effects. Note that this proximity was 
not appropriate for two pairs (pleasure-joy and irritation-contempt), hence we discarded 
them for further analyses. 
 
Sentences composing the narratives (not the target sentences) 
As opposed to Experiment 3, in this experiment we did not manipulate the 
typicality of the emotion components presented in the narratives per se (i.e., the 
difference between the optimal and suitable versions) but mainly manipulated the 
number of these components (i.e., five vs. three). If this manipulation did not allow us 
to compare Experiment 3 to this one in terms of the Motor Expression component, we 
were nonetheless interested in the results linked to the Subjective Feeling component 
(similar in both conditions). In Experiment 3, this component inference did not seem to 
be influenced by the version of the narrative in which it appeared. However, we still 
expected the Subjective Feeling component to be read faster in the optimal than in the 
moderate version of the narratives. This would reflect that readers easily map this broad 
emotional information onto their mental representation of emotions. Supporting this 
idea, results showed that readers were faster to read the Subjective Feeling sentence in 
the optimal (-159 ms) than in the moderate condition (-31 ms), t1(42) = 4.78, p < .001, 
t2(23) = 3.47, p < .01.  
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Target sentences including an emotion term 
We first expected to replicate the results of Experiment 3 as to the intended 
emotion target sentence (i.e., slower reading times in the optimal than in the moderate 
version). Second, we expected that, in both conditions, readers would slowdown when 
encountering the second target sentence, as this sentence contained an emotional word 
unlikely to have been inferred during reading, yet still plausible (i.e., test of the ease to 
map the information onto readers’ mental models). Third and finally, we expected 
slower reading times for the congruent emotion in the optimal than in the moderate 
version of the narratives. In the former version, readers may have more difficulty to 
map the congruent emotion onto a specific mental representation of emotion (i.e., 
highly constraining foundation), whereas in the latter version, the rather unspecific 
nature of the emotion representation might ease the mapping process.  
A first glance at the data signaled that, as in Experiment 3, the narratives on 
Love and Interest had to be discarded from the analyses. As discussed earlier, it could 
be argued that they may actually not be considered as emotions. Figure 6 shows the 
residual reading times of the intended target sentences and the congruent target 
sentences in Experiment 4.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Residual reading times of the emotion target sentences in 
the different versions of the narratives in Experiment 4.  
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One-tailed paired comparisons (i.e., planned comparisons) conducted on the 
residual reading times showed that, as expected, readers were faster by 40 milliseconds 
to read the intended emotion target sentence in the moderate version than in the optimal 
version, t1(42) = 2.66, p = .01, t2(19) = 1.67, p = .06. Interestingly, and as expected, this 
was also the case for the congruent target sentence, but to a greater extent, as readers 
were faster by 52 milliseconds to read the congruent emotion target sentence in the 
moderate version than in the optimal version, t1(42) = 1.87, p = .035, t2(19) = 1.82, p = 
.04. This numerical difference between the slopes of the two target sentences is most 
interesting. Again, note that in the congruent target sentence, the information presented 
was an easy-to-map one, yet in the optimal version, it seemed difficult to map, at least 
compared to the moderate version. 
This latter point was also apparent when considering the target sentences within 
the typicality conditions. The congruent emotion target sentence in the optimal version 
was read slower than the intended emotion, significantly by-participant t1(42) = -2.65, p 
= .006, marginally significantly by-item, t2(19) = -1.40, p = .09, whereas the difference 
in the moderate version was only significant by participant, t1(42) = -4.74, p < .001, 
t2(19) < 1 (See Figure 6). 
If an interaction effect (Target by Version) would have been ideal to illustrate 
our point, our data still support two ideas: (a) readers most likely integrate the emotion 
included in the intended emotion target sentence (hence slower times) in their mental 
representation of emotion, (b) the latter being highly specific (contrary to what was 
claimed in past research) to the extent of making it difficult for readers to map any 
congruent information onto it.  
 
Discussion 
 
In Experiment 4, we replicated the results of Experiment 3 regarding the 
intended emotion target sentence: readers were slower to read the target sentence 
containing the intended emotion when the narratives conveyed all the relevant 
information compared to when they conveyed only some components of the emotion. 
Although we have to consider reading times of both sentences as reflecting different 
processes, mainly due to the very different nature of the information presented (i.e., 
highest congruency vs. lowest congruency), readers were also slower to read the 
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following congruent target sentence containing a plausible yet unlikely emotion in the 
optimal version than in the moderate version. Most importantly, the difference between 
two versions was, at least numerically, highest in the congruent emotion condition.  
 These results support our integration hypothesis: readers seem to build a 
specific foundation based on the intended emotion when the information available is 
highly salient and typical, and that further processing of congruent yet not salient 
emotion information is rendered more difficult.  
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Experiment 5: 
Less obvious target sentences 
 
In Experiments 3 and 4, we relied on an optimal vs. moderate congruent 
paradigm to investigate the specificity of emotion inferences. We found that the more 
the narrative contained congruent information, the more the readers needed time to 
process the target sentence containing the emotional state of the protagonist. We 
interpreted these findings as mirroring an integration process triggered by the 
constraining nature of the narratives in the optimal condition.  
An alternative explanation for this increase in reading times associated to the 
increase in emotion information contained in the narrative may be a pragmatic reaction 
of surprise (as already introduced in Experiment 3). When encountering the target 
sentence, which explicitly states that the protagonist is experiencing a specific emotion, 
readers may be disturbed in their normal reading process as they may find this 
information so obvious that they wonder why the narrator would bother to give it. If this 
surprise effect may exist in the moderate version of the narratives, it would be more 
likely to happen in the optimal version of the narrative (where the emotion word in the 
target sentence may be most redundant), hence possibly leading to the linear trend 
shown in the previous experiments.  
In the present experiment, we investigated this issue by modifying the target 
sentences presented at the end of the narratives in order to make them less obvious. 
Instead of stating that the protagonist is experiencing an emotion, the new target 
sentences stated that because of the experienced emotion, the protagonist reacted in 
some particular way. These new target sentences should be less obvious, as they do not 
only explain what emotion the protagonist is feeling but also end the narrative in a more 
natural way (i.e., that’s what he/she did).   
If the surprise hypothesis were true, the slowdown associated to more relevant 
emotion information should not be present with the less obvious target sentences and 
the usual pattern of reading times should appear. That is, the reading times of the target 
sentences should be faster in the optimal than in the moderate version of the narrative.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
Sixty participants (13 men and 47 women) from the University of Fribourg 
participated in this experiment. The participants were aged from 18 to 41 (M = 21.72, 
SD = 4.55). All participants were native French speakers. Due to unusually long reading 
times, two participants were discarded from the analyses.  
 
Material 
The same emotional and filler narratives as in Experiment 3 were used in this 
experiment. The target sentences were modified so as to transmit less obvious 
information than in previous experiments and were structured as such: 
(Part I of the sentence): As [he/she] felt [target emotion], 
(Part II of the sentence): [main character did something].  
The second part of the sentence was elaborated so as to convey only already 
known information (i.e., related to the Action Tendency or to the Appraisal component 
described in the narrative). For example, in the Happiness narrative, the Action 
Tendency component (i.e., wanting to sing and dance), already made explicit in the 
narrative, was included in the target sentence: As she felt happy, Sarah danced until the 
end of the night.  
This choice was made in order to ensure that the time needed to process the 
second part of the target sentence was very unlikely to reflect an inference process 
related to this part of the sentence, as readers had already been presented with the 
information put in it. It also gave the possibility to analyze the processing time of the 
second part of the sentence in order to investigate possible spill-over effects coming 
from the processing of the emotion word present in the first part of the sentence.  
In order to get the participants used to seeing some of the sentences appear one 
part after the other, we also separated other sentences of the narratives. This was always 
the first sentence (i.e., the context sentence) of the experimental narratives in the 
optimal and suitable versions. Half of the narratives in the moderate version also 
presented the first sentence in two parts and the other half presented either the second 
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sentence or the third sentence (i.e., a filler sentence replacing the Motor Expression or 
the Psychophysiological component) in two parts.  
 
Procedure 
The same procedure as in Experiments 3 and 4 was followed in this experiment. 
Participants had to read the narratives at their own pace. Each narrative was presented 
one sentence at a time. At the beginning of each narrative, the message Are you ready? 
appeared on the screen. Participants pressed the Yes button in order to make the first 
sentence appear and to move forward in the narrative after each sentence. Some 
narratives (n = 14) were followed by a question related to the text that required a Yes or 
No answer in order to ensure that all participants paid adequate attention to the 
narratives. Before the beginning of the experiment participants were presented with 
three practice narratives.  
After the completion of the self-pace reading task, participants filled in the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the questionnaire about the emotional narratives. The 
whole testing session lasted approximately 45 minutes.  
 
Results  
 
Data transformation 
Before conducting the analyses, reading times were transformed to residual 
reading times as in Experiments 3 and 4. Residual reading times were calculated based 
on a regression of time (i.e., reading time) against position of the sentence in the 
experiment (i.e., trial number) and length (i.e., number of syllables in the sentence) for 
each participant and separately for each sentence. Residual reading times that were 
more than 2.5 SD above or below each participant’s overall mean were replaced in the 
analyses by the cut-off values (2.5% of the data). Positive residual reading times mean 
slower time to process the sentence.  
 
Sentences composing the narratives (not the target sentences) 
As in Experiment 3, the number and typicality of the features describing the 
emotional components present in the narratives was manipulated. We therefore present 
here the same analyses as those performed in Experiment 3 regarding the different 
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emotion components. As in the aforementioned experiment, we expected readers to 
base their emotion inferences on the different emotion components and consequently to 
infer these components whilst reading the emotional narratives. According to this 
hypothesis, we expected faster reading times for the component sentences described by 
typical features than for those described by less typical features. When comparing the 
reading times of the experimental component sentences (i.e., Motor Expression and 
Psychophysiology), participants showed the same tendency as those found in 
Experiments 3 and 4, yet the differences were not always significant. The typical Motor 
Expression component sentences were read faster (-13 ms) than the less typical ones (65 
ms), yet not significantly faster, t1(57) = 1.09, p = .14 (one-tailed), t2(23) = .88, p = .19 
(one-tailed). The same result came out for the Psychophysiology component sentences, 
the typical sentences being read on average only 35 ms faster than the less typical ones, 
t1(57) = .88, p = .19 (one-tailed), t2(23) = .37, p = .36 (one-tailed).  
As in previous experiments, we expected the Subjective Feeling sentences to be 
read faster in the optimal than in the suitable condition, in turn faster than in the 
moderate condition. If the residual reading times showed this tendency to decrease with 
more congruent information in the narrative, the linear trend did not reach significance, 
F1(1, 57) = 2.39, p = .13, F2(1, 23) = 1.26, p = .27.  
 
Target sentences including the emotion term 
This experiment aimed at ruling out the possibility that the linear trend found in 
Experiments 3 and 4 was due to a surprise effect when encountering the target sentence. 
If the surprise hypothesis were true, the reading times associated to the new target 
sentences should decrease with more information transmitted in the narrative, so as to 
mirror previous results found using the match vs. mismatch paradigm (i.e., faster 
reading times in the congruent condition). Table 9 presents the mean residual reading 
times for the different parts of the target sentences in the three versions of the narrative.  
A repeated measures ANOVA on the residual reading times of the first part of 
the target sentence (containing the emotion word) revealed no differences between the 
three contexts of congruency either when all narratives were taken into account, when 
the same two narratives as in the previous chapter (i.e., Love and Interest) were 
discarded from the analyses or when we considered only the narratives for which the 
participants totally agreed with the intended emotion term (all Fs < 1). 
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TABLE 9. Mean residual reading times in milliseconds (and standard errors) of the target 
sentences in the different versions of the narratives in Experiment 5 (Positive residual time 
means slower reading time).  
Versions First part of the 
target sentence 
Second part of the 
target sentence 
Whole target 
sentence 
Optimal 4 (11) 26 (18) 5 (13) 
Suitable 6 (16) 1 (21) -10 (16) 
Moderate 20 (11) -3 (16) -8 (14) 
 
 
As the first part of the sentence was relatively short (i.e., between five and 
eleven syllables) and consequently easily kept in memory, it may be possible that 
readers did not thoroughly process its content before pressing the button to move on in 
the narrative, hence continuing its processing when reading the second part of the 
sentence. In order to verify these potential spillover effects, a repeated measure 
ANOVA was done on the residual reading times of the second part of the target 
sentence. Again, no differences appeared between the three versions of the narratives 
(all Fs < 1). We completed the analyses by calculating residual reading times of the 
whole target sentences (both parts together) and ran a repeated measures ANOVA on 
these new residual times that again did not show any significant differences between the 
different versions of the narratives (all Fs < 1).  
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, we expected to replicate the results found in Experiments 3 
and 4 when using less obvious target sentences. When looking at the results, it first 
appeared that readers did not show the preference for emotion components described by 
typical features compared to that described by less typical features found in Experiment 
3. Secondly, we did not replicate the pattern of reading times associated to the 
Subjective Feeling component sentences.  
In addition, no differences in reading times of the target sentences between the 
versions of the narratives were found in this experiment. In order to rule out the surprise 
hypothesis that this experiment aimed at testing, we expected the same pattern of 
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reading times regarding the target sentences than that we found in Experiments 3 and 4. 
This pattern was however not demonstrated here. Nevertheless, the pattern of reading 
times of the target sentences found in this experiment does not permit us to conclude 
that a surprise effect was the basis of the previous experiments’ results. Still, it is 
possible to hypothesize that rendering the target sentences less obvious may have 
attenuated a potential surprise effect without allowing readers to completely suppress it. 
Reading times of the target sentences indeed showed a change of pattern that might lead 
to the expected reverse pattern if the sentences were made even less obvious.  
If this last hypothesis may be plausible, we favor an alternative explanation 
directly linked to the manipulation intending to make the target emotion sentences less 
obvious. By integrating the emotion term in the first part of target sentences describing 
the protagonist’s action, we may have changed the nature of the processes applied to 
this emotional information. Specifically, providing readers with the statement As 
[he/she] felt [target emotion] may have made the emotion information less central than 
when providing them with a sentence describing the emotion component. In this 
experiment, the emotion felt by the protagonist may have been considered as a cause for 
their behavior. In this sense, the focus of the target sentences may have been on its 
second part, not on the part containing the emotion term. The reading times of the first 
part of the target sentences somehow support this assumption (i.e., readers were faster 
in the moderate than in the optimal condition).  
Finally, we could also hypothesize that as the first part of the target sentences 
were relatively short (as said earlier), the processing of the emotion term may have 
overlapped with the processing of the second part of the sentence. In our analyses, we 
took this into account by looking at the reading times of the second part of the target 
sentences. However, spill-over effects are generally occurring on the word following to 
word of interest (Rayner, 1998). Consequently, by looking at the reading times of the 
whole second part of the narratives, potential spill-over effects may not have been 
detected (i.e., confounded in the whole sentence part reading time).  
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Chapter discussion 
 
In the experiments presented in this chapter, we assessed the specificity of 
emotional inferences using a congruency levels paradigm. Contrary to the usual match 
vs. mismatch paradigm, this paradigm allowed us to investigate fine-grained processes 
involved when different typicality contexts constrain readers’ mental models. The rather 
small yet highly informative reading time differences found in our experiments suggest 
deeper elaborating processes than the ones investigated so far with the habitual match 
vs. mismatch paradigm.  
Our results also generally suggest that past research on emotion inferences may 
have failed to address these processes simply because their narratives were 
unfortunately not constructed with rigorous attention to the emotion construct literature. 
Here, we propose that the GRID instrument (Fontaine et al., 2007; Fontaine et al., in 
press; Scherer, 2005) is a good base on which to create the materials necessary to 
investigate emotion inferences. 
Still, we propose that generally, when reading narratives about emotions, readers 
elaborate mental representations of the protagonist’s emotional state based on the 
available features of the components of this emotion. These representations may remain 
quite open (i.e., any congruent emotion can be mapped onto them) as long as the 
narratives do not constrain them by conveying necessary components and their 
associated typical and salient emotion features. When these are conveyed, readers may 
gradually build a strong and specific foundation based on the relevant emotion. Other 
incoming information, even if congruent, may be much more difficult to map onto the 
resulting representation than if mapped onto an underspecified representation.  
In terms of past research, Gernsbacher and colleagues were right to assume that 
specific representations of emotions were possible, yet they failed to clarify the 
necessary conditions for them to happen. Gygax and colleagues were right to assume 
that under normal conditions, readers build rather broad representations of emotion, 
onto which a large number of emotions can be mapped onto, yet they failed to 
acknowledge the possibility of specific emotion representations. Still, Gillioz et al. 
(2012), did try to investigate individual differences that might have resulted in more 
specific representations of emotions, and to a certain extent, they managed to do so. 
Both teams however reached their conclusions without carefully and appropriately 
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considering the emotion construct conveyed by their narratives. Note that Gygax et al. 
(2004), when questioning the content of their narratives, were in the right direction – 
without truly targeting the exact problem though –, and their results, if one considers 
only their matching conditions, were very similar to the ones found in this chapter (i.e., 
the more congruent the slower the reading times). However, since they concentrated on 
the match vs. mismatch paradigm, any signals of congruency level differences were 
absorbed by the (mighty) incongruence effects.    
As a final note, if our data constitute an initial step towards conciliating 
psycholinguistic research on emotion inferences and emotion construct research, one 
could also explain our results, especially the unexpected ones, in other ways. For 
example, we interpreted longer reading times as reflecting integration processes, but 
actually, we may have looked at attention processes. As the narratives were highly 
relevant in the optimal condition in terms of the protagonist’s emotional status, 
participants may have allocated more attention to the target sentences, without really 
having to integrate the information included in them into their mental models. Also, it 
could be that participants may have included specific emotions, justified by the 
constraining context, and that the level of individual specificity might mean that they 
included something different then what we suggested in our target sentences (hence 
longer reading times).   
Anyways, these explanations lead to the same conclusion, which we would like 
to stress as a take-home message and settle the specificity issue: given the appropriate 
emotion context, readers can infer specific emotions when reading.   	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6. Going Beyond the Match vs. Mismatch Effect: Back to 
Empathy Issues 
 
 
 
Experiment 6 : Priming empathy 
 
In previous experiments (i.e., Experiments 1 and 2), we showed no influence of 
the participants’ empathy level on the emotion inferences made during reading. We 
interpreted this fact by assuming that generating emotion inferences is quite automatic 
and independent of some individual factors. However, an alternative explanation may 
come from the relative homogeneity regarding some individual factors in the student 
samples having taken part in our experiments. If it is common in psychology to recruit 
psychology students as participants, this may be a problem when it comes to investigating 
a potential effect of the empathy level on the dependent variables.  
Additionally, it may be argued that the empathy level considered in previous 
experiments and measured via the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980, 1983) 
relates more to a stable trait than to empathic reactions that someone may have in 
response to the protagonist’s situation in a narrative. We actually took this fact into 
account by looking at the Fantasy scores (i.e., the tendency to transpose themselves into a 
fictional character’s shoes) in addition to the general empathy score in Experiments 1 and 
2, but we nevertheless think that directly manipulating the empathic state of the 
participants may further shed light onto the link between empathy and emotion 
inferences. In the present experiment, we tried to stimulate the participants’ empathic 
level by manipulating the social context in which the experiment took part.  
The social sharing of emotion is a process in which people communicate with 
target persons about some emotions they experience in their life (Rimé, 1989). When 
listening to a shared emotional episode, people activate mental images of the described 
situation that reactivate bodily reactions associated to similar situations they have already 
encountered (Rimé, 2005), a process similar to the simulation process described earlier 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999b; Glenberg, 1999).  
The impact of the social sharing of emotion on the persons implicated in the 
communication event was investigated by Christophe and Rimé (1997). These authors 
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used a retrospective method (e.g., Scherer & Wallbott, 1994) in which the participants 
have to recall an emotional event and answer questions about specific aspects of this 
event. In Christophe and Rimé’s (1997) study, the participants had to recall an event in 
which someone shared an emotion with them. They were then asked to rate the emotion 
they felt during the social sharing of the emotion episode. In this study, Christophe and 
Rimé (1997) showed that the social sharing of emotion has an emotional impact on the 
target persons involved in it, notably by inducing them to feel some emotions and 
triggering them to share these emotions with other persons. This study further showed 
that the more intense the shared episode is, the more the listener is aroused and 
experiences emotion in response to the episode. Rimé (2005) adds that when listening to 
the shared experience, the listener shows support and physical contact towards the person 
sharing their emotion in order to create connections with them. Additionally, Collins and 
Miller (1994), in a meta-analysis on the link between self-disclosure (i.e., the act of 
revealing information about oneself to another) and liking, reported that generally the 
listener develop positive beliefs about the persons disclosing personal information about 
themselves. On this basis, Rimé (2005) further argued that the social sharing of emotion 
promotes empathic processes.  
In this experiment, the activation of empathic processes was manipulated via the 
context in which the experiment took place. We asked participants to go through the 
reading task (as in Experiments 3, 4 and 5) in pairs. Some of these pairs had to complete 
a social sharing of emotion task before actually reading the narratives. We expected these 
participants to be more empathic during the reading task, hence more focused on the 
protagonist’s emotional state. Consequently, if the readers’ empathic state had an impact 
on the specificity of emotion inferences, the patterns of reading times of the target 
sentences should vary between the different groups of participants.   
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants (6 men and 30 women) from the University of Fribourg 
participated in this experiment. The participants were aged from 18 to 38 (M = 21.53, SD 
= 3.36). All participants were native French speakers.  
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Materials 
 
Experimental and filler narratives 
The same emotional and filler narratives as in Experiment 3 were used in this 
experiment. As we were principally interested in the influence of empathy on readers’ 
emotion representations and not on the construction of these representations, the order of 
the components in the narratives was not fully randomized. Hence, contrary to 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5, only three lists of narratives were used in this experiment (i.e., 
half of the narratives were presented with the experimental components in the beginning 
and half with these components in the end).  
 
Empathy manipulation 
In order to manipulate the participants’ empathy, we tested randomly assigned 
pairs of participants who did the reading task simultaneously. We tried to recreate a 
situation mirroring an episode of social sharing of emotion, hence promoting empathic 
processes in the listener (Rimé, 2005). In order to do so, one participant in the pair was 
asked to recall an emotional episode that happened recently and explain it to the other 
participant who was asked to carefully listen. This corresponded to the social sharing of 
emotion condition.  
We created a second condition in which empathic processes were not promoted by 
the social sharing of emotion. This condition also allowed controlling for the activation of 
empathic processes potentially resulting from the fact that the participants did the 
experiment together. One participant in this condition was given a task that had no 
relation with emotion or empathy processes (i.e., they were asked to solve simple 
mathematic equations). A second control regarding a potential activation of empathy in 
response to the act of simply expressing one’s emotion was done by asking the second 
participant to write down a recalled emotional event. Crucially, in both conditions, 
complete confidentiality was assured to the participants who were asked to recall their 
personal event. 
In sum, the participants were assigned to one out of four conditions regarding two 
factors: interaction and narration. The first factor, Interaction, was manipulated between 
groups of participants. That is, in the Interaction condition, both participants were asked 
to interact with each other whereas in the No Interaction condition, they had to 
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accomplish a task independent to each other. The second factor, Recall, was manipulated 
within groups of participants.  
The participants’ level of empathy was assessed with two items. They were asked 
to evaluate on a 5-point scale (0 = not at all, 4 = totally) the extent to which (1) they felt 
close to the other participant and (2) they had put themselves in the other participant’s 
shoes.  
 
Procedure 
After the empathy manipulation, the participants were asked to evaluate their 
empathy level. This was followed by the reading experiment. Each narrative was 
presented one sentence at a time. Participants were asked to read the sentences at their 
normal pace, as if they were at home reading a magazine. At the beginning of each 
narrative, the message Are you ready? appeared on the screen. Participants pressed the 
Yes button in order to make the first sentence appear and to move forward in the 
narrative after each sentence. Some narratives (n = 14) were followed by a question 
related to the text that required a Yes or No answer in order to ensure that all participants 
paid adequate attention to the narratives. Before the beginning of the experiment 
participants were presented with three practice narratives.  
After the completion of the self-pace reading task, participants filled in the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the questionnaire about the emotional narratives and were 
asked to re-evaluate their empathy level. The whole testing session lasted approximately 
45 minutes.  
 
Results  
 
Data transformation 
Reading times were transformed in order to take into account the characteristics of 
the sentences (i.e., length and position in the narrative as well as position in the in the 
experiment) and those of the participants (i.e., individual natural reading speed). 
Following the method introduced by Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Garnsey (1994) and used 
in Gygax et al. (2007), we calculated, for each participant and separately for each 
sentence, a regression equation of time (i.e., reading time) against position of the 
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sentence in the experiment (i.e., trial number) and length (i.e., number of syllables in the 
sentence). We subtracted the actual reading time from the time predicted by the 
regression to obtain residual reading times. A positive residual reading time therefore 
means that the time to process the sentence was longer than expected. Residual reading 
times falling more than 2.5 SD above or under each participant’s mean of each sentence 
were replaced by their cutoff value (3.5% of the data).   
 
Empathy manipulation 
Following Rimé’s (2005) findings that empathic processes are promoted by the 
social sharing of emotion, we expected the participants’ level of empathic feelings to be 
higher in the Interaction condition compared to the No Interaction condition. We also 
expected Recall to interact with Interaction: Whereas empathy may be more promoted in 
participants in the No Recall condition when confronted with the Interaction situation, it 
may be more promoted in participants in the Recall condition when in the No Interaction 
condition.  
A 2 (Time: Before Reading vs. After Reading) X 2 (Interaction: Interaction vs. No 
Interaction) X 2 (Recall: Recall vs. No Recall) mixed ANOVA on the mean empathy 
scores considering Time as an intra-participant measure and Interaction and Recall as 
inter-participants measures revealed a main effect of Time F(1, 32) = 12.87, p = .001 
showing that the participants reported more empathic feelings after (M = 1.68, SE = .15) 
than before the reading task (M = 1.35, SD = .11). This suggested that being in the same 
room as another person and performing the task simultaneously may suffice to trigger 
empathic feelings. The analysis also showed a main effect of Interaction, F(1, 32) = 
21.25, p < .001, and a main effect of Recall, F(1, 32) = 5.18, p = .03. Generally and as 
expected, the participants in the Interaction condition reported higher empathic feelings 
(M = 2.1, SE = .17) than the participants in the No Interaction condition (M = .93, SE = 
.19). Surprisingly, the participants in the No Recall condition also reported higher 
empathic feelings (M = 1.80, SE = .19) than that in the Recall condition (M = 1.23, SE = 
.17). These main effects were qualified by a Time by Interaction, F(1, 32) = 12.87, p = 
.001, and a Time by Recall, F(1, 32) = 10.71, p < .01, interaction effects but no 
Interaction by Recall interaction effect, F(1, 32) = .76, p = .39.  
As shown in Figure 7, in the Interaction condition, the participants’ reports were 
stable before and after the reading task whereas they increased in the No Interaction 
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condition. In a similar fashion, the participants in the No Recall condition were stable 
across the experiment, although the participants in the Recall condition reported higher 
empathic feelings at the end of the reading experiment compared to the beginning of the 
experiment. 
The participants showing the highest empathic feelings were, as expected, persons 
who were asked to listen to the other participant’s emotional experience (Interaction-No 
Recall). They were followed by participants asked to share a personal emotional 
experience (Interaction-Recall). 
However and contrary to what was hypothesized, the participants in the No 
Interaction-No Recall condition (i.e., that solved arithmetic simple operations) reported 
more empathic feelings than the participants in the No Interaction-Recall condition. This 
may follow from the fact that recalling a personal emotional experience and putting it on 
paper instead of sharing it may only activate self-directed feelings but not other-directed 
feelings present in empathy.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Mean reported empathic feelings in the different empathy 
conditions in Experiment 6. Participants had to rate the extent to which 
they felt close to the other participant and put themselves in the other 
participant’s shoes on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (totally).  	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Sentences composing the narratives (not the target sentences) 
Given that the narratives were presented in only one component order, it was not 
possible to compare the reading times of the experimental component sentences between 
the suitable and optimal versions. However, we still expected the Subjective Feeling 
component to be read faster in the optimal than in the suitable, in turn in the moderate 
version of the narratives. Contrary to our expectations, no difference was revealed 
between the three versions, F1(2, 70) = .65, p = .52, F2(2, 46) = .57, p = .57 (see Table 
10).  
 
Target sentences including the emotion term 
In this experiment, we first expected to replicate the linear trend found in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Contrary to our expectations, there was no difference in the reading 
times of the target sentences between the different versions of the narrative when all 
narratives were taken into account (see Table 10), nor when the same two narratives as in 
the previous chapter were discarded from the analyses (i.e., Love and Interest) nor when 
we considered only the narratives for which the participants totally agreed with the 
intended emotion term (all Fs < 1). 
When including the Interaction and Recall variables in the analysis, no interaction 
effect with the Version of the narrative was found. We then separated the participants 
into a higher empathy group (n = 17, M = .76, SD = .51) and a lower empathy group (n = 
19, M = 2.47, SD = .48) regarding their mean score of reported empathic feeling. When 
running the analysis with this new factor, no additional interaction effect was revealed.  
 
 
TABLE 10. Mean residual reading times (and standard errors) of the experimental sentences in 
the different versions of the narratives in Experiment 3 and in this experiment (Positive residual 
time means slower reading time). 
 Target emotion sentences Subjective Feeling sentences 
Version Experiment 3 This experiment Experiment 3 This experiment 
Optimal 18 (13) 12 (14) -126 (19) -33 (24) 
Suitable -5 (14) 17 (18) -102 (18) -56 (20) 
Moderate -26 (12) 25 (15) -111 (19) -16 (24) 
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Discussion 
 
In this experiment, we tried to directly manipulate the readers’ empathy with the 
context in which the reading experiment took part. We expected that empathy processes 
would be promoted in the group of participants exposed to the social sharing of emotion 
compared to the group of participants asked to perform the reading task together without 
communicating about emotions prior to the task. The measures of reported empathy 
showed that the participants in the interaction condition felt more empathic with their 
paired participants. In this sense, our manipulation seemed to have promoted empathic 
processes among the targeted participants. However, the reported empathy in the 
interaction group, if it was higher than in the no interaction group, was still not maximal 
(i.e., 2.1 on a scale with a maximum of 4). This can be explained by the differences 
between our experimental condition and the natural situations in which people usually 
decide to share some of their feelings. In natural situations, the addressee is generally an 
intimate person with which the communicator decides to share a personal experience 
(Christophe & Rimé, 1997). This was not the case in our experiment: The participants 
were not intimate even if they knew each other given that they followed the same cursus 
of studies. This last fact may also have affected the social sharing of emotion as the 
participants may not have wanted to share an important emotional episode with their 
paired participants. Since the intensity of shared emotional episodes has a direct relation 
with the emotions felt by the listeners (i.e., the more intense they are, the more the 
listeners are likely to be aroused) (Christophe & Rimé, 1997), sharing episodes of low 
intensity may not conduct the promotion of empathic processes. In addition, Collins and 
Miller (1994) reported that the content, either positive or negative of the shared episode 
has an impact on the feelings activated in the listener. When negative events are shared, 
less positive beliefs about the person are activated than when positive events are 
exchanged. In this experiment, given confidentiality issues, no data were collected 
regarding the content of the events described by the participants, hence not allowing us to 
examine more deeply this issue.   
It might be argued that this relative failure to promote empathic processes among 
participants could be an explanation for the lack of differences in emotion processing 
between the groups of participants. An alternative explanation lies in the fact that no 
control was done on the content of the emotional episodes shared between participants in 
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the Interaction condition and transcribed by the participants in the No Interaction 
condition. It seems plausible that some participants shared positive emotional events 
whereas some other participants shared negative emotional events. (Re)activating the 
representations linked to these events may have promoted better comprehension of 
positive or negative emotions presented in the narratives. On a similar note, if emotion 
comprehension via simulation is favored when the readers’ body and subjective states are 
congruent with the emotion in the narratives, then these processes might have been 
impaired for some narratives in this study. In further research, it would be relevant to 
manipulate and control the valence of shared episodes as well as their intensity by 
presenting the participants to a pretend participant (i.e., an accomplice).   
Nevertheless, when relying only on the reported empathy scores without taking 
into account the empathy condition, no additional effect of empathy on reading times of 
emotion sentences was found. These last results suggest that emotion inferences are 
driven quite automatically and that their specificity may not depend on general empathic 
capacities and support previous findings reported in Chapter 3.  
Concerning the specificity of emotion inferences, this experiment failed to 
replicate previous results regarding the pattern of reading times of the target emotion 
sentences. Again, the changes in the experimental conditions may have conducted the 
participants not to process the narratives in the same manner than in Experiments 3 and 4. 
For example, hearing the paired participants going through the narratives (i.e., by hearing 
the button being pressed) may have brought distraction in the experiment. Finally, the 
fact that the null effects reported here result from a lack of statistical power cannot be 
excluded.  
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7. Summary and General Discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the specificity of emotion inferences 
and the different factors that may allow readers to integrate specific emotion labels in 
their representations of the text. The different factors under investigation were related 
either to top-down (i.e., linked to the readers’ characteristics and strategies used during 
reading) or bottom-up processes (i.e., linked to the content of the narratives). In the 
experimental part of this thesis, it was suggested that individual differences play only 
little role in the specificity of emotion inferences. This can be explained by the fact that 
readers do not need to integrate specific emotion representations during reading. 
However, we strongly argue that when the text constrains, or encourages (in term of 
emotion content), specific emotion representations, readers are likely to include specific 
emotion label in their mental models of the text. These results are discussed after the 
presentation of a summary of this thesis’ results.  
 
Summary of findings 
 
In Chapter 3 it was first hypothesized that individual differences such as 
empathy level and working memory capacities may explain the complexity of emotion 
inferences. In addition, it was hypothesized that emotion inferences may be influenced 
by the readers’ involvement in the narratives through simulation and elaboration time 
constraints during reading. To investigate these issues, two experiments were 
conducted, based on the same narratives as in Gygax et al. (2007).  In Experiment 1, the 
participants were asked to read emotional narratives ending with a target sentence 
containing either a matching emotion, a mismatching emotion, a matching behavioral 
information or a mismatching behavioral information. In the first half of the experiment, 
the participants read the narratives in order to comprehend them, without further 
instruction. In the second half of the experiment, the participants were explicitly 
instructed to simulate the narratives, i.e., to imagine themselves in the protagonist’s 
shoes. The readers’ reading span, visuo-spatial span and empathy level were assessed. 
The results of Experiment 1 supported Gygax et al.’s (2007) findings regarding the 
under-specificity of emotion inferences. That is, readers were generally more sensible to 
the mismatch effect linked to behavioral information than that linked to emotion per se. 
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Moreover, little influence of the factors under investigation was found. Namely, only 
visuo-spatial working memory was shown to play a role in emotion inferences when the 
participants were asked to simulate the narratives, by reinforcing the readers’ preference 
for behavioral information compared to emotion per se. In Experiment 2, the same 
materials and measures as in Experiment 1 were used, but the time between the 
sentences was extended in order to allocate more time to process the content of the 
sentences to the participants. With extended time to elaborate, the results did not 
demonstrate any differences in the mismatch effect between behavioral and emotion 
inferences, nor did the readers’ individual characteristics play a role in generating 
inferences. Importantly, if the preference for behavioral information did not occur with 
extended time to elaborate, it was not replaced by the preference for inferences of 
emotion per se, as it was hypothesized.  
Though Experiment 6 was based on different materials (hence its later position 
in the thesis), we further examined the notion of empathy. In Experiment 6, it was 
hypothesized that the empathy trait measured in Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of IRI 
score may not mirror the actual empathy that someone may feel when reading a 
narrative (i.e., it may mirror just a trait). Therefore, Experiment 6 aimed at manipulating 
the participants’ empathy level prior to the reading task, by relying on the concept of the 
social sharing of emotion. Whereas our empathy manipulation seemed to work, at least 
to an extent, its influence during the experiment on the reading times of the emotion 
target sentences was moderate, if not unclear.  
The results of Experiments 1, 2 and 6 therefore suggested that individual 
differences play only little role in inferring emotions and that, when they do, they 
principally reinforce the behavioral representations of emotion inferences. In these 
experiments, it was also suggested that readers quite automatically enter simulation 
when reading and that simulation (or lack of simulation) may not explain the (lack of) 
specificity of emotion inferences (see section Future directions for a possible way to 
further explore simulation processes and their influence on emotion inferences).  
Bottom-up processes were addressed in the second experimental part of this 
thesis (Experiments 3, 4 & 5), which focused on the text characteristics that may 
encourage more elaborate or more specific emotion inferences. The second 
experimental part of the thesis relied on the simulation account of reading 
comprehension and tested the idea that emotional inferences are based on the same 
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components than those at stake during the actual experience of an emotion. In line with 
this idea, it was suggested in Chapter 4 that in order to fully comprehend an emotion 
described in the text (i.e., to include a specific representation of an emotion), readers 
need access to all the components of a given emotion, as defined by Scherer (e.g., 
2005).  
In order to investigate this issue, new experimental narratives were constructed 
based on the semantic field of emotion identified by the GRID (Fontaine et al., 2007, 
Fontaine et al., in press; Scherer, 2005). The emotion information transmitted through 
experimental narratives was manipulated in terms of quantity (i.e., the number of 
emotion components present in the narratives) and quality (i.e., the relevancy of the 
features characterizing these components), resulting in three versions of the narratives 
(i.e., optimal, suitable and moderate). A pilot study in Chapter 5 showed that the new 
narratives actually elicited a high agreement among the readers regarding the intended 
emotion. Very importantly, the agreement (offline task) was constant across the 
different versions of the narratives. In other words, no difference between the different 
versions of the narratives were showed in an offline task, when the participants were 
asked to choose the best matching emotion term corresponding to the narratives. 
Therefore, it was suggested that any differences occurring in a reading task based on the 
new emotional narratives should principally result from online processes. Experiment 3 
showed that when reading the narratives, the participants differed in their reading times 
of the target sentences between the different versions. More specifically, the more the 
narratives contained constraining emotion information (i.e., more emotion components 
defined by typical features constraining to one central emotion), the more readers 
needed time to process the target sentence containing the emotion word, though the 
increase was extremely fine-grained, unlike that found in the habitual match vs. 
mismatch paradigm. According to these results, it was suggested that the difference in 
the reading times of the target sentences between the versions of the narratives mirrored 
different processes at stake when encountering the target sentence. It was proposed that 
when narratives only correspond to an emotion, without truly constraining the 
representation of the protagonist’s emotion, readers map the emotion information 
contained in the target sentence onto their current representations. When narratives 
convey more typical information (hence more salient) as to activate a specific emotion 
representation, readers not only map the incoming information onto their current 
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representations but also integrate the incoming information into their mental 
representations of the text and make a foundation based on it. This integration process is 
reflected in higher reading times.   
This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 4, in which the participants were 
confronted to the same narratives as in Experiment 3, with an added target sentence. 
This additional sentence contained a congruent, possible yet not intended emotion term. 
It was expected that mapping this second target sentence onto the readers’ mental 
representation would be more difficult (i.e., need more time) if readers had elaborated a 
foundation based on a specific emotion word contained in the first target sentence than 
if they had only mapped the first emotion onto their representations. Supporting this 
mapping vs. integration hypothesis, the congruent target sentences were read slower in 
the optimal version compared to the moderate version of the narratives.  
In Experiment 5, the original emotion target sentences (e.g., At the moment, 
Sarah was happy) were replaced by less obvious target sentences (e.g., As she was 
happy, Sarah danced until the end of the night) that were presented in two parts. This 
manipulation aimed at ruling out the possibility that the increase in reading times of the 
target sentences associated to the increase of emotion information in the narratives may 
result from a surprise effect when encountering the target sentences resulting from those 
being too obvious (i.e., Why do they put this target sentence, it is so obvious). 
Experiment 5’s results did not demonstrate any differences between the different 
versions of the narratives in the reading times of the first part of the sentences, those of 
the second part of the sentences, or those of the whole sentences. These null results 
were interpreted as a consequence of the change in the content of the target sentences 
(i.e., the task activating a deductive process focused on the second part of the target 
sentence) that may have conducted the readers to map the incoming information rather 
than integrate it into their representations when reading the optimal version of the 
narratives.   
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Theoretical implications and related issues 
 
Individual differences and the specificity of emotion inferences 
 
The first aim of this study was to shed light on the influence of individual 
characteristics on the specificity of emotion inferences. According to the results found 
in Experiments 1 and 2, it is unlikely that the individual factors investigated in this 
thesis explain the under-specificity of emotion inferences found in previous studies 
(e.g., Gygax and colleagues, 2003, 2004, 2007). In spite of this, some satellite 
explanations might be difficult to rule out. For example, it might be the case that in 
these experiments, the way that the individual factors were assessed did not reveal their 
influence on emotion inferences. Regarding empathy, and as previously explained in 
Chapter 3, if the high- and low- empathy groups were different, their scores still 
corresponded to average or above average scores in the population. This may have lead 
to slight differences in their emotion inferences that did not conduct to visible 
differences in their reading times. In addition, the theoretical overlap between empathy 
and simulation may have altered the influence of empathy per se. Following evidence 
for the tight relation between empathy and simulation (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; 
Goldman, 2005; Preston & de Waal, 2002) and the assumptions that simulation 
processes are automatically involved in reading comprehension, disentangle empathic 
and simulation processes might not be possible in a reading task such as the one used in 
this thesis. In other words, empathy per se, as long as the participants belong to a 
normal population, may not explain the specificity of emotion inferences during 
reading. Consequently, the readers’ identification and sympathy to the protagonist 
might be more relevant factors implied in the complexity of emotion representations 
during reading. Indeed, the readers’ sympathy for the protagonist has been showed to 
play an important role on their representations of a situation. For example, Rapp and 
Gerrig (2002, 2006) showed that when readers experienced sympathy for the 
protagonist they were inclined to adapt their mental representations of the text in order 
to accept a preferred but impossible outcome. General empathy as well as contextual 
empathy may not directly impact on the readers’ identification or sympathy for the 
protagonist, thus not directly influence their mental representations. In essence, the 
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readers’ empathy level might be a too wide concept to directly influence emotion 
representations.  
In a similar fashion, working memory implications in inferring emotions might 
not have been revealed, as we exclusively relied on participants’ reading span (i.e., our 
sample was relatively good). Still, without relying on the reading span, Gernsbacher et 
al. (1998) did not show any disruption in the representations of the protagonist’s 
emotion when the readers were subject to concurrent memory loads. Therefore, as 
emotion inferences seem to be drawn in an automatic manner (to use Gernsbacher et 
al.’s terms), it could be argued that it is not surprising that readers’ memory span did not 
show any influence on the specificity of emotion inferences in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Another explanation for the lack of influence of working memory and empathy, 
already introduced in Chapter 3, may relate to the fact that readers do not actually need 
to integrate a specific emotion word in their mental representations of the text. 
Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a predominant role of behavioral component inference 
in readers’ mental representation of emotional short narratives. Most interestingly, when 
readers’ mental representations of emotion were influenced by simulation, it was not in 
the way that was expected (i.e., in triggering complex emotion inference), but in further 
favoring the behavioral component of emotion. These results strongly confirmed the 
idea first introduced by Gygax et al. (2007) that emotion inferences are best thought of 
in terms of the behavioral components of emotion, which the authors argued to be more 
easily integratable components of emotion inferences.  
Such a principle is grounded in two different yet related concepts. First, readers 
may only construct good enough representations (Sanford & Graesser, 2006), those 
being sufficient for readers to maintain a coherent understanding of the text (locally and 
globally). In essence, readers may not need to elaborate a complex representation of 
emotions. It would probably even be counterproductive to automatically integrate an 
elaborate representation of the main protagonist’s emotion, as any change of emotional 
status (signaled by very simple changes in the protagonists’ behaviors) may involve a 
large amount of cognitive processing. Second, according to the embodied accounts of 
cognition (Barsalou, 1999b), perceptual symbols manipulated during comprehension are 
multimodal and distributed throughout modality-specific systems (i.e., the different 
sensory modalities, proprioception and introspection). Behavioral information may be 
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easily mapped onto different modes of a distributed network of representations (i.e., as 
it is easily shared by verbal as well as perceptual representations).  
In addition to the aforementioned explanation, we also argued that the role of 
individual differences in inferring emotions may not have been revealed in Experiments 
1 and 2 because of the very content of the experimental narratives that did not allow 
readers to reach specific emotion representations. This issue is directly related to the 
way that emotion representations are constructed during reading.   
 
The construction of emotion inferences 
 
In this thesis, it was hypothesized that simulation processes play a central role in 
inferring emotion and that readers base their emotion representations on emotion 
components. According to simulation accounts of reading comprehension, mental 
models (in terms of Phil Johnson-Laird’s account, e.g., 1983) are not only propositional 
but represent rich, lifelike situations: when reading, readers enter a simulation process 
in which they put themselves in the protagonist’s shoes and in some way experience the 
situation described in the text (Barsalou, 1999a; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006). 
This process of simulation has been well documented in the field of emotion 
comprehension and embodiment of language (for a review, see Winkielman, 
Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). Evidence was found at the lexical level (i.e., word 
level) by Niedenthal et al. (2009) who showed that embodied responses (i.e., activation 
of facial muscles characteristics of a given emotion) are elicited when encountering 
emotion words (either concrete or abstract), yet only when the task required simulation 
in a particular modality-specific system (i.e., the somatic system in their experiment). In 
addition to the fact that comprehending emotion words requires simulation, they also 
showed that blocking the activation of the relevant muscles impair the comprehension 
of an emotion word.  
At the sentence level (yet still not at the discourse level), Havas et al. (2007) 
demonstrated similar interference effects when blocking the activation of the relevant 
muscles and the comprehension of emotion sentences as described earlier in this thesis. 
Further demonstration for the language embodiment of emotion was provided by a 
study from Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, and Davidson (2010) in which they 
showed that patients treated with botulinum toxin-A (i.e., a substance that paralyzes 
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muscles) were slower to comprehend anger sentences (which content would require the 
paralyzed muscles for fully comprehension) but were equally fast to comprehend happy 
or sad sentences than non-patients (which content would not require the paralyzed 
muscles).  
In this thesis, indirect evidence for the importance of simulation processes was 
demonstrated at the discourse level. Experiments 3 and 5 provided evidence that when 
reading emotional narratives, readers activate representations of the different real-life 
emotion components in order to construct their emotion representations. This was 
mirrored by faster reading times for the components described by highly typical features 
compared to components described by congruent but not typical features. In this thesis, 
we assumed that readers need the different emotion components (as they would when 
experiencing emotions) to infer a specific emotion and that emotion representations are 
based on those components. Therefore, it is assumed that readers, as long as they do not 
have included all relevant components in their mental representations of the text (either 
based on the text or on inference processes), do not constrain their emotion 
representations to specific ones. Note that if we based our assumptions on constructive 
processes, at the discourse level, one may argue that the components activate specific 
emotions in a more simple lexical-based, resonance mechanism. 
 In this case, rather than reflecting a constructionist process in which readers 
actively integrate information related to the incoming salient components, our results 
may only mirror passive memory activation. Specifically, the resonance process 
corresponds to the passive activation of information stored in long-term memory in 
response to information present in working memory (Gerrig & McKoon, 1998). Myers 
and O’Brien (1998) argue that information entering working memory is not only 
dependent on low-level priming (i.e., related lexical items) but also on the activation of 
text elements, information present in the readers’ mental models and general knowledge 
of the world. When the text offers sufficient supporting context for an inference to be 
drawn, this latter is activated through a passive resonance mechanism.  
Since it was not the purpose of this thesis to disentangle between resonance (i.e., 
passive) and constructionist (i.e., active) processes during reading, no definitive 
conclusion regarding the processes at work when mapping emotion components onto 
the current readers’ representations can be drawn based on this thesis’ results. 
Nevertheless, note that as readers encounter emotion features within different emotion 
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components, a passive activation of all potential related features (within or across 
components) would lead to an enormous cognitive load for readers. This is especially 
true, as most features are also part of many emotions (of course with different typicality 
levels), resulting in additional activations (taken passive activations). In all this seems 
rather unlikely. Empirically, our results, especially those signaling slower reading times 
for more salient target sentences seem to contradict a simple intra-lexical (or intra-
feature) passive activation, which would logically lead to a reverse pattern. We believe 
that although they might be resonance processes, they cannot fully account for our 
results. 
In all, the hypothesis that readers elaborate their emotion representations based 
on emotion components seems to be supported by the results found in this thesis. It was 
further argued that when all these components are accessed, readers reach specific 
emotion representations.  
 
The specificity of emotion inferences 
 
This claim regarding the specificity of emotion inferences follows from 
Experiments 3 and 4 results. In these experiments, readers, when provided with all 
relevant information regarding the protagonist’s emotion were slower to read the target 
sentences containing the emotion label than when they had access to incomplete 
emotion information. The slowdown in reading times of the target sentences when the 
narratives were highly constraining regarding the intended emotion (i.e., optimal 
condition) was interpreted as mirroring an integration process as opposed to the faster 
mapping process that may happen when the narratives were matching the intended 
emotion but not constraining its representation (i.e., moderate condition). This 
hypothesis was further supported by the fact that mapping another matching emotion 
onto the readers’ representations was more difficult in the optimal condition (i.e., highly 
salient) than in the moderate condition. This suggested that a new foundation based on 
the first emotion term had been built when encountering the first emotion term in the 
optimal version of the narratives (by integrating the specific emotion label in readers’ 
representations). In this sense, by integrating the intended emotion into their mental 
representations of the protagonist’s emotion, readers reach specific emotion 
representations. 
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It could be argued however (as in Chapter 5) that this slowdown in the reading 
times of the target emotion sentences related to more relevant information in the 
narratives may mirror a mismatch effect (yet of approximately 20 milliseconds). It is 
possible that readers have a quite large amount of activated emotion terms at the 
beginning of the narratives. When encountering the different emotion components 
throughout the text, readers may diminish the amount of relevant emotion labels and 
keep only emotion terms relevant to these components. When reaching the end of the 
narratives, readers may have restrained the amount of possible emotion alternatives. As 
more emotion information was given to them in the optimal version than in the 
moderate version of the narratives, the resulting amount of relevant emotions may be 
relatively small in the optimal version and larger in the moderate version. When 
encountering the emotion term in the target sentences in the optimal version, the pre-
activated relevant emotion terms may be different from the emotion term contained in 
the sentence, leading to a mismatch effect reflected in slower reading times. In the 
moderate version of the narratives, such a mismatch effect is unlikely given that more 
emotion terms are activated. If this last explanation offers another way to consider this 
thesis’s results, it nonetheless also supports the assumption that readers are able to reach 
specific emotion representations by restraining the amount of emotion terms relevant to 
a given narrative.  
 In summary, the findings presented in this thesis support the fact that when 
readers have access to the different components of emotion, they may elaborate a 
representations of the protagonist’s emotion based on these components and draw 
specific emotion inferences. 
 
Future directions 
 
Appraisal of emotion 
 
In this thesis, it was proposed that readers construct their mental representations 
of the protagonist’s emotion by simulating this emotion. It was also suggested that, via 
this simulation process, readers infer the different emotion components in order to reach 
a complex emotion representation. If this thesis focused on the quantity and quality of 
information linked to the different emotion components included in the narratives, no 
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specific attention was dedicated to the appraisal process of emotion. Indeed, 
componential theories of emotion not only define the different components to be 
activated during the experience of a given emotion but also state that emotions are 
elicited and differentiated by the subjective interpretation of the personal significance of 
events (Scherer & Ellsworth, 2003, p.45). In this view, the appraisal of the event 
triggering an emotion is central not only to the activation of different components, but 
also of the temporal sequence of the activation of these components. Researchers on 
emotion have proposed different assumptions regarding this temporal sequence, being 
seen either as partially (Ellsworth, 1991) or completely fixed (Scherer, 1984). Scherer’s 
model (1984, 1999) actually postulates that appraisal is composed of different stimulus 
evaluation checks according to the following sequence: Novelty, Object Pleasantness, 
Goal Conduciveness, Coping Potential and Compatibility with Standards.  
Scherer (1999) showed indirect evidence for a fixed sequential appraisal 
process. He presented participants with emotional episodes described either according 
to his predicted temporal sequence or to a random sequence and asked them to 
recognize as fast and as accurately as possible the emotion pictured in the description. 
The results showed that, when the sequence of events was in the predicted order, 
participants were faster and more accurate in their decisions. This supports the fact that 
not only the different components of emotion but also the way (i.e., the order) these 
components are related to the different appraisal checks are of prime importance in the 
construction of emotion representations. In order to complement this thesis’ results 
regarding the importance of emotion components in the process of emotion inferences 
when reading narratives, it is relevant to adapt Scherer’s (1999) study into a reading 
paradigm and investigate the influence of appraisal sequence on the online construction 
of the representation of emotions.  
Depending on the appraisal sequence described in the emotional narratives, 
readers may have more or less facility to infer a specific emotion. In order to investigate 
this issue, the sequence of components, as defined by Scherer’s evaluation checks, 
could be manipulated in addition to manipulating the emotion components as done in 
this thesis. Sentences composing the narratives could be presented either according to 
Scherer’s predicted sequence or in a random order, prior to the congruent target 
sentence containing the intended emotion. As in this thesis, the congruency of the target 
sentence (i.e., highly vs. moderately congruent) would be defined according to the 
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preceding context. Essentially, and according to Scherer’s (1999) suggestion, the 
predicted sequence should constitute the highly congruent condition whereas the 
random order sequence the moderate condition. Based on this thesis’ results showing a 
slowdown in reading times of the target emotion sentence following a highly relevant 
context, and based on Scherer’s (1999) suggestion, it may be expected that target 
sentences following a narrative containing the predicted appraisal sequence would be 
read slower that target sentences following a narrative containing a random appraisal 
sequence, implying an integrative process onto readers’ mental models.  
If, as expected, controlling for the appraisal order enhances the emotion 
relevancy of the narratives, the specificity of emotion representations inferred based on 
these narratives should be maximal. Simulation processes implied in text 
comprehension may therefore be highly favored by the relevancy of the emotional 
narratives, leading to potentially more vivid reactivations of the perceptual symbols 
linked to the emotion concepts conveyed in the narratives. In this case, the link between 
feeling emotions and representing them may be further investigated.  
 
Internalization of the protagonist’s emotion 
 
Comprehending an emotion or accessing knowledge about an emotion requires 
at least a partial simulation of sensory, motor and introspective states associated to this 
emotion (Barsalou, 1999a; Niedenthal et al., 2009). There is evidence for the fact that 
people experience congruent emotional states in response to other’s emotions (for a 
review, see Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). However, 
very little is known about the extent to which readers actually feel the protagonist’s 
emotion when reading (although the question is raised in most papers on emotion 
inferences). Still, there are studies on this issue, yet no consensus has been reached. For 
example, Komeda et al. (2008) showed that readers do not evaluate the main 
protagonist’s emotional status in terms of their own emotions during reading. However, 
Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, and Taylor (2011), demonstrated that readers, when directly 
addressed as the subject of a sentence (You) developed congruent emotion states to 
those of the protagonist, reflected in changes in their evaluation of affective valence and 
arousal.  
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Unfortunately, these experiments assessed readers’ emotions only via offline 
introspective measures (i.e., questionnaires and self-reports), preventing any solid 
conclusions as to the actual processes at stake. Only direct and non-introspective 
measures, such as psychophysiological affective reactions, may provide us with 
adequate data on the actual simulation processes at work when building a representation 
of emotions when reading narratives. These data could finally address appropriately the 
simulation issue raised by many in the text comprehension literature.  
This issue can be explored using physiological measures such as facial 
electromyography (EMG) to access potential simulation processes. Facial EMG is 
widely used in measuring emotion response through the activation of facial muscles, 
which are markers of changing emotional state, as they allow us to access covert 
muscular activation (i.e., not reflected into visible changes on the face). The facial EMG 
responses mostly distinguish the valence and the intensity of emotional reactions 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). In addition, specific patterns of activation can differentiate 
between some emotions: activity over the corrugator supercilii is typical of anger-
related stimuli and activity over the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi is associated 
to joy-related stimuli (Dimberg & Karlsson, 1997). Disgust, in addition to the same 
pattern of activation than anger-related emotions, provokes a reaction in levator labii 
superioris (Vrana, 1993). For this reason, assessing the internalization of the 
protagonist’s emotion should focus on narratives about the subset of emotions that have 
the clearest patterns (as regard to the literature) in terms of facial muscles (i.e., joy-
related, anger-related and disgust).   
In a study on the internalization of the protagonist’s emotion, the link between 
the protagonist’s emotional status and possible emotional experiences felt by readers 
would be investigated. If readers internalize main protagonists’ emotions during 
reading, greater specific activation of the muscles related to the described emotional 
term when reading the target sentence in the complete version of the narratives than in 
the incomplete version could be expected. More specifically, the corrugator region 
should show greater activity when the participants are confronted to anger and disgust 
compared to happiness or neutral narratives. The zygomaticus and orbicularis regions 
should reveal a greater activity during the reading of happiness narratives whereas the 
levator muscle should be more activated during the reading of disgust narratives 
compared to anger, happiness or neutral narratives (Niedenthal et al., 2009). All these 
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activations should be enhanced in the complete version of the narratives compared to 
the incomplete version.  
In addition, the simulation process should increase during the reading of the 
narratives as additional components are made accessible to the readers and allow them 
to elaborate a rich emotion representation. Following this hypothesis, the muscle 
activity mirroring the simulation process should get enhanced throughout each 
narrative, in a greater way for the complete than the incomplete narratives.  
As demonstrated by Brunyé et al. (2011), deeper simulation processes happen 
when reading second-person narratives. This issue could be addressed by using 
narratives written with a second-person pronoun (You) in order to directly address the 
reader and lead to more vivid reading experience and deeper simulation. Direct 
comparison with narratives written with a third-person pronoun (He/She) would allow 
determining which conditions are necessary for extensive (or optimal) simulation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the present thesis, we investigated the influence of top-down (i.e., individual 
differences and reading strategies) as well as bottom-up processes (i.e., the content of 
the text in terms of emotion components) on the specificity of emotion inferences. We 
strongly argue that readers construct emotion inferences during reading by relying on 
core components of emotion (conveyed by the text or inferred during reading) in order 
to elaborate a foundation on which specific emotion representations can be built. The 
experiments presented in this thesis supported this argument and demonstrated that 
elaborating emotion inferences in a constructive manner does not necessarily depend on 
readers’ characteristics yet reflect simulation processes related to emotion 
comprehension. Importantly, this thesis claims that the core components implied in 
emotion inferences correspond to the emotion components described in the 
componential theory of emotion (e.g., Scherer, 1984) and that when these components 
are made available to readers, complex emotion representations can be reached.  
Finally, the results presented in this thesis suggest that previous studies using the 
match vs. mismatch paradigm might have failed to assess the specific emotion 
integration process during reading and that combining emotion and text comprehension 
research offers new insights on the elaboration and specificity of emotion inferences.  
 	   147 
References 
 
Anderson, A., Garrod, S. C., & Sanford, A. J. (1983). The accessibility of pronominal 
antecedents as a function of episode shifts in narrative text. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 35A, 427-440. doi: 10.1080/14640748308402480 
Baddeley, A. (1996). Exploring the central executive. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 49A, 5–18. doi:10.1080/027249896392784 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a 
theory of mind? Cognition, 21, 37–46. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999a). Language comprehension: Archival memory or preparation 
for situated action? Discourse Processes, 28, 61–80. 
doi:10.1080/01638539909545069  
Barsalou, L. W. (1999b). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 22, 
577–660. doi:10.1017/S0140525X99002149 
Barsalou, L. W., Niedenthal, P. M., Barbey, A. K., & Ruppert, J. A. (2003). Social 
embodiment. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation. 
Advances in research and theory (Vol. 43, pp. 43–92). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press.  
Borghi, A. M., Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2004). Putting words in perspective. 
Memory and Cognition, 32, 863–873. doi:10.3758/BF03196865 
Brunyé, T. T., Ditman, T., Mahoney, C. R., & Taylor, H. A. (2011). Better you than I: 
Perspectives and emotion simulation during narrative comprehension. Journal of 
Cognitive Psychology, 23, 659–666. doi:10.1080/20445911.2011.559160 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1981). Electromyograms as measures of extent and 
affectivity of information processing. American Psychologist, 36, 441–456. 
doi:10.1037//0003-066X.36.5.441 
Christophe, V., & Rimé, B. (1997). Exposure to the social sharing of emotion: 
Emotional impact, listener responses and secondary social sharing. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 37–54. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0992(199701)27:1<37::AID-EJSP806>3.3.CO;2-T 
Cohen, J., MacWhinney, B., Flatt, M., & Provost, J. (1993). PsyScope: An interactive 
graphical system for designing and controlling experiments in the psychology 
laboratory using Macintosh computers. Behavior Research Methods, 
  
	  148 
Instruments and Computers, 25, 257–271. doi:10.3758/BF03204507 
Collins, N. L., & Miller, L. C. (1994). Self-disclosure and liking: a meta-analytic review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 116, 457–475. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.116.3.457 
Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory 
and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 450–66. 
doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(80)90312-6 
Davidson, R. J. (2003). Seven sins in the study of emotion: Correctives from affective 
neuroscience. Brain and Cognition, 52, 129–132. doi:10.1016/S0278-
2626(03)00015-0 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85. 
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 
113–126. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113 
de Vega, M., Diaz, J. M., & Leon, I. (1997). To know or not to know: Comprehending 
protagonists’ beliefs and their emotional consequences. Discourse Processes, 23, 
169–92. doi:10.1080/01638537709544988 
de Vega, M., Leon, I., & Diaz, J. M. (1996). The representation of changing emotions in 
reading comprehension. Cognition and Emotion, 10, 303–322. 
Decety, J., & Grèzes, J. (2006). The power of simulation: Imagining one’s own and 
other’s behavior. Brain Research, 1079, 4–14. 
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115 
Delaloye, C., Ludwig, C., Borella, E., Chicherio, C., & de Ribaupierre, A. (2008). The 
Reading Span as a measure of working memory capacity: Norms based on a 
French speaking population of 775 younger and older adults. Revue européenne 
de psychologie appliquée, 58, 89–103. doi:10.1016/j.erap.2006.12.004 
Dijkstra, K., Zwaan, R. A., Graesser, A. C., & Magliano, J. P. (1994). Character and 
reader emotions in literary texts. Poetics, 23, 139–157. doi:10.1016/0304-
422X(94)00009-U 
Dimberg, U., & Karlsson, B. (1997). Facial reactions to different emotionally relevant 
stimuli. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38, 297–303. doi:10.1111/1467-
9450.00039 
Ditman, T., Brunyé, T. T., Mahoney, C. R., & Taylor, H. A. (2010). Simulating an 
  
	  149 
enactment effect: Pronouns guide action simulation during narrative 
comprehension. Cognition, 115, 172–178. doi:0.1016/j.cognition.2009.10.014 
Ekman, P. (1977). Biological and cultural contributions to body and facial movement. 
In J. Blacking (Ed.), The anthropology of the body (pp. 34–84). London: 
Academic Press. 
Ellsworth, P. C. (1991). Some implications of cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. 
In K. T. Strongman (Ed.), International review of studies on emotion (pp. 143–
161). New York: Wiley. 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2003). Appraisal processes in emotion. In R. J. 
Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective 
sciences (pp. 572–595). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Eriksen, C. W., & Schultz, D. W. (1979). Information processing in visual search: A 
continuous flow conception and experimental results. Perceptual Psychophysics, 
25, 249–263. doi:10.3758/BF03198804 
Estevez, A., & Calvo, M. G. (2000). Working memory capacity and time course of 
predictive inferences. Memory, 8, 51–61. doi:10.1080/096582100387704 
Ferreira, F., Bailey, K. G. D., & Ferraro, V. (2002). Good-enough representations in 
language comprehension. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 11–
15. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00158 
Fincher-Kiefer, R. (2001). Perceptual components of situation models. Memory and 
Cognition, 29, 336–343. doi:10.3758/BF03194928 
Fincher-Kiefer, R., & DʼAgostino, P. R. (2004). The role of visuospatial resources in 
generating predictive and bridging inferences. Discourse Processes, 37, 205–
224. doi:10.1207/s15326950dp3703_2 
Fischer, M. H., & Zwaan, R. A. (2008). Embodied language: A review of the role of the 
motor system in language comprehension. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 61, 825–850. doi:10.1080/17470210701623605 
Fontaine, J. R., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. (2007). The world of 
emotion is not two-dimensional. Psychological Science, 18, 1050–1057. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02024.x 
Fontaine, J., Scherer, K. R., & Soriano, C. (Eds.). (in press). Components of emotional 
meaning: A sourcebook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
	  150 
Frijda, N. H. (2005). Emotion experience. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 473–497. 
doi:10.1080/02699930441000346 
Garnham, A. (1992). Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories 
of inference during reading. Psycoloquy, 3. 
Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. V. (1996). The mental models theory of language 
comprehension. In B. K. Britton & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Models of 
understanding text (pp. 313–339). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Garrod, S., & Sanford, A. J. (1985). On the real-time character of interpretation during 
reading. Language and Cognitive Processes, 1, 43-59. doi : 
10.1080/01690968508402070 
Gernsbacher, M. A. (1997). Two decades of structure building. Discourse Processes, 23, 
265–304. doi:10.1080/01638539709544994 
Gernsbacher, M. A., Goldsmith, H. H., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1992). Do readers 
mentally represent characters’ emotional states? Cognition and Emotion, 6, 89–
111. doi:10.1080/02699939208411061 
Gernsbacher, M. A., Hallada, B. M., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1998). How automatically 
do readers infer fictional characters’ emotional states? Scientific Studies of 
Reading, 2, 271–300. doi:10.1207/s1532799xssr0203_5 
Gernsbacher, M. A., & Robertson, R. R. . (1992). Knowledge activation versus sentence 
mapping when representing fictional characters’ emotional states. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 7, 353–371. doi:10.1080/01690969208409391 
Gernsbacher, M. A., Robertson, R. R. W., Palladino, P., & Werner, N. K. (2004). 
Managing mental representations during narrative comprehension. Discourse 
Processes, 37, 145–164. doi:10.1207/s15326950dp3702_4 
Gerrig, R. J., & McKoon, G. (1998). The readiness is all: The functionality of memory-
based text processing. Discourse Processes, 26, 67–86. 
doi:10.1080/01638539809545039 
Gillioz, C., & Gygax, P. M. (2012). Going beyond the simple match-mismatch effect: A 
study on emotion inferences and their underlying construct. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
Gillioz, C., Gygax, P. M., & Tapiero, I. (2012). Individual differences and emotion 
inferences during reading comprehension. The Canadian Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 66, 239-250 
  
	  151 
Glenberg, A. (1999). Why mental models must be embodied. In G. Rickheit & C. Habel 
(Eds.), Mental models in discourse processing and reasoning. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Glenberg, A. M. (2007). Language and action: Creating sensible combinations of ideas. 
In M. G. Gaskell (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 361–370). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Glenberg, A. M. (2011). How reading comprehension is embodied and why that matters. 
International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education, 4, 5–18. 
Glenberg, A. M., Havas, D., Becker, R., & Rinck, M. (2005). Grounding language in 
bodily states: The case for emotion. In R. A. Zwaan & D. Pecher (Eds.), The 
grounding of cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, 
and thinking (pp. 115–128). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9, 558–565. doi:10.3758/BF03196313 
Glenberg, A. M., Meyer, M., & Lindem, K. (1987). Mental models contribute to 
foregrounding during text comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 
26, 69–83. doi:10.1016/0749-596X(87)90063-5 
Goldie, P. (1999). How we think of others’ emotions. Mind & Language, 14, 394–423. 
doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00118 
Goldman, A. I. (2001). Desire, intention, and the simulation theory. In B. F. Malle, L. J. 
Moses, & Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social 
cognition (pp. 207–225). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Goldman, A. I. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In J. Dokic & J. Proust 
(Eds.), Simulation and knowledge of action. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Goldman, A. I. (2005). Imitation, mind reading, and simulation. In S. Hurley & N. 
Chater (Eds.), Perspective on imitation, from neuroscience to social science 
(Vol. Vol. 2, pp. 79–93). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Graesser, A. C., Millis, K. K., & Zwaan, R. A. (1997). Discourse comprehension. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 163–189. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.48.1.163 
Graesser, A. C., Singer, M., & Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences during 
narrative text comprehension. Psychological Review, 101, 371–371. 
  
	  152 
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.101.3.371 
Gygax, P. M. (2010). L’inférence émotionnelle durant la lecture et sa composante 
comportementale. [Emotion inference during reading and its behavioral 
component]. L’Année psychologique, 110, 253–273. 
Gygax, P. M., Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. (2004). Inferring characters’ emotional states: 
Can readers infer specific emotions? Language and Cognitive Processes, 19, 
613–638. doi:10.1080/01690960444000016 
Gygax, P. M., Oakhill, J., & Garnham, A. (2003). The representation of characters’ 
emotional responses: Do readers infer specific emotions? Cognition and 
Emotion, 17, 413–428. doi:10.1080/02699930244000048 
Gygax, P., & Tapiero, I. (2003). Divide and conquer: A study of the semantic structure 
of emotional inferences in reading comprehension. Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of Swiss Psychology, Bern, Switzerland. 
Gygax, P., Tapiero, I., & Carruzzo, E. (2007). Emotion inferences during reading 
comprehension  : What evidence can the self-pace reading paradigm provide? 
Discourse Processes, 44, 33–50. doi:10.1080/01638530701285564 
Hansen, S. (2011). Inhibitory control and empathy-related personality traits: Sex-linked 
associations. Brain and Cognition, 76, 364–368. 
doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2011.04.004 
Hauk, O., Johnsrude, I., & Pulvermüller, F. (2004). Somatotopic representation of 
action words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron, 41, 301–307. 
doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00838-9 
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., Gutowski, K. A., Lucarelli, M. J., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2010). Cosmetic use of botulinum toxin-A affects processing of emotional 
language. Psychological Science, 21, 895–900. doi:10.1177/0956797610374742 
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., & Rinck, M. (2007). Emotion simulation during 
language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 436–441. 
doi:10.3758/BF03194085 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1992). A capacity theory of comprehension: Individual 
differences in working memory. Psychological Review, 99, 122–149. 
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.99.1.122 
Kessels, R. P. C., van Zandvoort, M. J. E., Postma, A., Kappelle, L. J., & de Haan, E. H. 
  
	  153 
F. (2000). The Corsi block-tapping task: Standardization and normative data. 
Applied Neuropsychology, 7, 252–258. doi:10.1207/S15324826AN0704_8 
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A 
construction-integration model. Psychological Review, 95(2), 163–182. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.95.2.163 
Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and 
production. Psychological Review, 85, 363–394. doi:10.1037//0033-
295X.85.5.363 
Kneepkens, E. W. E. M., & Zwaan, R. A. (1994). Emotions and literary text 
comprehension. Poetics, 23, 125–138. doi:10.1016/0304-422X(94)00021-W 
Komeda, H., & Kusumi, T. (2006). The effect of a protagonist’s emotional shift on 
situation model construction. Memory and Cognition, 34, 1548–1556. 
doi:10.3758/BF03195918 
Mar, R. A. (2004). The neuropsychology of narrative: story comprehension, story 
production and their interrelation. Neuropsychologia, 42, 1414–1434. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.12.016 
Masson, M. E., & Miller, J. A. (1983). Working memory and individual differences in 
comprehension and memory of text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 
314–318. doi:10.1037//0022-0663.75.2.314 
McKoon, G., & Ratcliff, R. (1986). Inferences about predictable events. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 82–91. 
doi:10.1037//0278-7393.12.1.82 
McKoon, G., & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inference during reading. Psychological Review, 99, 
440–466. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.99.3.440 
Meneghetti, C., Gyselinck, V., Pazzaglia, F., & De Beni, R. (2009). Individual 
differences in spatial text processing: High spatial ability can compensate for 
spatial working memory interference. Learning and Individual Differences, 19, 
577–589. doi:0.1016/j.lindif.2009.07.007 
Miall, D. S. (1988). Affect and narrative: A model of response to stories. Poetics, 17, 
259–272. 
Molinari, C., Burin, D., Saux, G., Barreyro, J. P., Irrazabal, N., Bechis, M. S., Duarte, 
A., et al. (2009). Fictional characters’ emotional state representation: What is its 
degree of specificity? Psicothema, 21, 9–14. 
  
	  154 
Molinari Marotto, C., Barreyro, J. P., Cevasco, J., & van den Broek, P. (2011). 
Generation of emotional inferences during text comprehension: Behavioral data 
and implementation through the Landscape Model. Escritos de Psicología, 4, 9–
17. doi:10.5231/psy.writ.2011.1803 
Mouilso, E., Glenberg, A. M., & Havas, D. (2007). Differences in action tendencies 
distinguish anger and sadness after comprehension of emotional sentences. In D. 
S. McNamara & J. G. Trafton (Eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1325–1330). Austin, TX: 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Myers, J. L., & O’Brien, E. J. (1998). Accessing the discourse representation during 
reading. Discourse Processes, 26, 131–157. doi:10.1080/01638539809545042 
Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. 
(2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Personality & 
Social Psychology Review, 9, 184–211. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0903_1 
Niedenthal, P. M., Winkielman, P., Mondillon, L., & Vermeulen, N. (2009). 
Embodiment of emotion concepts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
96, 1120–1136. doi:10.1037/a0015574 
Oakhill, J., Yuill, N., & Garnham, A. (2011). The differential relations between verbal, 
numerical and spatial working memory abilities and children’s reading 
comprehension. International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education, 4, 
83–106. 
Oatley, K. (1994). A taxonomy of the emotions of literary response and a theory of 
identification in fictional narrative. Poetics, 23, 53–74. doi:10.1016/0304-
422X(94)P4296-S 
Oatley, K. (1999). Why fiction may be twice as true as fact: Fiction as cognitive and 
emotional simulation. Review of General Psychology, 3, 101–117. 
doi:10.1037//1089-2680.3.2.101 
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975). Cross-cultural universals in 
affective meaning. Urbana: Universitiy of Illinois Press. 
Potts, G. R., Keenan, J. M., & Golding, J. M. (1988). Assessing the occurrence of 
elaborative inferences: lexical decision versus naming. Journal of Memory and 
  
	  155 
Language, 27, 399–415. doi:10.1016/0749-596X(88)90064-2 
Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 1–72. doi:10.1017/S0140525X02000018 
Pulos, S., Elison, J., & Lennon, R. (2004). The hierarchical structure of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Social Behavior and Personality, 32, 355–359. 
doi:10.2224/sbp.2004.32.4.355 
Rapp, D. N., & Gerrig, R. J. (2002). Readers’ reality-driven and plot-driven analyses in 
narrative comprehension. Memory and Cognition, 30, 779–788. 
doi:10.3758/BF03196433 
Rapp, D. N., & Gerrig, R. J. (2006). Predilections for narrative outcomes: The impact of 
story contexts and reader preferences. Journal of Memory and Language, 54, 
54–67. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.04.003 
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of 
research. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 372–422. doi:10.1037//0033-
2909.124.3.372 
Rimé, B. (1989). Le partage social des émotions. In B. Rimé & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), 
Textes de bases en psychologie: Les émotions (pp. 271–303). Lausanne: 
Delachaux et Niestlé. 
Rimé, B. (2005). Le partage social des émotions [The social sharing of emotion]. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39, 1161–1178. doi:10.1037/h0077714 
Sanford, A. J., & Graesser, A. C. (2006). Shallow processing and underspecification. 
Discourse Processes, 42, 99–108. doi:10.1207/s15326950dp4202_1 
Scherer, K. R. (1982). Emotion as a process: Function, origin and regulation. Social 
Science Information, 21, 555–570. doi:10.1177/053901882021004004 
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process 
approach. In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to Emotion (pp. 
293–317). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Scherer, K. R. (1999). On the sequential nature of appraisal processes: Indirect evidence 
from a recognition task. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 763–793. 
doi:10.1080/026999399379078 
Scherer, K. R. (2000). Psychological models of emotion. In J. Borod (Ed.), The 
  
	  156 
neuropsychology of emotion (pp. 137–162). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scherer, K. R. (2005). What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social 
Science Information, 44, 695–729. doi:10.1177/0539018405058216 
Scherer, K. R., & Wallbott, H. G. (1994). Evidence for universality and cultural 
variation of differential emotion response patterning. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 66, 310–328. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.66.2.310 
Scherer, K. R., Wallbott, H. G., & Summerfield, A. B. (1996). Experiencing emotion: A 
cross-cultural study. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.  
Schmalhofer, F., & Glavanov, D. (1986). Three components of understanding a 
programmer’s manual: Verbatim, propositional, and situational representations. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 279–294. doi:10.1016/0749-
596X(86)90002-1 
Singer, M., Andruslak, P., Reisdorf, P., & Black, N. L. (1992). Individual differences in 
bridging inference processes. Memory and Cognition, 20, 539–548. 
doi:10.3758/BF03199586 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating conditions of 
the human smile: a nonobtrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 768–777. doi:10.1037//0022-
3514.54.5.768 
Tan, S. (1994). Film-induced affect as a witness emotion. Poetics, 23, 7–32. 
doi:10.1016/0304-422X(94)00024-Z 
Trueswell, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., & Garnsey, S. M. (1994). Semantic influence on 
syntactic processing: Use of thematic information in syntactic disambiguation. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 33, 265–312. 
van den Broek, P., Young, M., Tzeng, Y., & Linderholm, T. (1999). The landscape 
model of reading: Inferences and the one-line construction of memory 
representation. In H. van Oostendorp & S. R. Goldman (Eds.), The construction 
of mental representation during reading. (pp. 71–98). Mawhah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
van Dijk, T. A., & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Vermeulen, N., Corneille, O., & Niedenthal, P. M. (2008). Sensory load incurs 
conceptual processing costs. Cognition, 109(2), 287–294. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.09.004 
  
	  157 
Vrana, S. R. (1993). The psychophysiology of disgust: differentiating negative 
emotional contexts with facial EMG. Psychophysiology, 30, 279–286. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1993.tb03354.x 
Ward, J. H. (1963). Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective function. Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 58, 236–244. doi:10.2307/2282967 
Winkielman, P., Niedenthal, P., & Oberman, L. (2008). The embodied emotional mind. 
In G. R. Semin & E. R. Smith (Eds.), Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive 
affective and neuroscientific approaches (pp. 263–288). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zwaan, R. A. (1999a). Embodied cognition, perceptual symbols, and situation models. 
Discourse Processes, 28, 81–88. doi:10.1080/01638539909545070 
Zwaan, R. A. (1999b). Situation models: The mental leap into imagined worlds. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 15–18. doi:10.1111/1467-
8721.00004 
Zwaan, R. A. (2004). The immersed experiencer: Toward an embodied theory of 
language comprehension. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and 
motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. Vol. 44, pp. 35–62). New 
York, NY: Academic Press. 
Zwaan, R. A., Magliano, J. P., & Graesser, A. C. (1995). Dimensions of situation model 
construction in narrative comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 21, 386–397. doi:10.1037//0278-
7393.21.2.386 
Zwaan, R. A., & Rapp, D. N. (2006). Discourse comprehension. In M. J. Traxler & M. 
A. Gernsbacher (Eds.), Handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 725–764). San Diego, 
CA: Elsevier. 
Zwaan, R. A., Stanfield, R. A., & Yaxley, R. H. (2002). Language comprehenders 
mentally represent the shapes of objects. Psychological Science, 13, 168–171. 
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00430 
Zwaan, R. A., & Taylor, L. J. (2006). Seeing, acting, understanding: Motor resonance in 
language comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 
1–11. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.135.1.1 
 
